Emergency medicine

An integrated approach that includes a central role for pathology laboratories is necessary Mass casualty events (MCEs) are defined as events or other circumstances “where the normal major incident response of one or several health organisations must be augmented by extraordinary measures to maintain an efficient, suitable and sustainable response”.1 Haemorrhage is a leading cause of mortality in MCEs, accounting for almost 50% of deaths in the first 24 hours,2,3 and transfusion emergency preparedness is increasingly recognised as a critical element of an integrated approach to MCEs,4 with timely availability and appropriate delivery of blood components being an essential part of management. On 20 January 2017, an MCE occurred in Melbourne, Victoria, when a car struck pedestrians in the Bourke Street Mall in the central business district, killing six people and injuring more than 30. The injured were taken to various adult and paediatric hospitals around Melbourne, including designated trauma centres and non‐trauma hospitals, both public and private. A Code Brown was activated at some of these hospitals. This is a hospital alert activated internally when notification of an external incident is received, usually by emergency services or health departments, which requires mobilisation of additional capability and capacity within that facility to receive an influx of patients.5 In Victoria, the users of blood products, including public and private hospitals and pathology laboratories, are represented by the Victorian Blood User Group. The Blood User Group meets quarterly with Australian Red Cross Lifeblood (previously Australian Red Cross Blood Service) to discuss issues relevant to the use and supply of blood products. In February 2017, Blood User Group members highlighted concerns with communication during the Bourke Street incident. Poor communication from hospitals to their pathology laboratories was noted during activation of hospital Code Brown alerts. There was also uncertainty and lack of transparency surrounding supply of blood components from Lifeblood to hospitals in Victoria, not only to those involved in the incident but also those awaiting delivery of routine blood inventory. In response to these concerns, the Blood User Group held a forum in August 2017 to discuss these issues and to make recommendations to assist planning for future incidents. Blood User Group representatives and invited guests, including National Blood Authority representatives, heard presentations from the Victorian Department of Health and Human Services, Lifeblood and four hospitals that received patients, outlining issues and learnings from the incident, followed by further discussion. A summary of recommendations was circulated to forum attendees. This article highlights issues and recommendations pertinent to hospitals and associated pathology laboratories, in particular their haematology and transfusion laboratories. Recommendations Pathology staff must form part of hospital critical incident management teams In some hospitals, the associated pathology laboratory is not part of the critical incident management team, and when these hospitals were notified of the Bourke Street MCE by emergency services, this was only communicated to the pathology laboratory via public address systems or other informal means. Updates received by hospitals from emergency services throughout the event were similarly not always communicated in a planned way. Key pathology representatives in some hospitals also attended their emergency departments in person, which was invaluable for communication but occurred on an ad hoc basis rather than being part of a documented protocol. Without streamlined communication, pathology representatives can often only respond to blood component requests and transfusion specimens when they arrive, leading to potential delays in blood product provision. As transfusion support remains a core component of management in MCEs, a key recommendation is that pathology staff must form part of any hospital's critical incident management team. This should be documented in the critical incident protocol, and involves active pathology staff participation during critical incidents. Further formalised pathology roles, such as physical attendance at critical sites in the hospital (eg, emergency department) to streamline communication with the laboratory, are also encouraged. This ensures that pathology services receive adequate notification of critical events, and enables direct involvement in ongoing management of the incident in a systematic way with clear lines of communication. It also allows pre‐emptive action such as pre‐thawing of clinical plasma, and review and management of current inventory including appropriate use of emergency blood components. Implement safe, non‐sequential allocation of unit record numbers for consecutive emergency patients One hazard noted at the forum was a lack of specific labelling protocols for identifying patients presenting to some emergency departments, resulting in potentially dangerous patient identifiers being used; for example, consecutive unit record numbers for consecutive patients, or the same prefix on all patients. This may facilitate clerical errors and patient misidentification. It is recommended that institutions ensure that allocation of unit record numbers for consecutive unknown patients is performed in a safe way, which minimises the risk of patient misidentification. Ensure adequate levels of pathology staff familiar with critical event management Staffing levels were an issue at some sites during the Bourke Street MCE, owing to senior staff being on leave. Similarly, when critical incidents occur after‐hours, staffing is often limited and senior personnel may not be on site, resulting in less experienced staff enacting their critical incident management plans. Extra staff may be required and there may be difficulty of access to workplaces if the incident results in road closures. Working during the incident can be physically and emotionally tiring, and replacement staff will be required after the event.4,6 Therefore, it is recommended that all staff, irrespective of experience, should be familiar with their local critical incident management plan, and that consideration be given to how staffing levels are managed during and after a critical incident. Include pathology staff in practice disaster scenarios All hospitals should practise responses to disaster scenarios and involve pathology representatives. During the Bourke Street event, hospitals other than the major trauma centres received multiple casualties. “Walking wounded” may also present at nearby hospitals, irrespective of whether these have emergency departments. Performing practice scenarios is therefore important to familiarise staff with their critical incident plans. Limitations of these scenarios are recognised, as they often do not encompass the practical issues faced by pathology teams, such as time taken to run multiple pathology samples, perform multiple crossmatches and accept into inventory large numbers of blood products. Despite these limitations, it is recommended that hospitals perform practice disaster scenarios and involve pathology staff to highlight areas of potential weakness. Consider standby phase in Code Brown responses One hospital activated their Standby Code Brown during the Bourke Street MCE, when it was first notified by emergency services of the possible arrival of casualties, but before patient numbers or severity of injuries were known. This standby phase alerted the critical response areas of the hospital, including the emergency department and pathology services, to an external incident, allowing review of department response plans such as staffing levels and blood product inventory without activating a full Code Brown response. The standby code remained in place until the hospital was advised of further details of presenting patients. It is recommended that hospitals incorporate such a standby phase in their emergency response plan. This alerts relevant departments to plan and prepare for escalation of an event when a critical incident is first notified to the hospital, but before further details are known or casualties have presented, without activating the full series of Code Brown activities which can be disruptive. Discussion Effective communication during MCEs is critical. It is common for many more blood components to be requested than are eventually transfused, and the overall requirement for products in these events is often lower than expected.7,8 Most blood use in MCEs occurs within the first 24 hours, particularly in the first 4 hours as the majority of severe casualties arrive within this time frame.2,7 Therefore, the key to managing these chaotic and rapidly evolving events is early, accurate and ongoing updated communication between emergency services, state health departments, hospitals, pathology laboratories and Lifeblood to ensure that blood components are urgently allocated to appropriate patients while limiting unnecessary ordering and cross‐matching of products. Local communication between hospital departments and pathology laboratories can be improved by implementing the above recommendations, in particular by involving pathology laboratories in critical incident management. Hospitals may use existing communication channels including email, intranet and paging or other messaging services; however, the protocol for using these should be clearly documented in the critical incident management plan. Broader statewide communication via health departments and Lifeblood would also allow other health care services to respond appropriately; for example, by managing blood inventory conservatively until the extent and impact of the MCE is known. This requires effective communication between health departments and Lifeblood, and it is imperative that information circulated via state jurisdictions and Lifeblood is consistent to avoid confusion. Forum attendees recommended that the National Blood Authority enable Lifeblood to disseminate information to pathology services through a web‐based blood product ordering system, BloodNet, which is used by transfusion laboratories throughout Australia. Health departments should similarly ensure that existing channels for communicating emergency information to hospitals, such as hospital personnel contact details, are current. Any communication must also be effective outside standard business hours. Fax or email messages are unreliably received after‐hours, and phone contact with appropriate hospital personnel may be more effective. The Bourke Street Mall MCE highlighted the challenges involved in supplying blood components during such events. The recommendations are similar to those published in a previous review on transfusion preparedness for MCEs4 and recognise the requirement for an integrated approach that includes a central role for pathology laboratories. Incorporating the lessons learnt from this incident will allow for more organised responses and streamlined communications between all departments and institutions.

Linda Saravanan · Amanda Ormerod

The prevalence of food allergy among Victorian children is rising.1 In Victoria, children with suspected food allergies can be on hospital outpatient clinic waiting lists for months before being assessed.2 This may lead families to consider alternative avenues, which can lead to poor allergy management and the need for emergency care. Increasing numbers of Victorian children are presenting to emergency departments,3 but we do not know whether the number visiting with food allergy is also rising. We analysed Victorian Emergency Minimum Dataset (VEMD) data for the period 2005–06 to 2014–15. The VEMD is a statewide administrative dataset that includes non‐identifiable patient‐level data for all Victorian public emergency department encounters. We included all food allergy‐related presentations by children and young people aged 0–19 years, selected according to International Classification of Diseases, tenth revision, Australian modification (ICD‐10‐AM) codes: T78.0 (anaphylactic shock due to a food reaction), T78.1 (other adverse food reactions, not elsewhere classified), T78.4 (allergy, unspecified: includes non‐food‐related allergies), and L27.2 (dermatitis due to ingested food). Presentation rates by age group were calculated using Australian Bureau of Statistics (ABS) age‐stratified population data for Victorians aged 0–19 years;4 rates for regions were calculated using ABS population data for Statistical Areas 2 (SA2).5 The study was deemed exempt from the need for formal ethics approval by the Royal Children's Hospital Human Research Ethics Committee. The number of children presenting to emergency departments with food allergy‐related problems increased from 2368 in 2005–06 to 4263 in 2014–15; the presentation rate increased from 18 to 29 per 10 000 population (Box 1). About half the children who presented with food allergy‐related problems were aged 0–4 years, the rate for this age group increasing from 38 to 55 per 10 000 population (Box 2). The proportion of presentations triaged as being more urgent (triage categories 1–3) also increased, from 51% to 63% (Box 1). The rate of presentations to metropolitan hospitals increased more (from 18 per 10 000 in 2005–06 to 32 per 10 000 in 2014–15; 78% increase) than did the rate for rural hospitals (26 per 10 000 in 2005–06 to 36 per 10 000 in 2014–15; 38% increase) (Box 1). Hospitals in the North‐West Melbourne region received about one‐third of all allergy‐related emergency department visits, and the number in this region doubled over the study period (706 in 2005–06; 1536 in 2014–15) (Box 3). These data indicate that the demand for emergency services associated with food allergy‐related problems in children increased during 2005–15. The increase was particularly marked for children aged 0–4 years and for children and young people in the North‐West Melbourne and Southern Melbourne regions. While the reason for the increased burden is not clear — that is, whether the prevalence of allergy had increased (including because of a change in population composition), management plans had changed, or access to community services was reduced — the consequence is greater demand on emergency services across Melbourne. Box 1 – Presentations to Victorian public emergency departments by childen and young people (0–19 years) with food allergy‐related problems 2005–06 2006–07 2007–08 2008–09 2009–10 2010–11 2011–12 2012–13 2013–14 2014–15 All food allergy presentations Number 2368 2680 2754 2991 3082 3159 3185 3422 3881 4263 Rate (per 10 000 population)* 18 20 21 22 23 23 23 24 27 29 ICD‐10‐AM diagnostic codes T78.0 141 (6.0%) 152 (5.7%) 154 (5.6%) 168 (5.6%) 233 (7.6%) 283 (9.0%) 289 (9.1%) 339 (9.9%) 437 (11.3%) 501 (11.8%) T78.1 800 (33.8%) 948 (35.4%) 962 (34.9%) 1127 (37.7%) 1167 (37.9%) 1152 (36.5%) 1117 (35.1%) 1288 (37.6%) 1464 (37.7%) 1624 (38.1%) T78.4 1234 (52.1%) 1351 (50.4%) 1441 (52.3%) 1488 (49.8%) 1552 (50.4%) 1597 (50.6%) 1633 (51.3%) 1702 (49.7%) 1881 (48.5%) 2031 (47.6%) L27.2 193 (8.2%) 229 (8.5%) 197 (7.2%) 208 (7.0%) 130 (4.2%) 127 (4.0%) 146 (4.6%) 93 (2.7%) 99 (2.6%) 107 (2.5%) Age Number 0–4 years 1202 (50.8%) 1364 (50.9%) 1424 (51.7%) 1537 (51.4%) 1520 (49.3%) 1595 (50.5%) 1593 (50.0%) 1759 (51.4%) 2015 (51.9%) 2152 (50.5%) 5–9 years 466 (19.7%) 515 (19.2%) 521 (18.9%) 573 (19.2%) 673 (21.8%) 608 (19.3%) 660 (20.7%) 702 (20.5%) 813 (21.0%) 967 (22.7%) 10–14 years 305 (12.9%) 335 (12.5%) 355 (12.9%) 405 (13.5%) 403 (13.1%) 426 (13.5%) 383 (12.0%) 433 (12.7%) 515 (13.3%) 561 (13.2%) 15–19 years 395 (16.7%) 466 (17.4%) 454 (16.5%) 476 (15.9%) 486 (15.8%) 530 (16.8%) 549 (17.3%) 528 (15.4%) 538 (13.8%) 583 (13.7%) Rate (per 10 000 population)* 0–4 years 38 42 43 45 43 45 44 47 53 55 5–9 years 15 16 16 18 21 18 19 20 22 26 10–14 years 9 10 11 12 12 13 12 13 15 16 15–19 years 12 13 13 13 14 15 15 15 15 16 Sex Number Boys 1284 (54.2%) 1435 (53.5%) 1476 (53.6%) 1625 (54.3%) 1663 (54.0%) 1723 (54.5%) 1779 (55.9%) 1867 (54.6%) 2158 (55.6%) 2388 (56.0%) Girls 1084 (45.8%) 1245 (46.5%) 1278 (46.4%) 1366 (45.7%) 1419 (46.0%) 1436 (45.5%) 1406 (44.1%) 1555 (45.4%) 1723 (44.4%) 1875 (44.0%) Rate (per 10 000 population)* Boys 19 21 21 23 24 25 25 26 29 32 Girls 17 19 20 21 21 22 21 22 24 26 Hospital region Number Metropolitan† 1560 (65.9%) 1860 (69.4%) 1907 (69.2%) 2008 (67.1%) 2071 (67.2%) 2194 (69.5%) 2186 (68.6%) 2345 (68.5%) 2781 (71.7%) 3149 (73.9%) Rural‡ 808 (34.1%) 820 (30.6%) 847 (30.8%) 983 (32.9%) 1011 (32.8%) 965 (30.5%) 999 (31.4%) 1077 (31.5%) 1100 (28.3%) 1114 (26.1%) Rate (per 10 000 population)* Metropolitan† 18 22 22 23 23 25 24 25 29 32 Rural‡ 26 27 27 32 33 31 32 35 35 36 Triage category Categories 1–3 1198 (50.6%) 1429 (53.3%) 1568 (57.0%) 1707 (57.0%) 1830 (59.3%) 1861 (59.0%) 1807 (56.8%) 2047 (59.8%) 2365 (61.0%) 2694 (63.2%) Categories 4, 5 1170 (49.4%) 1251 (46.7%) 1186 (43.0%) 1284 (43.0%) 1252 (40.7%) 1298 (41.0%) 1378 (43.2%) 1375 (40.2%) 1516 (39.0%) 1569 (36.8%) ICD‐10‐AM = International Classification of Diseases, tenth revision, Australian modification. * All presentation rates are per 10 000 children in Victoria aged 0–19 years in the corresponding category. † Victorian Emergency Minimum Dataset (VEMD) regions: North‐West, Southern, and Eastern Melbourne. ‡ VEMD regions: Loddon Mallee, Gippsland, Barwon South West, Hume, Grampians. Box 2 – Presentations to Victorian public emergency departments by people aged 0–19 years with food allergy‐related problems: rates per 10 000 population, by age group Box 3 – Presentations to Victorian public emergency departments by people aged 0–19 years with food allergy‐related problems, by hospital campus region

Rachel O'Loughlin · Harriet Hiscock

Usual care must be rapidly adapted to isolate, assess and test large numbers of patients during the COVID‐19 pandemic Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19), which is caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2), emerged in China in late 2019.1 COVID‐19 is an example of a high consequence infectious disease that may present to an Australian hospital. These infections are uncommon in Australia and, in most cases, were imported from overseas. Less frequently, there is onward local transmission, such as during the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic in 2009. High consequence infectious diseases present unique challenges to Australian hospitals. Their rarity leads to unfamiliarity and loss of institutional knowledge between events. Many hospitals operate at near maximal capacity between outbreaks and have limited surge capacity.2 Protocols designed to manage single patients require adaptation to situations where larger numbers of patients require isolation, assessment and testing for infection. While every Australian hospital has a mass casualty or disaster protocol, these are developed for all hazards and may not address problems specific to high consequence infectious diseases, including: the need to rapidly identify and isolate potentially infectious patients to prevent nosocomial transmission; the complexity of rapid triage and assessment on frequently evolving epidemiological and clinical grounds; the difficulty of differentiating high consequence infectious diseases from more common but clinically similar conditions;3 the absence of rapid diagnostic tests to aid clinical decision making; and the potential for a prolonged surge for weeks to months during which time the workforce may be affected by both infection and absenteeism. Here we describe the strategic approach of the Royal Melbourne Hospital to triage and screen patients who have presented at risk (or concerned that they are at risk) during the early phases of COVID‐19. Our resources may be of value to other organisations refining their triage and clinical algorithms. The Royal Melbourne Hospital response The Royal Melbourne Hospital is an adult tertiary referral centre and the designated state‐wide provider for quarantinable diseases. The emergency department (ED) treats over 80 000 patients annually. From 6 January 2020, we instituted tools to identify at triage those patients with risk factors for COVID‐19 and rapidly isolate them. Initially, there was capacity to assess patients in one of three existing negative pressure rooms. On 25 January, the first patient with COVID‐19 in Australia, who had arrived in Melbourne on a flight from Guangzhou, was confirmed. The Victorian Department of Health and Human Services informed all passengers on the flight of their possible contact with the patient, leading to a significant surge in presentations to the Royal Melbourne Hospital. Box 1 presents an overview of the challenges in managing high consequence infectious diseases and details of our coordinated approach. Key components that can be used by other services are detailed below. Governance Unlike other major incident responses, which tend to be short‐lived, response to an outbreak requires a sustained response that will inevitably have an impact on other clinical services. A governance process that includes executive sponsors and senior clinical leaders is essential. The Royal Melbourne Hospital COVID‐19 response leveraged an existing code brown (external emergency) pandemic subplan and clinical code yellow (internal infectious disease emergency) plans as a governance framework. A governance group including medical and nursing executives and senior clinicians from the ED, infectious diseases, infection prevention services and microbiology meet regularly. A single standard operating procedure exists on our hospital intranet that provides all clinically relevant information for frontline health care workers (eg, personal protective equipment guidelines, current case definitions, patient assessment algorithms). It is updated frequently given the dynamic situation and, thus, functions as a living document for staff. This document provides 24/7 access to an authoritative source that supports junior and senior staff alike to feel confident in their practices and approach. Infrastructure Establishment of a fever clinic. A particular design feature that may be adopted by other facilities is the rapid establishment of an out‐of‐department fever clinic. In response to the first surge of patients, we rapidly repurposed the nearby hospital transit lounge, which was closed for the weekend, into a fever clinic (Box 2). The clinic received its first patient within 2 hours of notification from the Victorian Department of Health and Human Services of the first local case. In its first 7 days, we assessed 109 patients. We discharged over 90% of patients within 4 hours of arrival. We retain this model as patient numbers continue to increase. In this model of care, patients are physically segregated from the rest of the ED into a dedicated rapid assessment and treatment space from their arrival, limiting exposure to other patients. The main benefit of this approach is that cases yet to be identified can be an important contributor to nosocomial transmission; therefore, early separation and detection are vital.4,5 However, immediate recognition of cases is difficult due to unfamiliarity with the disease, overlap in clinical presentation with more common illnesses, and due to patient wait times. Our fever clinic model of care was based on the success of this model in Toronto and Taiwan during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak,6 where no transmission was reported in these facilities despite hospital exposure being implicated in the majority of cases in these regions (eg, it was the presumed source of exposure for 72% of patients in Toronto7,8). It has also been reported as an effective strategy for triaging patients in Wuhan for COVID‐19.9 Similar approaches appear to have been used in other countries, but detailed descriptions are not yet available in the literature. In Australia, segregation of major incident patients was exemplified by the Royal Darwin Hospital, which functioned as the forward receiving hospital for medically evacuated patients during the 2002 Bali bombings.4 The benefits of establishing a fever clinic include: protecting an existing environment for the maintenance of business continuity; facilitating protocolised interventions for spatially clustered groups of patients; providing a physical location to send additional disaster resources without cluttering areas of core business; and enhancing record‐keeping. Limitations of our approach include the additional staffing required, operational impact of loss of transit lounge, staff unfamiliarity with the location of resources (such as resuscitation trolleys), and a slightly further distance from resuscitation bays if patients deteriorate. Moreover, we were also concerned about the risk of stigmatisation of patients who are seen to be segregated from the main ED waiting room cohort. Implementation of electronic self‐registration and self‐screening. A surge related to an emerging infectious disease provided our clerks’ department with a confluence of unique administrative and logistical challenges. These included: a high proportion of patients came from a non‐English speaking background; contact tracing and follow‐up requires accurate registration and an extended suite of contact details, but usual disaster response medical records protocols generate only anonymised patient registrations; non‐clinical staff (ward clerks) unfamiliar with personal protective equipment would be required to extensively interview patients to confirm details at some point; patients came in bursts, producing delays in registration; manual screening paperwork and registration papers provide a potential fomite for disease transmission; and our ED is paper‐free under usual circumstances. We developed a novel solution to this problem, leveraging the fact that over 91% of Australian citizens and over 96% of Chinese citizens own a smartphone5,10 and converted an initial paper‐based bilingual screening tool to an online one. This is hosted using the research electronic data capture (REDCap) tool (www.projectredcap.org).11 Patients are directed to a secure website optimised for use on a smartphone. The registration portal is free to use. They answer questions regarding their epidemiological risk (such as a detailed travel history, or being a health care worker), clinical risk factors (such as being immunocompromised) and symptoms. Results are immediately fed to remote clinical computers where ward clerks can register the patient without direct patient contact and clinicians can see screening information before their clinical encounter. While not yet tested under a pandemic scenario, we anticipate this method of self‐registration may be particularly useful in the event of a significant surge in patient numbers. Triage sieve and sort of patients can be rapidly undertaken by clinicians who are fed real‐time registration data. Compared with usual mass casualty principles, the inclusion of epidemiological data in the electronic tool is valuable for triage in this setting to screen out the relatively high proportion of patients with perceived, but not actual epidemiological risk factors. Our REDCap infrastructure is available in the Supporting Information for adaptation by other health services. Conclusion The importation of emerging infections into Australia is rare, and onward transmission is rarer still. As the Royal Melbourne Hospital received a surge in patients who required screening for COVID‐19 relatively early during the current outbreak, our recent observations may provide opportunities for other hospitals to enhance their preparedness and response plans. We prioritise prevention of nosocomial transmission (using a scalable, separated fever clinic) early planning for worsening surge (adopting scalable solutions) and clear clinical governance (providing malleable and accessible centralised resources). Box 1 – Elements of the Royal Melbourne Hospital clinical response Element of response Challenges Approach used Clinical governance Multiple clinical units involved, with tangible impacts on business as usual activity and frequent changes to the model of care and the expectations Where possible, we operated within existing plans and policies. Daily executive and head of unit level huddles were instituted initially, and then stepped down to weekly as needed, producing hospital agreement on messaging and expectations of all teams and sharing of information between executive, infectious diseases (ID), infection prevention services (IPS) and emergency medicine (EM). COVID‐19 multidisciplinary working groups were formed within the ED and ID clinical units Infrastructure A space was needed to accommodate the extra patients while maintaining infectious isolation among them, and between them and the rest of the ED census A graduated response used with existing ED negative pressure rooms used for small numbers, a cohort subwaiting area was created when several patients were present in the ED at once, and a separate fever clinic was created in the nearby transit lounge used for surge response Infection prevention and control practices Transmission dynamics are incompletely understood and there is a risk of nosocomial amplification (especially during aerosolising procedures) Education sessions, posters, and videos used to reinforce PPE training; nebulisers removed from dedicated treatment space; hand sanitiser stations; PPE stations and infectious waste bins deployed; and a SOP employed for aerosolising procedures (Supporting Information) Clinical care (including triage, assessment and testing) There is rapidly evolving understanding of clinical and epidemiological characteristics of the disease. Staff lack familiarity with the disease and with the roles performed (concierge nurse, fever clinic doctor), while the normal ED and hospital functions need to continue alongside Creation of a SOP including clinical algorithms for triage, assessment and biological sampling as a living document hosted on the hospital intranet, and updated as needed and used as a single source of truth for clinical staff. Gradual transition to algorithm‐driven assessment by junior medical staff to free up senior staff for unwell patients. Action cards with role descriptions were provided in the SOP for all fever clinic staff Communication with patients Initially, most patients were Mandarin‐speaking Bilingual signage (English and Mandarin) deployed in the fever clinic, and bilingual patient resources and screening questionnaire generated. Discharge information sheets specific to different tiers of risk were translated into Mandarin and provided to all patients discharged from the fever clinic Human resources Maintenance of staff competence and confidence essential for safety and prevention of absenteeism Regular education sessions to provide updated clinical information and epidemiology, train in PPE, and answer questions COVID‐19 = coronavirus disease 2019; ED = emergency department; PPE = personal protective equipment; SOP = standard operating procedure. Box 2 – Floor plan of the Royal Melbourne Hospital fever clinic and guiding principles for a fever clinic COVID‐19 = coronavirus disease 2019; PPE = personal protective equipment; SOP = standard operating procedure.

Amanda M Rojek · Martin Dutch · David Camilleri · Emma Gardiner · Emma Smith · Caroline Marshall · Kirsty L Buising · Nicola Walsham · Mark Putland

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic is pushing health systems to, and possibly beyond, their limits.1 In Italy, the exponential rise in case numbers has caused a corresponding rise in demand for intensive care unit (ICU) beds.2 To determine how many ICU beds will be required in Australia, we propose a simple model of an uninterrupted pandemic process based on the local situation in late March 2020, and compare this model with recent data from the Lombardy.3 The uninterrupted exponential growth scenario In queueing theory, Little's law4 describes the relationship between the number of patients in a system (L) and the mean arrival rate (λ) and length of time the patient remains in the system (W) as: L = λW If a tertiary hospital has a steady state rate of 20 new admissions of patients with confirmed COVID‐19 per day, of whom one requires ICU admission5 (λ) for a mean 10 days (W), the hospital ICU will need at least 10 beds to accommodate these patients. If, however, the number of new confirmed cases increases by 20% each day (in late March 2020, the number was increasing in Australia by 23% each day6), and 100 cases are confirmed on one day, about 120 will be confirmed on the next. This increase in the daily rate of 20 new cases will mean one extra ICU admission per day, and the need for at least 10 further ICU beds. That is, the total number of ICU beds needed will be about 10% of the number of confirmed cases, or 50% of the number of new cases during the exponential growth phase of the epidemic. Approximately 2300 ICU beds are available in Australia;7 if public health measures fail to curb the rate of growth in case numbers, the national ICU capacity would be exceeded when the number of COVID‐19 cases reaches 23 000. Other sources8 have estimated that Australia could cope with as many as 44 580 COVID‐19 cases, but this would grant only a 3‐day extension before ICU capacity was exceeded. In our exponential growth scenario, commencing with 100 confirmed cases on day 1, 31 ICU beds would be required by day 7 and 119 by day 14 (Box 1). In sensitivity analyses, ICU bed capacity is sufficient even after 30 days if the ICU admission rate is reduced to 2.5%, but would be exceeded by day 26 were the ICU admission rate as high as 10%. It is important to note that our model describes a particularly serious scenario, and that actual outcomes will be modified by parameters not included in the model, including potential lags between diagnosis, hospital admission, and transfer to intensive care, and the proportion of true positive results among people tested for infecton. Is the modelled scenario plausible? To evaluate how realistic the uninterrupted exponential growth scenario is, we compared exponential and linear growth models with recent data for the Lombardy in Italy.9 Using piecewise regression models, the increase in the number of ICU patients during days 1–14 was exponential (R2 = 0.96); from day 15, ICU admissions continued to rise steeply, but the increase was linear (R2 = 0.99) (Box 2). To determine the reason for the change in growth rate at day 15, we compared the ICU admission and mortality rates for patients hospitalised with COVID‐19. The mortality rate during days 1–14 was fairly constant at about 8.8%, but rose dramatically from day 15 to a mean 23%. Most deaths during the first 14 days were probably of patients in intensive care, but we suspect that from day 15 patients died partly because of the lack of access to ICU beds as demand exceeded the capacity of the system to provide them, as indicated by the fall in ICU admission rate (Box 3). Conclusion While the assumptions of our model can be debated, the exponential increase in Australian cases until late March suggested that it described a realistic clinical scenario consistent with overseas data available at that time. The exponential increase in case numbers and subsequent demand for ICU beds could have overwhelmed the capacity of even the largest Australian hospitals if SARS‐CoV‐2 transmission had not been as drastically reduced as it appears to have been by the successful public health measures enacted by the federal and state governments and the adherence to these measures by the Australian public. The rate of ICU admissions per positive case may be lower in Australia than reported for Italy and China — because of healthier underlying demographic conditions, a greater number of detected milder cases, or both — but this would not change the overall implications of the model. Australia must maintain measures to strictly control the rate of new cases and continue to improve our ICU surge capacity, lest we squander the chance to avoid an Italian fate. Box 1 – Intensive care unit (ICU) bed demand, by time and proportion of patients with confirmed COVID‐19 who require intensive care Box 2 – Intensive care unit (ICU) admission rate in the Lombardy: actual and modelled Box 3 – Intensive care unit (ICU) admission rate and mortality for all patients with COVID‐19 admitted to hospitals in the Lombardy

Hamish DD Meares · Michael P Jones

Introduction: This statement was planned on 11 March 2020 to provide clinical guidance and aid staff preparation for the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic in Australia and New Zealand. It has been widely endorsed by relevant specialty colleges and societies. Main recommendations: Generic guidelines exist for the intubation of different patient groups, as do resources to facilitate airway rescue and transition to the “can't intubate, can't oxygenate” scenario. They should be followed where they do not contradict our specific recommendations for the COVID‐19 patient group. Consideration should be given to using a checklist that has been specifically modified for the COVID‐19 patient group. Early intubation should be considered to prevent the additional risk to staff of emergency intubation and to avoid prolonged use of high flow nasal oxygen or non‐invasive ventilation. Significant institutional preparation is required to optimise staff and patient safety in preparing for the airway management of the COVID‐19 patient group. The principles for airway management should be the same for all patients with COVID‐19 (asymptomatic, mild or critically unwell). Safe, simple, familiar, reliable and robust practices should be adopted for all episodes of airway management for patients with COVID‐19. Changes in management as a result of this statement: Airway clinicians in Australia and New Zealand should now already be involved in regular intensive training for the airway management of the COVID‐19 patient group. This training should focus on the principles of early intervention, meticulous planning, vigilant infection control, efficient processes, clear communication and standardised practice.

David J Brewster · Nicholas Chrimes · Thy BT Do · Kirstin Fraser · Christopher J Groombridge · Andy Higgs · Matthew J Humar · Timothy J Leeuwenburg · Steven McGloughlin · Fiona G Newman · Chris P Nickson · Adam Rehak · David Vokes · Jonathan J Gatward

Objectives: To assess the capacity of intensive care units (ICUs) in Australia to respond to the expected increase in demand associated with COVID‐19. Design: Analysis of Australian and New Zealand Intensive Care Society (ANZICS) registry data, supplemented by an ICU surge capability survey and veterinary facilities survey (both March 2020). Settings: All Australian ICUs and veterinary facilities. Main outcome measures: Baseline numbers of ICU beds, ventilators, dialysis machines, extracorporeal membrane oxygenation machines, intravenous infusion pumps, and staff (senior medical staff, registered nurses); incremental capability to increase capacity (surge) by increasing ICU bed numbers; ventilator‐to‐bed ratios; number of ventilators in veterinary facilities. Results: The 191 ICUs in Australia provide 2378 intensive care beds during baseline activity (9.3 ICU beds per 100 000 population). Of the 175 ICUs that responded to the surge survey (with 2228 intensive care beds), a maximal surge would add an additional 4258 intensive care beds (191% increase) and 2631 invasive ventilators (120% increase). This surge would require additional staffing of as many as 4092 senior doctors (245% increase over baseline) and 42 720 registered ICU nurses (269% increase over baseline). An additional 188 ventilators are available in veterinary facilities, including 179 human model ventilators. Conclusions: The directors of Australian ICUs report that intensive care bed capacity could be near tripled in response to the expected increase in demand caused by COVID‐19. But maximal surge in bed numbers could be hampered by a shortfall in invasive ventilators and would also require a large increase in clinician and nursing staff numbers.

Edward Litton · Tamara Bucci · Shaila Chavan · Yvonne Y Ho · Anthony Holley · Gretta Howard · Sue Huckson · Philomena Kwong · Johnny Millar · Nhi Nguyen · Paul Secombe · Marc Ziegenfuss · David Pilcher

Herpes zoster ophthalmicus (HZO), a condition that affects the ophthalmic division of the trigeminal nerve, is caused by reactivation of latent varicella zoster virus;1,2 about 10% of people with varicella zoster infections experience HZO.1 Over the past decade, the number of emergency department presentations by people with herpes zoster in Australia has increased by 2–6% per year, and the number of people with herpes zoster managed in general practice has almost doubled.3 The purpose of our study was to develop a contemporary perspective of the clinical presentation, incidence of complications, and treatment practice for patients with HZO referred to an Australian tertiary eye hospital. We performed a retrospective audit of digital health records of the first 100 consecutive patients who presented to the Royal Victorian Eye and Ear Hospital (RVEEH) emergency department with HZO during July 2017 – July 2018. The investigation was approved by the Human Research Ethics Committee of the Hospital as a quality control project (reference, 18/1416HL). The clinical features at the time of presentation of the 100 patients are summarised in the Box. Sixty‐five patients initially presented to their general practitioner, 20 to a hospital emergency department, and 15 directly to the RVEEH. The mean time between rash onset and presentation to a GP or emergency department was 3.3 days (range, 0–14 days). For 51 patients, treatment commenced before presentation to the RVEEH (famciclovir, 27; valaciclovir, 16; acyclovir, 6; two patients had received no topical treatment); treatment had commenced within 72 hours of the rash developing for 36 of these patients (71%). The recommended dose and frequency were prescribed for 16 of the 51 patients: famciclovir (500 mg three times a day), two patients; valaciclovir (1 g three times a day), 12 patients; acyclovir (800 mg five times a day), two patients. For 29 patients, antiviral therapy was prescribed at lower than the recommended dose (famciclovir, 21 patients; valaciclovir, two patients; acyclovir, two patients) or prescribed as a topical treatment (acyclovir, two patients); the prescribing information was not documented for five patients. Nineteen of the 68 patients who attended follow‐up 7–14 days after their initial presentation to the RVEEH presented with ocular symptoms regarded as late complications, including four with more than one complication. Eight of 29 patients (29%) who had not commenced systemic antiviral therapy within 72 hours of rash onset developed late complications, as did 13 of 71 patients (18%) who were treated within 72 hours (Fisher exact test: P = 0.78). We found concerning variations in timing and practice of treating HZO, despite recognised clinical guidelines.4,5 This may be partly explained by diagnostic uncertainty caused by the variability of clinical signs during the early stages of HZO,6 and by an earlier discrepancy between the famciclovir dosing recommended by therapeutic guidelines (250 mg three times a day) and recommendations based upon the results of a clinical trial4 (500 mg three times a day). This discrepancy has since been resolved in the therapeutic guidelines.4 Our findings suggest that education of all health care professionals involved in the care of patients with HZO needs to be improved. Clinical practice guidelines must provide clear and consistent information about managing HZO. Box – Demographic characteristics and clinical features of 100 consecutive people presenting with herpes zoster ophthalmicus to the Royal Victorian Eye and Ear Hospital, July 2017 – July 2018 Characteristic Sex (men) 52 Age at presentation (years), median (IQR) 59 (39–76) Age at presentation (years), range 16–93 Clinical features at presentation Best‐corrected visual acuity ≥ 6/12 62 Intra‐ocular pressure (mmHg), mean (SD) 15.4 (5.9) Rash 92 Pain 63 Conjunctivitis 62 Lid swelling 53 Skin erythema 41 Anterior uveitis 26 Keratitis 20 Other* 6 Late complications 19 Uveitis 11 Keratitis 5 Other† 3 IQR = interquartile range; SD = standard deviation. * Raised intra‐ocular pressure, retinitis/choroiditis, optic neuritis, cranial nerve palsy. † Neuralgia, elevated intra‐ocular pressure.

Rahul Chakrabarti · Grace George · Kristen Wells · Carmel Crock

Objectives: To evaluate the impact of the Victorian Stroke Telemedicine (VST) program during its first 12 months on the quality of care provided to patients presenting with suspected stroke to hospitals in regional Victoria. Design: Historical controlled cohort study comparing outcomes during a 12‐month control period with those for the initial 12 months of full implementation of the VST program at each hospital. Setting: 16 hospitals in regional Victoria that participated in the VST program between 1 January 2010 and 30 January 2016. Participants: Adult patients with suspected stroke presenting to the emergency departments of the participating hospitals. Main outcome measures: Indicators for key processes of care, including symptom onset‐to‐arrival, door‐to‐first medical review, and door‐to‐CT times; provision and timeliness of provision of thrombolysis to patients with ischaemic stroke. Results: 2887 patients with suspected stroke presented to participating emergency departments during the control period, 3178 during the intervention period; the patient characteristics were similar for both periods. A slightly larger proportion of patients with ischaemic stroke who arrived within 4.5 hours of symptom onset received thrombolysis during the intervention than during the control period (37% v 30%). Door‐to‐CT scan time (median, 25 min [IQR, 13–49 min] v 34 min [IQR, 18–76 min]) and door‐to‐needle time for stroke thrombolysis (73 min [IQR, 56–96 min] v 102 min [IQR, 77–128 min]) were shorter during the intervention. The proportions of patients who received thrombolysis and had a symptomatic intracerebral haemorrhage (4% v 16%) or died in hospital (6% v 20%) were smaller during the intervention period. Conclusions: Telemedicine has provided Victorian regional hospitals access to expert care for emergency department patients with suspected acute stroke. Eligible patients with ischaemic stroke are now receiving stroke thrombolysis more quickly and safely.

Chris F Bladin · Joosup Kim · Kathleen L Bagot · Michelle Vu · Natasha Moloczij · Sonia Denisenko · Chris Price · Nancy Pompeani · Lauren Arthurson · Casey Hair · Justin Rabl · Mick O'Shea · Patrick Groot · Leslie Bolitho · Bruce CV Campbell · Helen M Dewey · Geoffrey A Donnan · Dominique A Cadilhac

The impact of discharge destination on outcomes after treatment for orthopaedic trauma requires further investigation

Lara A Kimmel · Pamela M Simpson · Anne E Holland · Elton R Edwards · Peter A Cameron · Richard S Steiger · Richard S Page · Raphael Hau · Andrew Bucknill · Jessica Kasza · Belinda J Gabbe

To the Editor: Currie and colleagues highlight the important topic of animal vaccines as occupational hazards and the need for improved clinician advice to manage patients safely.1 The article title describes “high pressure” injections, yet the oil emulsion vaccine of most concern, against ovine Johne's disease, is delivered via a standard needle injection. All accidental mineral oil injections are of concern (as are all high pressure injections). Appropriate identification and advice can be obtained by contacting a Poisons Information Centre (PIC). This was not discussed by Currie and colleagues, although it was recommended in a reference they cited.2 Unlike some vaccine manufacturers, the publicly funded PIC service provides 24‐hour emergency medical advice (131 126) for the public and health professionals. PICs access the Australian National Poisons Register, which allows rapid identification of the dozens of oil‐containing vaccines. Currently in Australia, oil adjuvant vaccines lack clear labelling to identify the presence of oil on the front packaging. Increased prominence would aid recognition, similar to initiatives for active ingredients within human therapeutic products. Indeed, review of the unscheduled status of most animal vaccines is required as they possess a risk assessment profile at odds with the Scheduling Policy Framework.3 Improved pharmacovigilance of veterinary products (and agrochemicals) is urgently required, particularly regarding the risks posed to human health. Unpublished analysis of data from Australian PIC annual reports identified about 2000 cases annually of human exposures to veterinary pharmaceuticals. We recently reported on human exposures to veterinary pharmaceuticals from New South Wales PIC calls from 2014 to 2016, with 30 exposures to Johne's disease vaccine alone.4 Collectively, PICs have over 20 times the number of reports to the designated authority for post‐market surveillance; the Australian Adverse Experience Reporting Program run by the Australian Pesticides and Veterinary Medicines Authority received 91 reports for human effects from registered veterinary medicines and agricultural chemical products combined in 2015.5 There is an opportunity for PICs to be engaged more efficiently in surveillance, which would allow the collection of additional information through follow‐up calls to understand risk factors, evaluate outcomes and recommend interventions to prevent future injuries. This would facilitate improvements in management of human exposures to veterinary pharmaceuticals to protect occupational health.

Jared A Brown · Nicholas A Buckley · Rose Cairns · Claire E Wylie

Christmas is known for festive decorations

Paul Heyworth · Ryan Shulman

Essential oil exposures are frequent in Australia, and more than half involve children

Kristenbella AYR Lee · Joanna E Harnett · Rose Cairns

An 88-year-old woman presented with 2 months of right upper quadrant pain, weight loss, and 3 days of fevers

Sudharsan Venkatesan · Henrik Falhammar

Greater coordination is needed to shift from a “mantle of safety” to providing adequate health care for rural and remote Australians

Peter Aitken

Achieving gender equity in intensive care medicine requires specific interventions to attract and retain female trainees and support their progress to leadership roles

Lucy J Modra · Sarah A Yong

… but how are we deciding which patients are selected for ICU referral and admission?

Alison M Mudge

To the Editor: A 40‐year‐old man with no past medical history presented to the emergency department complaining of a painful red rash across his back, which he noticed when he undressed at home after work. On examination, the patient was systemically well with normal vital signs. He had a non‐blanching, band‐shaped erythematous rash across his upper back, with no associated vesicles, consistent with a first degree burn. The patient worked as a field environmental engineer and was required to wear high visibility shirts throughout his working day. It was noticed that the band‐shaped rash coincided with the upper high visibility band on his work shirt (Box). The patient also reported that the high visibility tape on his shirt often becomes extremely hot when he works out in the sun, and he occasionally has to change position so the shirt does not touch his skin in that area. The rash was managed as a first degree burn, with emollient aloe vera cream and simple analgesia. Retroreflective tape is used on work clothing to increase the wearer's visibility to others, especially in the dark. It usually consists of minute glass beads or prismatic elements encapsulated in a transparent film, which reflect light back towards its source. Safety warnings mention cases of increased heat build‐up around shoulders, neck and ears, but no cases have been published in the medical literature. Skin abrasions have also been described when aged tape cracked and frayed was brushed against the forehead.1 The manufacturers also warn about the tape risk to smoulder or melt when subjected to heat. To the authors' knowledge, this is the first reported case of skin burns occurring secondary to overheating of retroreflective tape. Even though not life‐threatening, it caused discomfort to the patient for a few days. Workplaces mandating clothes with retroreflective tape should ensure that garments with the tape in areas touching the skin are not worn in very hot and sunny conditions and consider using removable vests instead. Manufacturers should consider designing shirts that decrease direct contact between retroreflective tape and skin, potentially by increasing the number or thickness of cloth layers under it. Box – Band‐shaped erythematous rash across the patient's upper back coinciding with the upper retroreflective band on the work shirt

Ioana Vlad

The most frequent reason for retrieval, myocardial infarction, requires early treatment and extensive long term management

Fergus W Gardiner · Alice M Richardson · Lara Bishop · Abby Harwood · Elli Gardiner · Lauren Gale · Narcissus Teoh · Robyn M Lucas · Martin Laverty

The proportion of head injuries that is acutely clinically significant is greater for recreational sports than for contact sports associated with risk of concussion

Nitaa Eapen · Gavin A Davis · Meredith L Borland · Natalie Phillips · Ed Oakley · Stephen Hearps · Amit Kochar · Sarah Dalton · John Cheek · Jeremy Furyk · Mark D Lyttle · Silvia Bressan · Louise Crowe · Stuart Dalziel · Emma Tavender · Franz E Babl

Antivenom dosage for Australian elapid envenoming should be decided by clinical evaluation of individual patients

Scott A Weinstein · Peter J Mirtschin · Julian White

The availability of paracetamol needs to be restricted to stem the increasing number of overdoses

Rose Cairns · Jared A Brown · Claire E Wylie · Andrew H Dawson · Geoffrey K Isbister · Nicholas A Buckley

Mental and behavioural disorders in rural and remote communities trigger a considerable number of RFDS retrievals

Fergus W Gardiner · Mathew Coleman · Narcissus Teoh · Abby Harwood · Neil T Coffee · Lauren Gale · Lara Bishop · Martin Laverty

N arrowly targeting single risk factors will not reduce gaps in injury burden and other health outcomes

Geoffrey J Dobb · Kwok M Ho

Objectives: To investigate the admission characteristics and hospital outcomes for Indigenous and non‐Indigenous patients admitted to intensive units (ICUs) after major trauma. Design, setting: Retrospective analysis of Australian and New Zealand Intensive Care Society (ANZICS) Adult Patient Database data from 92 Australian ICUs for the 6‐year period, 2010–2015. Participants: Patients older than 17 years of age admitted to public hospital ICUs with a primary diagnosis of trauma. Main outcome measures: ICU and overall hospital lengths of stay, hospital discharge destination, and ICU and overall hospital mortality rates for Indigenous and non‐Indigenous patients. Results: 23 804 people were admitted to Australian public hospital ICUs after major trauma; 1754 (7.4%) were Indigenous Australians. The population‐standardised incidence of admissions was consistently higher for Indigenous Australians than for non‐Indigenous Australians (847 per million v 251 per million population; incidence ratio, 3.37; 95% CI, 3.19–3.57). Overall hospital mortality rates were similar for Indigenous and non‐Indigenous patients (adjusted odds ratio [aOR], 1.04; 95% CI, 0.82–1.31). Indigenous patients were more likely than non‐Indigenous patients to be discharged to another hospital (non‐Indigenous v Indigenous: aOR, 0.84; 95% CI, 0.72–0.96) less likely to be discharged home (non‐Indigenous v Indigenous: aOR, 1.17; 95% CI, 1.04–1.31). Conclusion: The population rate of trauma‐related ICU admissions was substantially higher for Indigenous than non‐Indigenous patients, but hospital mortality rates after ICU admission were similar. Indigenous patients were more likely to be discharged to a another hospital and less likely to be discharged home than non‐Indigenous patients.

Fraser Magee · Anthony Wilson · Michael J Bailey · David Pilcher · Paul J Secombe · Paul Young · Rinaldo Bellomo