Emergency medicine

Objective: To compare the frequency and outcomes of cardiac arrests in general practice clinics with those of paramedic‐witnessed cardiac arrests. Design, setting: Retrospective study; analysis of Victorian Ambulance Cardiac Arrest Registry data, 1 January 2000 – 30 December 2019. Participants: Patients with non‐traumatic cardiac arrests whom emergency medical services staff attempted to resuscitate. Main outcome measures: Survival to hospital discharge. Results: 6363 cases of cardiac arrest were identified: 216 in general practice clinics (3.4%) and 6147 witnessed by paramedics (96.6%). The proportion of patients presenting with initial shockable rhythms was larger in clinic (126 patients, 58.3%) than paramedic‐witnessed cases (1929, 31.4%). The proportion of general practice clinic cases in which defibrillation was provided in the clinic increased from 2 of 37 in 2000–2003 (5%) to 19 of 57 patients in 2016–2019 (33%); survival increased from 7 of 37 (19%) to 23 of 57 patients (40%). For patients with initial shockable rhythms, 57 of 126 in clinic cases (45%) and 1221 of 1929 people in paramedic‐witnessed cases (63.3%) survived to hospital discharge; of 47 general practice patients defibrillated by clinic staff, 27 survived (57%). For patients with initial shockable rhythms, the odds of survival were greater following paramedic‐witnessed events (adjusted odds ratio [aOR], 3.39; 95% CI, 2.08–5.54) or general clinic arrests with defibrillation by clinic staff (aOR, 2.23; 95% CI, 1.03–4.83) than for general practice clinic arrests in which arriving paramedics provided defibrillation. Conclusion: Emergency medical services should be alerted as soon as possible after people experience heart attack warning symptoms. Automated external defibrillators should be standard equipment in general practice clinics, enabling prompt defibrillation, which may substantially reduce the risk of death for people in cardiac arrest.

Brian Haskins · Ziad Nehme · Peter A Cameron · Karen Smith

A 67-year-old woman was referred to our ear, nose and throat department with confirmed cerebrospinal fluid (CSF) rhinorrhoea

Sandeep G Mistry · Wallace Walker · James Earnshaw · Anders Cervin

People in hotel quarantine need Increased psychological support and other mental health services

Michael Dinh · Owen Hutchings · Kendall Bein · James Shaw · Aditi Raut · Saartje Berendsen Russell · Dianna Jagers · Rajip Thapa · Gregory Fox · James Edwards · Timothy Wand · Warwick Britton

A lack of clear protocols elevates risks for clinicians for the consequences of decisions that they have a professional duty to make in the interests of their community Clinicians, ethicists and lawyers have long debated the parameters of triage in response to the inevitable disasters that sporadically overwhelm the health care system. Almost universally, they have advocated for open, transparent and consultative triage protocols, guidelines and legislation to combat biases and to support clinicians making unavoidable decisions in the interests of the community as a whole. The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic has highlighted the importance of transparent triage. While there is considerable debate about ethical aspects of triage protocols, including concerns that the traditional focus on utilitarianism is discriminatory, largely missing from this discussion in Australia is that triage protocols are also important from a legal perspective — as a mechanism to promote lawful decision‐making processes and as a justification or defence to support clinicians’ decisions if a matter is litigated. The purpose of this article is twofold. First, after providing an overview of current COVID‐19 triage policies in Australia, we assess their legal status. Second, we argue that beyond ethics, transparent policies are needed so their compliance with law can be tested, and to enable practitioners to better understand their obligations before making sometimes “impossible” decisions. Australian COVID‐19 triage policies Australian clinicians have seen numerous ethical and professional guidance documents addressing COVID‐19 triage.1,2,3 These documents anticipate that if Australia’s health care system is overwhelmed as in other countries, clinicians will need guidelines to allocate limited resources, including ventilators, beds and highly trained personnel. The umbrella term “triage policy” denotes: (i) broad ethical or operational guidelines with suggested decision‐making principles;1,2,3 and (ii) more specific triage protocols,4 with set inclusion and exclusion criteria, and a process to prioritise individual patients when the system is overwhelmed. Many Australian COVID‐19 triage policies are ethical guidelines, but some Australian hospitals have also developed triage protocols.5 Internationally, the availability and content of such protocols varies widely. In a study from the United States, over half of responding institutions lacked a COVID‐19 triage protocol.6 In 2020, Mitchell and colleagues exposed insufficient transparency and significant variation in Victorian protocols.5 In Australia, primary responsibility for the administration of hospital services lies with the states, which have the power to promote a statewide approach to triage. Although every Australian state and territory has disaster management plans,7 publicly available COVID‐19 triage protocols are lacking. From March 2020 to 27 November 2020, the lead author (EC) regularly searched health department websites for COVID‐19 triage policies, examining both the websites’ content dedicated to COVID‐19 and searching keywords alone and in various combinations (COVID; intensive care; critical care; ICU; triage; framework; guidelines; policy; ethical). These searches revealed few relevant documents (Box 1). New South Wales is the only state to mention a triage guideline, but its COVID‐19 framework does not link to it.8 Queensland Health released an extensive ethical framework for COVID‐19 in April 2020,5 which has since been removed.9 Western Australia has a four‐page ethical framework but no publicly accessible protocol.10 The Commonwealth Government’s COVID‐19 strategy indicates the Commonwealth will work with state and territory governments to “agree on novel coronavirus triage criteria (if required)”,11 but there are no such criteria to date. Given constitutional arrangements, there is no expectation that the Commonwealth Government would provide these. The National Health and Medical Research Council has conducted consultation on an ethics framework for pandemics, but this is limited to ethical guidance. Legal status of COVID‐19 triage policies The prospect of deciding between patients who would benefit from life‐sustaining treatment is distressing. Compounding this is the potential for legal liability. Many of the legal issues that arise in pandemic triage are untested, and various areas of law may be engaged and applied in complex, fact‐specific ways. As other work has detailed, health authorities have wide discretion in making resource allocation decisions, which are generally respected by the courts.12,13 However, in some circumstances, clinicians (and institutions) may be found liable, and decisions may also be challenged on public law grounds (Box 2).13,14,15 These concerns are not merely academic; after Hurricane Katrina one doctor faced possible murder charges and civil lawsuits after several patients died during a hospital evacuation.16 Overseas, some governments have enacted immunity or indemnity laws to protect clinicians making COVID‐19 triage decisions.14,15 No such laws exist in Australia, and they do not appear to have been considered. Absent such laws, triage protocols may provide the next strongest legal defence. Under civil liability legislation, a clinician will generally not be negligent if acting in a manner widely accepted in Australia by peer professional opinion as competent medical practice (professional practice defence).12,13 Concrete advice on the legal significance of triage policies is difficult because the relationship between law and professional guidance is complex and each case is evaluated according to its unique facts. Whether the professional practice defence applies generally depends on the guideline’s nature, author and purported authority.17,18 A policy may create additional obligations beyond those imposed by law (eg, a specific hospital COVID‐19 triage protocol that must be followed by its clinicians), which may inform the legal standard of care.18 However, policy is not necessarily determinative of the standard of care, especially when couched as broad guidance (eg, COVID‐19 ethical guidelines from a professional college).18 Rigid adherence to policy can also be problematic; to meet the standard of care (and broader public decision‐making standards), clinicians must use judgment appropriate to the circumstances.17 Moreover, while policy can establish obligations in addition to the law, law may also impose more onerous obligations than a policy.18 When this occurs the legal standard will prevail. In other words, COVID‐19 triage policies can shape a regulatory response but only within the boundaries of the law. COVID‐19 triage policies may infringe laws in various nuanced ways.14 Liddell and colleagues note that the utilitarian “save the most lives possible” principle underlying most triage policies can infringe patients’ legal rights, many of which are unchanged in a disaster.14 In the United Kingdom, a legal challenge to the National Institute for Health and Care Excellence (NICE) COVID‐19 critical care protocol was initiated on the basis that its heavy reliance on the Clinical Frailty Scale constituted unlawful discrimination.19 In response, NICE revised the protocol to reduce reliance on the Clinical Frailty Scale for some patients. These issues have significant implications for clinicians: Absent a COVID‐19 triage policy, not providing beneficial life‐sustaining treatment is potentially risky because it may be harder to establish the professional practice defence in a negligence action. An institution’s failure to promulgate a policy could also result in claims. Additionally, a triage protocol (with its greater degree of specificity) would generally provide more legal protection than ethical guidelines. While it is lawful for governments and professional bodies to issue COVID‐19 triage policies, these policies should rely on appropriate evidence and must comply with specific jurisdictional laws, such as guardianship and human rights legislation (Box 2). Triage policies promote quality and consistency in decision making and guide clinicians to consider appropriate factors. However, clinicians must still exercise judgment which is reasonable and responsive to individual circumstances. Policies should provide guidance for when an individual is denied life‐sustaining treatment, since the duty to exercise reasonable care remains. Where reasonably possible, this may include communicating to the patient (or family) the reasons for the decision, providing appropriate palliative care, and information about complaints or dispute resolution processes. Transparency — not just about ethics From an ethical perspective, legitimate triage decisions require “accountability for reasonableness” — a fair process based on relevant criteria, a publicly accessible rationale, and (to the extent possible given the urgency of decisions) mechanisms for appeal, review and enforcement.20 Transparency is also important from a legal perspective because it subjects triage policies to public scrutiny before public health emergencies reach crisis levels. While internal legal advice on triage policies may have been sought, the NICE example illustrates that public scrutiny, consultation and litigation play an important role in testing legal boundaries. In addition to protecting individual patients, this promotes rigorous policy development and evaluation, and also benefits clinicians who are then not relying on policy later found to be deficient.17 It may also alleviate stress caused by uncertainty about protocols. Disclosure of triage policies also delivers a measure of natural justice by providing notice to patients and their families of decision‐making criteria and processes. Conclusion So far, Australia has avoided the scale of pandemic that has overwhelmed health systems elsewhere. While in this context, governments’ reluctance to develop and/or release triage protocols until a crisis has arrived is politically understandable, such a course of action carries significant risks. Public confidence is enhanced when governments have the political courage to embark on these difficult public debates in advance of need. Prioritising some individuals over others when the demand for resources exceeds supply is confronting for clinicians and the community alike, and challenges us to reflect on our deeply held values as a society. When clinicians are allocating scarce resources, they need standards to support their decisions which have been subject to public consultation and rigorous legal review. Australia’s successful management of the COVID‐19 pandemic is offering us the luxury of time to consult and reflect. [Corrections added on 9 June 2021 after first online publication: an additional row was added to Box 1.] Box 1 – Australian triage protocols and ethical guidelines for resource allocation during the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic Jurisdiction COVID‐19 triage protocol or ethical guidelines Type of guidance Publicly available Commonwealth Australian Health Ethics Committee of the National Health and Medical Research Council: An ethics framework for pandemics (in development). Ethical guidelines Anticipated Australian Capital Territory None located on ACT Health website (https://health.act.gov.au). New South Wales NSW Health provides a COVID‐19 framework entitled “NSW adult intensive care services pandemic response planning”.8 The framework indicates that the NSW guideline for resource‐based decision making includes the “use of allocation frameworks and tools” with a reference (but no link to) a document entitled the “NSW Health COVID‐19 intensive care guidance drawn from principles in the NSW Health Influenza Pandemic Plan (PD2016_016). Sydney: NSW Health; 2020”. This 2020 document is based on the NSW Health Influenza Pandemic Plan (PD2016_016), which references the NSW Health policy “Influenza Pandemic – Providing Critical Care (PD2010_028)”. PD2010_028 contains a triage tool (https://www1.health.nsw.gov.au/pds/Pages/a-z.aspx). However, as the updated COVID‐19 intensive care guidance is not publicly available, we cannot confirm that it contains the same guidance as PD2016_016 or the PD2010_028 triage tool. Triage protocol and ethical and operational guidelines No Northern Territory None located on the NT Health Department website (https://health.nt.gov.au). Queensland On 20 April 2020, Queensland Health released a comprehensive ethical framework (developed in consultation with numerous stakeholders) but this has since been removed from its website.9 Ethical guidelines No (initially available but subsequently recalled) South Australia None located on the SA Health website (https://www.sahealth.sa.gov.au). Tasmania None located on the Tasmanian Department of Health website (https://www.health.tas.gov.au). Victoria None located on the Victorian Department of Health and Human Services website (https://www.dhhs.vic.gov.au/clinical-guidance-and-resources-covid-19). Western Australia The WA Health Department website includes a framework to guide decision making on the appropriateness of intensive care management during the COVID‐19 pandemic (last updated 26 June 2020) in its section on COVID‐19 guidance for health professionals.10 Ethical guidelines Yes Box 2 – Examples of potential areas of legal risk in response to pandemic triage decisions* Civil law Withholding or withdrawing beneficial life‐sustaining treatment from one patient to provide it to a patient with a better prognosis could amount to a breach of the duty of care and liability in negligence (subject to the peer professional practice defence for clinicians and the resource allocation defence in the case of hospitals). Criminal law Withdrawing a ventilator from one patient who is stable to provide it to another patient with a greater chance of survival could lead to charges of murder or manslaughter if the first patient dies as a result (charges would be subject to prosecutorial discretion and jurisdiction‐specific defences such as necessity). Commonwealth and state antidiscrimination laws A triage protocol could violate state and territory antidiscrimination legislation if the decision was made on the basis of a protected attribute such as age, disability or race (although specific protections may apply under the legislation for decision makers). Guardianship legislation This applies to patients who lack decision‐making capacity; for example, because they are unconscious, sedated or have cognitive impairment. At common law, medical practitioners have no legal duty to provide treatment that is non‐beneficial. However, the Guardianship and Administration Act 2000 (Qld) makes it an offence to withhold or withdraw life‐sustaining treatment from patients who lack capacity without the consent of an appropriate decision maker, even if providing that treatment would be “inconsistent with good medical practice” (ie, even if that treatment is non‐beneficial). This may preclude some triage decisions in Queensland. A decision to withhold or withdraw beneficial life‐sustaining treatment from a patient who lacks capacity to provide it to someone with a better prognosis may violate state or territory guardianship legislation, which requires health care decisions to be made in a person’s best interests. (This could also result in an emergency application to the Supreme Court to intervene in its parens patriae jurisdiction to protect the patient’s best interests.) * This is a non‐exhaustive list of examples. For an expanded discussion of legal challenges in Australia, see Close et al.13 See further Liddell et al14 for the UK context, which has some similarities to Australia.

Eliana Close · Lindy Willmott · Tina Cockburn · Simon Young · Will Cairns · Ben P White

Community naloxone supply to prevent fatal overdose needs to consider patients using pharmaceutical opioids Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme (PBS) opioid prescriptions in Australia have increased from 2.4 million in 1992 to 7 million in 2007 to 15 million prescriptions in 2016.1 The corresponding rate of opioid mortality over this time almost doubled from 3.8 deaths per 100 000 Australians in 2007 to 6.7 in 2017,2 with fatal opioid overdoses increasing from 482 in 2002 per 100 000 Australians to 900 in 2018.3 Most of these deaths involved prescription opioids, and contrary to what many assume, only one‐third of prescription opioid‐related deaths involved intravenous drug use.4 Among deaths associated with common prescription opioids (including fentanyl, morphine, oxycodone, tramadol and codeine), 49% involved people with chronic pain.4 Naloxone, a rapidly acting semi‐synthetic opioid antagonist, has an important role in reducing opioid overdoses by acting as an emergency reversal agent.5 It is currently available in Australia for intramuscular injection or nasal spray. The intranasal formulation was listed on the PBS in November 2019 as an unrestricted General Schedule medication. New South Wales, Western Australia and South Australia are trialling a program of take‐home naloxone available free to people using prescription or illicit opioids and at risk of opioid‐related death or those who may witness an overdose.5 Various aspects of patient history including current opioid medications (especially if the opioids are higher doses or slow release preparations) and comorbidities (such as complex diseases, mental illnesses or respiratory conditions) can help identify people who should be recommended to carry naloxone.5 Take‐home naloxone provided to laypeople to administer in the event of overdose was found to successfully reverse more than 96% of community overdoses in a systematic review.6 The evidence of naloxone’s therapeutic effect and life‐saving role has resulted in the drug being carried in most emergency medical kits and included on the World Health Organization Model Lists of Essential Medicines (https://www.who.int/groups/expert-committee-on-selection-and-use-of-essential-medicines/essential-medicines-lists). Community members, general practitioners and pharmacists frequently perceive naloxone as a medication for people who use illicit opioids, namely heroin.7 However, opioid‐related mortality in people taking pharmaceutical opioids for chronic pain is common. There is a clear evidence–practice gap demonstrating the need for increased discussion about opioid‐related risks and naloxone in this population. In the context of rising pharmaceutical opioid harm, the United States Centers for Disease Control and Prevention provided recommendations for co‐prescribing naloxone for at‐risk patients with chronic pain; such patients include those taking an oral daily morphine equivalent dose of 50 mg or more, taking concurrent benzodiazepines with opioids, having a history of substance use disorder, or having a history of overdose.8 Using these indications, an Australian study reported that 78% of patients on Schedule 8 opioids for chronic non‐cancer pain qualified for take‐home naloxone.8,9 Yet current national data show that less than 3% of all naloxone supplied is on individual PBS prescriptions, with most naloxone prescriptions accounted for by harm reduction programs.10 An additional negligible amount of naloxone is sold over the counter by pharmacists.10 Between 2014 and 2018, an estimated 10 642 units of naloxone were supplied in Australia. Even if a large proportion of this were dispensed to people taking pharmaceutical opioids for chronic pain, it would be vastly insufficient given the 300 000 Australians receiving long term opioids each year.10,11 The majority of Australian patients on pharmaceutical opioids who are at risk of overdose do not appear to be prescribed this emergency medication. Health care provider attitudes towards pharmaceutical opioid‐related risk may be contributing to low naloxone prescribing rates. In qualitative work, Australian GPs described hesitancy in prescribing opioids to younger and middle‐aged patients with chronic pain due to perceived risks of opioid‐related harm.12 In contrast, GPs were more comfortable prescribing opioids for older patients, as they believed there was a lower risk of serious opioid‐related harm in this population.12 These findings highlight doctors’ subjective judgements of overdose risk, which may be a barrier to recognising patients who would benefit from take‐home naloxone. Similar qualitative work highlighted that the biggest barriers to naloxone prescribing were low levels of awareness about naloxone, and unwillingness by doctors to prescribe it.7 This may be driven by incorrect beliefs that patients on pharmaceutical opioids are at low risk of overdose, lack of knowledge, and incorrect patient reporting of actual opioid use.7 GPs and pharmacists are ideally placed to provide and advocate for routine take‐home naloxone. GPs prescribe just over half of all opioids in Australia13 and are the main health care professional seen regularly by people taking opioids for chronic pain. Conversations about naloxone initiated by health care providers present an opportunity to highlight proactive steps to reduce opioid‐related risk, and also raise awareness of overdose management. Unfortunately, community knowledge about opioid‐related risk is low, and most people prescribed opioids for pain are unable to identify common signs of potentially fatal opioid toxicity.14 Improved naloxone prescribing alone is therefore unlikely to be effective without education and increased awareness of opioid overdose signs by patients, family members, friends and carers — who are the expected administrators of naloxone in the event of overdose. One commonly cited barrier to prescribing take‐home naloxone is fear that patients may be offended by the offer or recommendation.7,14 However, Australian research shows that when informed about naloxone, most people prescribed opioids for pain would want or in fact expect their doctor to prescribe it to them.14 Sensitivity around language is key to openly communicating with patients about this issue. Terms like “overdose” still carry considerable stigma and are poorly understood by laypeople. A more patient‐centred approach (and to avoid having important health messages dismissed as irrelevant by patients), might involve changing our language to use terms like “severe opioid‐related side effects” or “life‐threatening opioid toxicity” instead of “drug overdose” to explain the same concept. Discussing naloxone may also help patients recognise the level of harm associated with non‐indicated opioids. The therapeutic benefit of opioids for chronic pain is limited and guidelines strongly caution their use.13 Presenting naloxone as a necessary medication for people on long term opioids may help patients better understand the implications of taking these strong analgesics. This may intuitively encourage patients to request opioid deprescribing or dose reductions. Conversely, increased prescribing of naloxone may risk providers (and patients) justifying high dose opioid prescriptions by relying on naloxone as a safety net. These fears are common with opioid harm minimisation efforts but are not supported by evidence6 and should not detract from the expected number of lives that could be saved by naloxone. A novel approach may be to consider routine co‐prescription of naloxone for patients on strong long term opioids. Laxatives and antiemetics are commonly co‐prescribed with opioids by providers cognisant of common opioid side effects; however, this concept does not seem to extend to naloxone. Take‐home naloxone for people on opioids is analogous to intramuscular glucagon for patients with diabetes on insulin, or auto‐injectable adrenaline for anaphylaxis. Most people are unlikely to need these emergency medications, but in the case of profoundly dangerous adverse events, naloxone, like glucagon or adrenaline, has a life‐saving role. Changing the narrative around take‐home naloxone from “overdose treatment” to “routinely prescribed emergency medication” may help provider attitudes and encourage the normalisation of naloxone prescribing. Our conservative estimate suggests that about 200 000 naloxone scripts would be indicated annually using this approach, at a cost of $40–50 each on the PBS.8 This is comparable with the PBS cost of an adrenaline auto‐injector or glucagon, which are both listed at $40.15 The estimated volumes of naloxone required would also be similar to combined PBS prescription volumes of glucagon (about 44 000 prescriptions) and adrenaline auto‐injectors (about 110 000 adult prescriptions and 28 000 paediatric prescriptions) according to Medicare statistics of PBS prescriptions from July 2019 to June 2020, excluding doctor’s bag prescriptions.15 We present these comparisons between naloxone and other widely accepted emergency medications to show the severity of current naloxone under‐prescribing. From a health economics perspective, increased naloxone prescribing at the rates we suggest would cost the Australian a similar amount to glucagon and adrenaline combined through PBS reimbursement. Further, naloxone would still cost only a fraction of current PBS‐subsidised opioid prescriptions (oxycodone alone costing over $61 million in 2018–201915) and overdose‐related hospitalisation costs. Naloxone may assist with reducing opioid prescription rates and cost, and most importantly would save lives. GPs and pharmacists should consider discussing and co‐prescribing take‐home naloxone with opioids for patients with chronic pain. Australia’s increasing prescription opioid overdoses demands this conversation. However, normalising the role of naloxone as a routinely co‐prescribed emergency medication will require major changes in community and health care provider attitudes, improved awareness of the role of naloxone, and reduction of overdose‐associated stigma. Ongoing collaborative efforts are needed to embrace higher prescribing and dispensing of naloxone.

Pallavi Prathivadi · Suzanne Nielsen

A 61-year-old man was referred to our ophthalmology service 3 days after a tree branch injury to the left eye

Shivesh Varma · Yi Fan Tang · Salim Okera

Objective: To assess the analgesic efficacy and safety of single‐dose oral cannabidiol (CBD) as an adjunct to standard care for patients presenting to an emergency department with acute low back pain. Design: Randomised, double blinded, placebo‐controlled clinical trial. Setting: The tertiary emergency department of Austin Hospital, Melbourne. Participants: Patients who presented with acute, non‐traumatic low back pain between 21 May 2018 and 13 June 2019. Intervention: One hundred eligible patients were randomised to receiving 400 mg CBD or placebo in addition to standard emergency department analgesic medication. Main outcome measures: Pain score two hours after administration of study agent, on a verbal numerical pain scale (range, 0‒10). Secondary outcomes were length of stay, need for rescue analgesia, and adverse events. Results: The median age of the 100 participants was 47 years (IQR, 34‒60 years); 44 were women. Mean pain scores at two hours were similar for the CBD (6.2 points; 95% CI, 5.5–6.9 points) and placebo groups (5.8 points; 95% CI, 5.1–6.6 points; absolute difference, –0.3 points; 95% CI, –1.3 to 0.6 points). The median length of stay was 9.0 hours (IQR, 7.4‒12 hours) for the CBD group and 8.5 hours (IQR, 6.5‒21 hours) for the placebo group. Oxycodone use during the four hours preceding and the four hours after receiving CBD or placebo was similar for the two groups, as were reported side effects. Conclusion: CBD was not superior to placebo as an adjunct medication for relieving acute non‐traumatic low back pain in the emergency department. Trial registration: Australian New Zealand Clinical Trials Registry, ACTRN12618000487213 (prospective).

Bronwyn Bebee · David M Taylor · Elyssia Bourke · Kimberley Pollack · Lian Foster · Michael Ching · Anselm Wong

To the Editor: The Coroners Court of Victoria made several recommendations in 2020 after a 38‐year‐old man died alone at home.1 The cause of death was determined to be sepsis in the setting of an adrenal crisis. The key coronial recommendations1 were to emphasise to the general medical community the non‐specific nature of symptoms of impending adrenal crisis (eg, fatigue, nausea, loss of appetite, vomiting),2 to record the diagnosis of adrenal insufficiency prominently as an alert in medical records,3 and to encourage endocrinologists to provide sick day or steroid stress dosing letters to patients, general practitioners, and family members and carers. The Endocrine Society of Australia (ESA) endorses these recommendations. A standard patient letter has been developed and is now available on the ESA’s Hormones Australia website.4 We strongly support medical record alerts for the diagnosis of cortisol deficiency due to Addison disease or hypopituitarism. It is crucial for doctors to have a high index of suspicion for the possibility of impending adrenal crisis in a patient with known adrenal insufficiency. The clinical syndrome evolves from acute adrenal insufficiency with symptoms of malaise, nausea and lethargy — all of which are non‐specific and may be considered part of another pathological process — to adrenal crisis, which is associated with hypotension initially manifest by postural blood pressure falls greater than 20 mmHg.2,3 Prevention involves advice on stress dosing:1 triple glucocorticoid dosing for 3 days (ie, the 3 × 3 rule),2 parenteral hydrocortisone at home (SOLU‐CORTEF Act‐O‐Vial, Pfizer) when unable to take tablets,3 and the availability of personal alerts (eg, a MedicAlert bracelet [MedicAlert Foundation], a steroid card) when the person is delirious or very unwell (Box). The incidence of adrenal crises is increasing in Australia.3 Missed cases or failure to treat them because of overestimation of the risks of glucocorticoid therapy are unfortunately too common. Box – Practical steps to reduce the risk of adrenal crisis Ensure that others are aware of the diagnosis of established adrenal insufficiency Prominent medical alert in GP and hospital medical records Patient carries either a steroid card, which lists diagnosis and glucocorticoid therapy, or uses a MedicAlert bracelet (MedicAlert Foundation) A sick day or steroid stress dosing letter should be provided by the endocrinologist to the patient with adrenal insufficiency, with a copy to their GP Encourage the patient with adrenal insufficiency to provide copies of the letter to their next of kin, close relatives or carer Have a high index of suspicion for an impending adrenal crisis Beware of non-specific symptoms of nausea, vomiting or lethargy in a patient with established adrenal insufficiency Prevent an adrenal crisis in patients with established adrenal insufficiency When unwell, follow the 3 × 3 rule (ie, three times the usual glucocorticoid dose for 3 days) and seek urgent medical attention if not improving Promptly treat an impending adrenal crisis The patient and/or carer should be trained to administer 100 mg SOLU‐CORTEF Act‐O‐Vial (Pfizer) intramuscularly* if vomiting occurs or the patient is unable to swallow tablets GP = general practitioner. * Some authorities recommend the off‐label use of a subcutaneous injection as this is easier for patient and/or carer to administer.

Peter S Hamblin · Bu B Yeap · David J Torpy

In Australia, an estimated 12.7% of patients with ST‐elevation myocardial infarction (STEMI) die or have recurrent myocardial infarctions within 30 days of diagnosis.1 Prompt reperfusion reduces morbidity and mortality, and guidelines consequently aim to minimise the time between symptom onset and reperfusion.1,2,3 Patients with chest pain may arrange their own transport to an emergency department or travel by ambulance. The risk period is shorter for patients without access to a defibrillator when they travel by ambulance, and they receive initial management more promptly. In Australia, only one in two patients with STEMI calls an ambulance.4 Characterising patients less likely to call an ambulance would inform targeted public health efforts to improve this situation. We analysed data contributed by 43 hospitals across Australia to the Cooperative National Registry of Acute Coronary Care, Guideline Adherence and Clinical Events (CONCORDANCE)5 for patients with confirmed STEMI who presented to these hospitals during 23 February 2009 – 31 December 2017. We excluded patients who experienced out‐of‐hospital cardiac arrest or cardiogenic shock. We compared the clinical characteristics, time to reperfusion, and hospital outcomes, including death and major adverse cardiovascular events (MACE) — cardiac death, myocardial infarction, heart failure, or shock — for patients who arrived by ambulance or otherwise, after adjusting for Global Registry of Acute Coronary Events (GRACE) risk score6 at baseline. The statistical significance of differences in categorical variables was assessed in Rao–Scott χ2 tests and that of continuous variables in Wilcoxon rank‐sum tests. For adjusted analyses, we used multivariable logistic regression models in a generalised estimating equation (GEE) framework, adjusted for clustering by hospital. Analyses were conducted in SAS 9.4. Ethics approval for the study was granted by the Concord Repatriation General Hospital Human Research Ethics Committee (reference, HREC/08/CRGH/180). Of 2765 patients who presented with STEMI to CONCORDANCE hospitals during 2009–2017, 1616 (58.4%) arrived by ambulance and 1149 (41.6%) by other means. The median age of patients arriving by ambulance (64 years; interquartile range [IQR], 54–74 years) was higher than for the other patients (59 years; IQR, 51–67 years), and the proportions with hypertension, a family history of coronary heart disease, or prior myocardial infarction, atrial fibrillation, or stroke/transient ischaemic attack were larger (Box). Time between arrival at hospital and reperfusion (primary percutaneous intervention or fibrinolysis) was significantly shorter for patients who arrived by ambulance than for other patients (Box). After adjusting for GRACE risk score, the odds of death (adjusted odds ratio [aOR], 1.16; 95% confidence interval [CI], 0.65–2.08) and MACE (aOR, 0.89; 95% CI, 0.72–1.10) were similar for the two patient groups (Supporting Information). Our analysis of data from a large Australian registry indicates that fewer than 60% of patients with STEMI arrive at hospital by ambulance; those who do have a higher median age and larger proportions have histories of cardiovascular disease. Importantly, their median time to reperfusion is shorter than for those not arriving by ambulance, probably because STEMI is diagnosed by electrocardiography during their journey to the hospital, which facilitates priming of emergency departments (for fibrinolysis) and catheterisation laboratories (for percutaneous coronary intervention). Despite the less favourable risk profiles of patients who arrive by ambulance, their hospital outcomes are comparable with those of patients who present directly to hospital, presumably because of their more rapid access to reperfusion. Our finding that patients with STEMI who are older and have more comorbid conditions are more likely to call an ambulance is not novel,7 but does indicate that this has not changed in recent years. This underscores the value of calling an ambulance when chest pain develops, and suggest that this public health message should be more actively promoted. Box – Baseline characteristics and times to reperfusion of 2765 patients who presented with STEMI to CONCORDANCE hospitals, 2009–2017 table#t1 tbody td:nth-child(n+2) P. Pleft { text-align: center; } Transport to hospital Characteristic Ambulance Other means P Number of patients 1616 (58.4%) 1149 (41.6%) Age (years), median (IQR) 64 (54‒74) 59 (51‒67) < 0.001 Sex (men) 1140 (71%) 933 (81%) < 0.001 English as first language 1383 (86%) 959 (83%) 0.44 Prior myocardial infarction 252 (16%) 151 (13%) 0.046 Prior heart failure 49 (3%) 27 (2%) 0.27 Prior percutaneous coronary intervention 177 (11%) 116 (10%) 0.46 Prior coronary artery bypass graft 52 (3%) 26 (2%) 0.10 Prior atrial fibrillation 96 (6%) 30 (3%) < 0.001 Prior bleeding 17 (1%) 14 (1%) 0.63 Chronic renal failure 73 (5%) 42 (4%) 0.17 Prior stroke/transient ischaemic attack 94 (6%) 32 (3%) < 0.001 Diabetes 321 (20%) 232 (20%) 0.80 Hypertension 853 (53%) 534 (47%) < 0.001 Dyslipidaemia 696 (43%) 473 (41%) 0.21 Family history of coronary heart disease 514 (32%) 477 (42%) < 0.001 Grace risk score (Fox), median (IQR) 114 (95‒135) 102 (85‒119) < 0.001 Reperfusion modality Primary percutaneous coronary intervention 919 (57%) 486 (42%) < 0.001 Fibrinolysis 434 (27%) 442 (38%) < 0.001 None 320 (20%) 273 (24%) 0.010 Hospital arrival to reperfusion (h), median (IQR) Primary percutaneous coronary intervention 1.2 (0.7‒2.1) 2.1 (1.4‒6.1) < 0.001 Fibrinolysis 0.6 (0.3‒1.3) 0.8 (0.5‒1.3) 0.002 IQR = interquartile range; STEMI = ST‐elevation myocardial infarction.

Eleanor Redwood · Karice Hyun · John K French · Leonard Kritharides · Mark Ryan · Derek P Chew · Mario D'Souza · David B Brieger

To the Editor: The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic has raised concerns of a subsequent increase in suicides,1 but limited empirical data are available on this topic.2,3 We analysed numbers of suicidal presentations (including suicidal ideation, non‐suicidal self‐injury and suicide attempts) to emergency departments (EDs) within the Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service before and since the spread of COVID‐19 in Queensland, Australia. Cases were identified from ED administrative data through relevant diagnoses, presenting problems and keywords, followed by a manual investigation of triage narratives to exclude false positive cases, such as non‐deliberate injuries or poisonings. The numbers of ED visits between January and August 2020 were compared with the projected numbers, calculated by applying an annual increase of 13.5%4 to presentations during the same period in 2019. From March 2020 onwards, a marked divergence between observed and projected numbers is noted, corresponding to the oscillations in the numbers of diagnosed COVID‐19 cases in Queensland (Box). At the peak of the pandemic, the reductions in suicidal presentations were the largest (29.8% in March and 23.6% in April 2020). Over the next 2 months, daily numbers of diagnosed COVID‐19 cases remained low and the difference between observed and projected numbers gradually narrowed (20.8% in May and 14.6% in June 2020). In July 2020, observed numbers exceeded projected numbers by 11.4%, but then declined again in August 2020, coinciding with another resurgence of COVID‐19. Between March and August 2020, the Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service had 554 less suicidal presentations than expected. The well documented negative impact of COVID‐19 on all aspects of society, including mental health,5 suggests that a substantial reduction of suicide risk during this time is unlikely. Instead, our results may reflect changes in help‐seeking behaviour, with fewer people willing to seek help for suicidality through in‐hospital consultations due to fears of contracting COVID‐19.6 Ongoing promotion of telehealth and enabling safe hospital presentations or alternatives to ED7 is therefore needed to prevent the adverse outcomes of the COVID‐19 pandemic due to delayed access to care. Limitations of this work include potential underestimations of suicidal presentations due to coding issues8 and the inability to differentiate between types of suicidal presentations. Box – Numbers of suicidal presentations to the Gold Coast Hospital and Health Service in 2019 and 2020, and numbers of daily coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) cases in Queensland, Australia Error ranges for the projected 2020 numbers are 95% confidence intervals.

Jerneja Sveticic · Nicolas JC Stapelberg · Kathryn Turner

CHRIS supported the Victorian ICU response during the COVID‐19 pandemic The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic put an unprecedented strain on intensive care resources throughout the world. Initially in Wuhan (China)1 and then in Lombardy (Italy),2 London (United Kingdom) and New York (United States),3 demand exceeded capacity, with 10–15% of the patients admitted to hospital developing critical illness. Australia has 191 adult and paediatric intensive care units (ICUs), with over 2300 ICU beds.4 This is equivalent to 8.9 ICU beds per 100 000 population, more than the UK but fewer than Italy and the US.5,6 In late March 2020, rising numbers of COVID‐19‐related admissions to ICUs were observed throughout Australia.7 The Australian and New Zealand Intensive Care Society (ANZICS) and the Australian Government Department of Health recognised that ICU demand was unlikely to be uniform, that capacity might be exceeded in one region but not in another, and that matching ICU resources to areas of greatest need might be required. A single sentence encapsulated the approach: “Why would we let a patient die in Western Australia if we can see a spare ventilator in Sydney?” A nationwide system to monitor ICU demand and capacity in Australia A nationwide dashboard of ICU activity, the Critical Health Resources Information System (CHRIS), was rapidly developed as a collaboration between Telstra Purple, Ambulance Victoria, ANZICS and the Australian Government Department of Health. All adult and paediatric ICUs (public and private) in Australia were instructed to enter data twice daily. This manual data entry typically took 5 minutes. Each ICU was immediately able to see patient numbers and resources available within every ICU in their region and also see an aggregate summary of all ICUs in Australia. CHRIS was available to all state and territory health departments, to all patient transport and retrieval agencies, and also to ICUs in New Zealand. The system went live on 1 May 2020, after 26 days of development. Three weeks later, 184 out of 188 eligible ICUs (98%) in Australia were contributing data. The ICU response to the second wave of COVID‐19 in Victoria After a decline in severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2) infections throughout Australia, notifications rose again in Melbourne at the end of June 2020.8 In response, ICU directors from the lead hospitals of the nine designated Victorian health care clusters commenced a daily morning meeting with representatives from Ambulance Victoria, Safer Care Victoria and the Victorian Department of Health and Human Services. The group committed to maintaining standards of care expected under normal (non‐pandemic) conditions and to achieving this by proactively transferring patients (with or without COVID‐19) to another ICU if delivery of care was compromised by high local demand. Decisions to transfer patients were informed by data from CHRIS. Pre‐existing critical care transfer systems run by Ambulance Victoria were used. From the beginning of July to the end of September 2020, there were 237 ICU admissions with COVID‐19 pneumonitis, of which 210 (88%) occurred in July and August. Admissions were predominantly to public hospitals in north‐western Melbourne.9 The rapid and localised nature of presentations meant that it was faster to transfer patients to ICUs with vacant capacity than to open and staff additional beds, despite physical ICU bed spaces being available. Transfers from the emergency department or ICU at the four north‐western metropolitan hospitals alone accounted for 35% (46/133) of all critical care transfers in Victoria during July and August. Spare ventilators were available at all sites on all days. On six occasions in August, there were more than 140 ventilated patients (with or without COVID‐19) in Victoria. On each of these days, there were more than 500 spare ICU ventilators available (Box 1 and Supporting Information, graphic 1 in the video). Despite individual hospitals indicating transient increases in ICU bed numbers, there was no overall increase in open staffed ICU beds. As COVID‐19 cases rose, so too did numbers of critical care staff unavailable due to COVID‐19 exposure or illness, with 15 consecutive days when there were more than 60 staff unavailable (Box 2). Lessons learned CHRIS provided real‐time data on ICU activity and capacity. In addition to facilitating the transfer of critically ill patients, CHRIS also enabled early diversion of ambulance presentations to emergency departments at hospitals where ICUs had capacity. These approaches were integral to ensuring standards of care were maintained by clinicians, retrieval agencies and the Victorian health department. At the same time, there was visibility to the Australian Government Department of Health, which would, if required, coordinate a national response to overwhelmed ICU services. Although several individual ICUs came under strain, retrieval and critical care systems in metropolitan Melbourne were not overwhelmed. Strategies to redistribute critical care demand are likely to have contributed to high survival rates for ventilated patients with COVID‐19 in Victoria.9 Timely transfers to ICUs with open available beds could be facilitated. Availability of staff was more important in determining capacity to deliver care than availability of ventilators. The role for CHRIS in the future The local application of a national tool (CHRIS) for real‐time display of ICU activity and resources was a key component of the response to the COVID‐19 pandemic in Victoria. CHRIS has the potential to augment existing ICU monitoring systems. The tool may also assist in the response to local and national public health emergencies, such as mass casualty events, bushfires10 or thunderstorm asthma.11 Automated linkage of CHRIS to existing state‐based and national systems should be investigated. In addition, it may have potential use in monitoring health policy impacts more broadly. Box 1 – Snapshot of the Critical Health Resources Information System (CHRIS) summary page for Victoria during August 2020 ACT = Australian Capital Territory; COVID‐19 = coronavirus disease 2019; ECMO = extracorporeal membrane oxygenation; HDU = high dependency unit; ICU = intensive care unit; NSW = New South Wales; NT = Northern Territory; NZ = New Zealand; QLD = Queensland; SA = South Australia; TAS = Tasmania; VIC = Victoria; WA = Western Australia. Box 2 – Number of ventilated (dark blue) and non‐ventilated (light blue) patients in Victorian intensive care units and the number of critical care staff unavailable to work due to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) exposure or illness (green dots), listed each morning in the Critical Health Resources Information System (CHRIS) LOWESS = locally weighted scatterplot smoothing.

David Pilcher · Nicholas R Coatsworth · Melissa Rosenow · Jason McClure

An emergency imaging pathway based on local and international guidance tailored to the Australian health care setting Imaging in coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) is primarily helpful in diagnosing COVID‐19‐related complications and identifying alternative diagnoses that may explain a patient’s presentation. It can also be useful in the risk stratification of patients by identifying the presence and severity of comorbidities.1,2 Imaging is of limited use in screening for COVID‐19 in asymptomatic individuals, and in many cases where COVID‐19 symptoms are mild.1,3 Indiscriminate use of imaging in patients with confirmed or suspected COVID‐19 not only exposes the patient to unnecessary radiation but also represents an unnecessary infection risk and logistic demand for medical imaging departments. Existing international COVID‐19 imaging pathways have been derived in clinical environments significantly different from Australia, often where there is high COVID‐19 prevalence and constrained resource availability. Some centres preferentially use chest x‐ray, whereas others perform various types of computed tomography (CT) imaging of the chest. There is also inconsistency in the reporting of imaging studies in suspected or confirmed COVID‐19, with some reports following traditional didactic format, and others using synoptic template reports as recommended by a variety of medical bodies.4,5 Here we describe an imaging pathway developed at the Royal Adelaide Hospital, the designated COVID‐19 hospital in South Australia. This pathway aims to outline the imaging indications, technique and reporting of chest imaging in an emergency setting, at a time of low COVID‐19 prevalence. We incorporate current available international pathways and best practice guidelines for emergency imaging of COVID‐19 patients into a simple pathway relevant to Australian practice. Imaging pathway development We reviewed consensus and position statements from the Royal Australian and New Zealand College of Radiologists, the Australian and New Zealand Society of Thoracic Radiology, the Fleischner Society and the British Society of Thoracic Imaging. Recommendations pertaining to high COVID‐19 prevalence environments and resource‐constrained environments were modified to suit a scenario of low prevalence. When local guidelines conflicted with international organisations, priority was given to local recommendations on the basis of relevance. Recommendations were subsequently integrated into a clinical imaging pathway in consultation with local specialists in radiology, emergency medicine, general medicine, respiratory medicine and infectious diseases (Box). Reporting terminology The pathway incorporates standardised reporting terminology for patients with COVID‐19 as recommended by the Australian and New Zealand Society of Thoracic Radiology.5 Categorisation of study findings as “normal,” “indeterminate,” “typical” or “other diagnosis favoured” improves report clarity and creates actionable imaging outcomes. Appropriate use of CT The main role of CT in this pathway is to exclude complications and alternative diagnoses in patients with confirmed or suspected COVID‐19. The pathway prompts clinicians to consider CT for patients who are hypoxic (or have an oxygen requirement) and who have a chest x‐ray that is either “normal” or “indeterminate for COVID‐19”. In this instance there is a clinicoradiological discrepancy, and either a complication (such as a pulmonary embolus) or an alternative diagnosis is suspected. In keeping with British Society of Thoracic Imaging guidance, a low‐dose unenhanced CT of the chest is the CT scan of choice, with strong consideration given to an additional CT pulmonary angiogram.4 There is accumulating evidence that patients with COVID‐19 are abnormally prothrombotic, and conventional clinical decision rules and blood tests (especially D‐dimer) may not be applicable.3 Clinicians should have a lower threshold than usual for performing a CT pulmonary angiogram. The unenhanced CT functions primarily as a baseline, as the presence of intravenous contrast can artifactually simulate ground glass. Whenever possible, the non‐contrast CT scan and the CT pulmonary angiogram should be performed on the same occasion to minimise infection control risk and operational demands on medical imaging departments. Baseline imaging for patients at risk of deterioration Patients with comorbidities are recognised as being at higher risk of deterioration. Defined risk factors vary between institutions but include older patients, requirement for oxygen supplementation, significant comorbidities (especially cardiac or respiratory) and immunosuppression. The consensus statement from the Fleischner Society supports imaging in patients who have a positive test result for COVID‐19 and risk factors for disease progression, regardless of their clinical status. The use of imaging in this situation is to establish a baseline for future comparison and determine the extent of comorbidities. Imaging may also inform the intensity of follow‐up monitoring, either in the community or an inpatient setting.1 Incidental findings suspicious for COVID‐19 Although there are no radiological findings pathognomonic for COVID‐19, there are radiological findings commonly associated with infection.5 When imaging findings typical for COVID‐19 are seen in a patient who is not suspected of having infection, the pathway prompts the radiologist to discuss the findings with the referring emergency physician. Patient isolation and COVID‐19 testing may be required. This is intended as a safety net for patients who may not be identified by current clinical screening processes, acknowledging that patients with COVID‐19 may be asymptomatic, may present with atypical symptoms and do not necessarily have knowledge of close contact with an infected individual. Ultrasound There is some evidence that point‐of‐care ultrasound can be used in the imaging of patients with COVID‐19; however, given variability in specialist expertise and availability, this has not been incorporated in this pathway.1 Conclusion Chest imaging in suspected or confirmed COVID‐19 in a low prevalence environment is best used to detect complications and rule out alternative diagnoses. The pathway described here aims to clarify imaging indications, technique and reporting of studies performed on patients with suspected or confirmed COVID‐19 in an acute care setting. Box – COVID‐19 emergency imaging guidelines AP = anteroposterior; ANZSTR = Australian and New Zealand Society of Thoracic Radiology; COVID‐19 and COVID = coronavirus disease 2019; CT = computed tomography; CTPA = computed tomography pulmonary angiogram; CXR = chest x‐ray; ED = emergency department.

David Ngan · Suzanne McKeen · Meegan Gun · Daniel Haustead · Andrew Low · Brett Lorraine · James Bewes

To the Editor: As the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic spread across Europe, we worked in the intensive care unit (ICU) of a Swedish university hospital. We share our experiences and offer some thoughts regarding Sweden’s pandemic response. The decentralised Swedish health system works on three levels (Box). These traditional divisions may partially account for the lack of coordination between care services in the initial phases of the pandemic, where large numbers of deaths occurred in care homes. As the pandemic intensified, safety checks were implemented to protect residents of aged care facilities. This resulted in a quick containment of infections, although tragically too late for many. Our health care region received the fourth highest number of hospitalisations in Sweden.1 We were privileged to work in a system that was well organised, without political conflict and with pre‐existing disaster plans that were quickly converted to pandemic plans. A pandemic‐specific leadership established a centralised inventory and oversaw the acquisition and distribution of beds, staffing, medical equipment, essential drugs, personal protective equipment and disinfection agents. An eight‐step plan ensured a rapid escalation of regional ICU capacity. Intermediate care units were opened, reducing demand for ICU beds. Projected numbers of patients were calculated daily, based on models provided from the Public Health Agency of Sweden and local data. Anaesthesia and intensive care are a combined speciality in Sweden. This enabled the rapid deployment of a large workforce of anaesthetists and nurse anaesthetists to ICUs. Despite these resources, our tripled ICU capacity meant significant staffing challenges, with additional difficulties because of staff illnesses and quarantines. Our impression is that the Swedish response has been controlled and planned for the long term. Daily public announcements from the Public Health Agency became a regular part of our lives and Swedes were generally compliant with recommendations regarding physical distancing and hygiene routines. We are perplexed by reports in the media that life went on as usual in Sweden. In fact, life was very different. Most people worked from home, large numbers were furloughed, many institutions were closed and public events were cancelled. Travel was discouraged and fell dramatically.2 What sets the Swedish approach apart from others is that these measures were largely voluntary, with generally good public support. We avoided an overwhelming wave of patients with an undercapacity of ICU beds, as seen in many other countries. We maintained normal criteria for ICU admissions. This is notable given that Sweden has the second lowest number of ICU beds per capita in Europe.3,4 Results from intensive care are encouraging, with mortality rates generally lower than previously reported.5 Challenges included staff burnout, a shortage of usual sedatives and lack of clinical experience with this new disease, resulting in the use of futile and potentially harmful treatments. However, guidance from a national group of senior clinicians provided regular recommendations6 and there was excellent compliance with advice from regulatory authorities. Up to 70% of elective surgeries were cancelled during the first half of 2020. Cancer‐related surgeries continued to be prioritised during the pandemic, but the longer term effects of cancelled surgeries, outpatient clinics and altered illness behaviour are not known. We are heartbroken at our inability to provide enough comfort to relatives of our patients who succumbed to COVID‐19 when hospital visits were prohibited. As two Australian emigrants working in a Swedish ICU, we are humbled by our ability to contribute to the care of patients during the pandemic. Our Australian medical training instilled in us a sense of duty, tempering any feelings of helplessness. We applaud the tenacity of our Swedish colleagues. We wish our Australian colleagues well and hope that Australia will be protected from the horrors of COVID‐19. Box – Decentralised organisation of the Swedish health care system

Michelle S Chew · Thomas Halliday

To the Editor: Elasticated straps — also known as “octopus” straps or bungee cords — are used to secure loads of various shapes and sizes. Unexpected release of the potential energy stored in these straps can cause catastrophic injuries. The Royal Victorian Eye and Ear Hospital (RVEEH) is the largest eye hospital in Australia and is well positioned to assess and treat a variety of ocular injuries. We explored trends in presentations to the RVEEH emergency department (ED) for such injuries between 2007 and 2018, using the ED triage database and information relating to total numbers of ocular trauma presentations. This study was approved by the RVEEH Ethics Committee (09/886H). Between 2007 and 2018, there were 169 presentations involving an elasticated strap‐related eye injury (145 male and 24 female; mean age, 43.4 years). While most patients had multiple injuries, the most common primary diagnosis was traumatic hyphaema, followed by corneal abrasion and open globe (full‐thickness wounds) injuries (Box). There were 23 admissions, of which 21 required surgical intervention, with vitrectomy, orbital wound exploration and closure, and lensectomy being the most common procedures. The final visual acuity measurements of the 17 patients who were admitted and able to be followed up were 6/36 or better for nine patients and 6/60 or worse for eight patients. While males presented more frequently than females, the absolute number of yearly presentations by gender was stable. Elasticated strap‐related injuries accounted for 0.23% of the total 72 663 ocular trauma presentations in the period. While it is problematic to compare incidence with previous studies, due to factors such as growth of the RVEEH ED, growth of other hospitals around Melbourne, and population growth, elasticated strap‐related eye injuries remain a significant contributor to presentations at the RVEEH. These straps were a known danger in the early to mid‐1990s1 and they remain dangerous more than 20 years later, causing severe ocular damage and requiring operative intervention in 12.4% of patients. Although the total number of elasticated strap‐related eye presentations does not appear to be dramatically rising, the continued presence of severe eye injuries necessitating admission for surgical intervention is cause for concern. Multiple steps can be taken to address the continued challenge of elasticated strap‐related injuries. Thorough assessment of the patient remains crucial to facilitate prompt treatment of vision‐threatening diagnoses. In addition, preventive measures should be undertaken to lessen the likelihood of visual loss caused by these devices. This includes patient education and encouraging the use of alternative devices that are functionally similar but pose no risks to eyesight, such as non‐elasticated straps that can be gradually tightened, braided metal locking straps, or even self‐contained soft roof rack and strap combinations. Regulators should also consider whether the convenience of elasticated straps justifies the danger they continue to pose to eyesight almost half a century after they were first introduced to Australia and the first eye‐related injury was reported.2 Box – Primary diagnoses of elasticated strap‐related eye injury sequelae table#t1 tbody td:nth-child(n+2) P. Pleft { text-align: center; } Primary diagnosis* Total cases Traumatic hyphaema 63 (3.3%) Corneal abrasion 42 (24.9%) Open globe injury 11 6.5%) Conjunctival/lid/canalicular laceration 7 (4.1%) Commotio retinae 8 (4.7%) Traumatic iritis/mydriasis/uveitis 7 (4.1%) Periorbital haematoma 3 (1.8%) Corneal foreign body 2 (1.2%) Subconjunctival haemorrhage 2 (1.2%) Traumatic glaucoma 2 (1.2%) Conjunctival abrasion 1 (0.6%) Vitreous haemorrhage 1 (0.6%) Posterior vitreous detachment 1 (0.6%) Retinal detachment 1 (0.6%) Lens dislocation 1 (0.6%) Other injury 5 (3.0%) No abnormality detected 7 (4.1%) Patient did not wait to be seen 5 (3.0%) Total 169

Philip Rothschild · Peter Meagher · Thomas G Campbell

Adequate capacity — beds, equipment, consumables, and, crucially, trained personnel — is needed to cope with a surge of critically ill patients

Mervyn Singer

The prognosis may not be as poor as overseas, but the intensive care resource burden may be greater

Aidan JC Burrell · Breanna Pellegrini · Farhad Salimi · Husna Begum · Tessa Broadley · Lewis T Campbell · Allen C Cheng · Winston Cheung · D James Cooper · Arul Earnest · Simon J Erickson · Craig J French · John M Kaldor · Edward Litton · Srinivas Murthy · Richard E McAllister · Alistair D Nichol · Annamaria Palermo · Mark P Plummer · Mahesh Ramanan · Benjamin AJ Reddi · Claire Reynolds · Tony Trapani · Steve A Webb · Andrew A Udy

Switching trauma specialist services to pandemic management would be unwarranted

Teagan L Way · Seth M Tarrant · Zsolt J Balogh

Fit testing of respirators is recommended to ensure proper fit for individual health care workers and is required to comply with respirator standards

Adrian Regli · Britta S Ungern‐Sternberg

The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‑19) pandemic has forced many countries to take extraordinary measures to prevent spread of disease. In New South Wales, public health orders introduced during 18–26 March 2020 required the closure of major industries and prohibited non‐essential gatherings of more than 100 people or allowing less than 4 m2 space per person. On 29 March, further public health orders prohibited people leaving home other than for work, study, shopping, medical care, or exercise.1,2 Changes in patterns of presentations to emergency departments (EDs) have been reported during COVID‐19 lockdowns overseas, including reduced numbers of patients with certain high acuity conditions, such as acute coronary syndrome (ACS) and stroke.3,4,5 Understanding the situation in Australia is important for public health policy during this and future pandemics. The Western Sydney Local Health District is a metropolitan health network in NSW of four hospitals (each with EDs) with a total capacity of 1925 beds, serving a catchment of 950 000 people. We analysed triage, International Classification of Diseases, tenth revision, Australian modification (ICD‐10‐AM) coding, and separations data for ED presentations during 29 March – 31 May in each of 2019 and 2020. Differences in mean daily presentation numbers for each triage category and selected presentation types were assessed in non‐paired Student t test with Bonferroni correction. All data analysis was performed in Excel (Microsoft). As a quality assurance project, the study was exempted from formal ethics approval. The number of ED presentations during 29 March – 31 May was almost 25% lower in 2020 than in 2019 (26 617 v 35 268). Presentation numbers in all triage categories were lower in 2020 (P < 0.001), except for category 1 (resuscitation) (506 v 445, 14% increase; P = 0.40). The proportion of patients discharged from the ED was greater in 2020 (60% v 53%) and that of patients who did not wait for treatment smaller (1% v 5%). The number of patients admitted to hospital was lower in 2020 than 2019 (8047 v 11 838), as were the proportions admitted to hospital (30% v 34%) (Box 1). ED presentations with fourteen selected diagnoses were further examined: common infectious diseases (infectious enteric disease, pneumonia), conditions frequently seen in EDs (wrist or hand fractures, femur fractures, appendicitis, renal calculi), conditions for which fewer ED presentations have been reported during COVID‐19 restrictions overseas (stroke or cerebral haemorrhage, ACS, chest pain, transient ischaemic attacks), and conditions that may be exacerbated or for which follow‐up in routine medical services may be reduced by COVID‐19 and its associated restrictions (mental health problems, substance misuse, malignancy). The numbers of presentations with infectious enteric disease, pneumonia, wrist or hand fractures, stroke or intracerebral haemorrhage, and chest pain not resulting in another diagnosis were lower in 2020 than in 2019. The numbers of presentations with ACS were similar. The number of presentations with mental health problems was higher in 2020 (daily mean, 8.4; standard deviation [SD], 3.1) than in 2019 (daily mean, 6.9; SD, 2.6; difference, +1.5 presentations per day; 95% confidence interval, +0.1–2.9) (Box 2; online Supporting Information). Social distancing may have reduced the spread of infectious enteric diseases and community‐acquired pneumonia, and home isolation may have led to fewer fractures. However, lower numbers of presentations with chest pain or stroke (also reported overseas4) may reflect factors other than lower incidence, such as suspension of outpatient clinics and elective procedures, social distancing measures, and public anxiety. COVID‐19 has profoundly affected health care delivery. We found concerning reductions in ED presentation numbers that may indicate delayed seeking of appropriate medical attention. Public health messages should encourage timely presentation of people with time‐sensitive, potentially life‐threatening conditions, even during pandemics. Equally concerning is the higher number mental health‐related presentations, which may reflect anxiety about COVID‐19, loss of job security, or prolonged isolation. Studies of patients presenting to health care services as they re‐open are required to fully appreciate the health implications of the COVID‐19 epidemic. Box 1 – Emergency department presentations to Western Sydney Local Health District hospitals during corresponding two‐month periods in 2019 and 2020 Triage category Resuscitation Emergency Urgent Semi‐urgent Non‐urgent Total 29 March – 31 May 2019 Total number of presentations 445 8910 12 464 10 726 2723 35 268 Daily presentations, mean (standard deviation) 7.0 (3.2) 139 (15.9) 195 (19.3) 168 (22.3) 42.5 (10.7) 551 (41.8) Admitted to hospital 350 (79%) 4550 (51%) 4524 (36%) 2156 (20%) 258 (9%) 11 838 (34%) Discharged: treatment complete 38 (9%) 3350 (38%) 6155 (49%) 7093 (66%) 2039 (75%) 18 675 (53%) Transferred to another hospital or service 26 (6%) 521 (6%) 577 (5%) 299 (3%) 68 (2%) 1491 (4%) Did not wait 0 65 (1%) 560 (4%) 735 (7%) 239 (9%) 1599 (5%) Discharged against medical advice 7 (2%) 413 (5%) 646 (5%) 442 (4%) 81 (3%) 1589 (5%) Died in emergency department/dead on arrival 24 (5%) 11 (< 1%) 2 (< 1%) 1 (< 1%) 38 (1%) 76 (< 1%) 29 March – 31 May 2020 Total number of presentations 506 7609 9095 7346 2061 26 617 Daily presentations, mean (standard deviation) 7.9 (2.6) 119 (18.4) 142 (17.5) 115 (17.9) 32.2 (8.4) 416 (40.6) Admitted to hospital 370 (73%) 3112 (41%) 3072 (34%) 1279 (17%) 214 (10%) 8047 (30%) Discharged: treatment complete 62 (12%) 3836 (50%) 5146 (57%) 5324 (72%) 1525 (74%) 15 893 (60%) Transferred to another hospital or service 26 (5%) 424 (6%) 461 (5%) 304 (4%) 136 (7%) 1351 (5%) Did not wait 0 22 (< 1%) 84 (1%) 170 (2%) 107 (5%) 383 (1%) Discharged against medical advice 9 (2%) 210 (3%) 328 (4%) 267 (4%) 64 (3%) 878 (3%) Died in emergency department/dead on arrival 39 (8%) 5 (< 1%) 3 (< 1%) 0 15 (1%) 62 (< 1%) Change in presentation numbers, 2020 v 2019 +14% –15% –17% –32% –25% –25% table#t1 tbody td:nth-child(n+2) P. Pleft { text-align: center; } Box 2 – Mean changes (with 95% confidence intervals) for numbers of emergency department presentations with selected diagnoses (ICD‐10‐AM codes), 29 March – 31 May 2020 v 29 March – 31 May 2019 ICD-10-AM = International Classification of Diseases, tenth revision, Australian modification. * Not resulting in another diagnosis. † Excluding cases without mention of obstruction.

Andrew W Kam · Sarah G Chaudhry · Nathan Gunasekaran · Andrew JR White · Matthew Vukasovic · Adrian T Fung

A 5-year-old girl sustained partial thickness facial burns from oleander leaves that she applied as pretend make-up

Sarah Oudtshoorn · Sanchita Gera · Parshotam Gera

Resource‐limited emergency departments responding to the COVID‐19 pandemic face many challenges — their strength lies in their unique solutions The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic is stretching hospital resources around the world. Emergency departments (EDs) are on the frontline of care and have been impacted significantly by the surge of patients with both suspected and confirmed infection.1,2 Resource‐limited EDs in low and middle income countries are particularly vulnerable. Pre‐existing issues, including a limited workforce supply, have been exacerbated, and new threats, such as a lack of personal protective equipment (PPE) and oxygen, have emerged.1,2 This article explores the impacts of the COVID‐19 pandemic on resource‐limited EDs across the Indo–Pacific. It considers the unique challenges for the region and describes opportunities for building system resilience at a time of unprecedented demand for emergency care. Emergency departments and the COVID‐19 pandemic Emergency care systems are essential for universal health coverage.3 Effective emergency care improves health outcomes, and is critical to achieving the health‐related Sustainable Development Goal targets.4 EDs are the cornerstone of emergency care systems, enabling access to facility‐based care for patients with acute illness and injury. They provide an interface between community and hospital care, and address unmet needs for vulnerable patients. These roles are augmented during communicable disease outbreaks, when EDs fulfil surveillance, triage and clinical care functions.3,4 Since the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID‐19 a global pandemic in March 2020, most low and middle income countries across the Indo–Pacific have reported cases. About 20% of patients require hospital admission, and early recognition and resuscitation can help reduce mortality.1 EDs therefore have a key role to play in risk‐stratifying patients, providing initial therapy, establishing goals of care, and identifying patients who may benefit from advanced interventions. Pandemic preparedness The Indo–Pacific encompasses the eastern Indian Ocean and Western Pacific regions, connected through South‐East Asia. The region is characterised by cultural, geographical and economic diversity.5 The Global Health Security Index reflects a country's ability to detect, communicate and respond to a communicable disease outbreak.6 Most low and middle income countries across the Indo–Pacific score below the average preparedness level of 40.2 (on a scale of 0–100) and are among the least prepared countries.6 These findings reflect pre‐existing gaps in health care capacity that are likely to be exacerbated during a public health emergency.7 A historical lack of investment in emergency care systems across Indo–Pacific low and middle income countries means that many EDs have limited resilience in times of increased demand.3,4 Emergency care has not been a focus for international donors,4 and sequential reductions in the Australian Government's development assistance budget for health have further compromised capacity building efforts.8 Although these projections foreshadow a devastating impact on low and middle income countries across the region, the global experience of the COVID‐19 pandemic has illustrated the limitations of preparedness modelling. Several of the most prepared countries are now disease epicentres with overstretched health services, in part reflecting an initial reluctance to follow WHO advice regarding testing and contact tracing.9 Indo–Pacific nations may have strengths that protect against this trend, such as recent epidemic experience.10 Nimble and innovative responses may help build resilience, potentially providing globally relevant lessons that would typically be expected from high income countries. Challenges in public health response A major determinant of the pandemic's impact on EDs will be the success of broader public health interventions. Low and middle income countries, including those in the Indo–Pacific, will face unique challenges in disease containment.2 As demonstrated by several Pacific countries, island states have greater ability to shut their borders and limit inward passage of the virus. However, a freeze on international access will have a significant socio‐economic impact and is unlikely to be sustainable. It may also affect the supply of essential medical equipment, surveillance capacity (given that certain countries rely on foreign pathology services for COVID‐19 testing) and retrieval systems. An important mechanism to disrupt community transmission of COVID‐19 is physical distancing. This is antithetical to many sociocultural practices across the Indo–Pacific, where communal living is common and regular congregation at community meeting places is the norm. Modelling from a Papua New Guinean setting has demonstrated that physical distancing measures in that community were 60–70% less effective compared with Australia.11 Public health responses across the region have already been complicated by extreme weather events and humanitarian crises. Examples include Cyclone Harold, a category 5 cyclone that recently affected the South Pacific, and the climbing infection rate in the worlds’ largest refugee camp at Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh.12 Worsening climate change will further exacerbate the incidence and severity of natural disasters and disease outbreaks. Challenges for emergency departments As community transmission increases, demand for ED care will escalate. The impact may be more pronounced among Indo–Pacific communities as a result of high rates of non‐communicable disease.13 COVID‐19 appears to be more severe in patients with diabetes, hypertension and chronic pulmonary illness, all of which are prevalent across the region.13 Increasing demand is likely to expose pre‐existing deficiencies in ED systems and resources, including scarce critical care capacity.1,2 A survey of emergency care clinicians in the Pacific recently identified minimal integration of surge response with routine emergency care, and a lack of essential processes, such as triage and patient flow.7 Consistent with these data, Box 1 lists key challenges in systems, spaces, supplies and staff that have become evident to Indo–Pacific clinicians during COVID‐19 response planning.2 Emerging data suggest that frontline clinicians are at an increased risk of death from COVID‐19, in part due to suboptimal PPE.14 Limited access to PPE is a major threat and will place ED clinicians at increased risk of infection. Low and middle income countries face challenges in PPE procurement because of supply chain limitations as well as market‐based competition with high income countries.1,2 Illness among health care workers will stretch an already fragile health care workforce. In the event of a surge, EDs will require significant increases in staffing, and the challenge may be exacerbated by high rates of comorbidities, absenteeism and inadequate training.7,13 Additionally, many Indo–Pacific EDs rely on a sole medical leader for clinical and administrative decision making.15 The pandemic may place these clinicians at risk of burnout, illness and death, thereby exacerbating the mismatch between supply and demand for care. Unintended consequences To meet these challenges, EDs will need to make substantial changes to their processes. However, there is a risk that distraction from pre‐existing health priorities will worsen the overall impact. Patients with chronic disease have poor outcomes at times of increased health system stress, as occurred in West Africa during the 2014 Ebola epidemic when resources were diverted away from routine care.16 Lockdown measures will make it difficult for some patients to access emergency care, and fear of acquiring COVID‐19 in hospital may create a further barrier to ED attendance. Additionally, the socio‐economic consequences of public health interventions are likely to contribute to poor health outcomes in the longer term. There is also a risk that donor funding will target resource intensive equipment (such as ventilators) that may be unsuitable in a low and middle income country context. Many resource‐limited ED clinicians are accustomed to a low cost essential care approach.1 Rather than emphasising expensive and high risk interventions, a focus on simple measures such as rigorous infection control and oxygen therapy is likely to be advantageous.1 The pandemic has already had a gendered impact, exacerbating the “triple burden” of productive, reproductive and community work responsibilities imposed on women.17 This has been particularly evident in low and middle income countries, where women make up a larger proportion of frontline workers and are disproportionately expected to fulfil unpaid household duties.17 Addressing immediate needs Addressing these challenges requires urgent action. While high level guidelines such as the WHO Emergency and Disaster Risk Management Framework18 exist, these often neglect the practical challenges faced by EDs. COVID‐19 guidance for Indo–Pacific EDs must complement WHO recommendations, and be culturally appropriate, fiscally responsible and immediately actionable2 (Box 2). Indo–Pacific ED leaders are already implementing COVID‐19 response plans. Examples from across the region are profiled in Box 3. These early success stories highlight the capacity of local clinicians to lead disaster response activities and provide meaningful care in the face of escalating health care demand. The Australian Government has provided some support for this effort by contributing funds to the WHO response plan and deploying specialist advisors to selected Indo–Pacific countries.8 Opportunities An increasingly interconnected world, combined with climate change and mass migration, will result in more frequent communicable disease outbreaks. COVID‐19 provides an opportunity to build resilient EDs that are better prepared for this challenge. The pandemic is also a chance to enhance the sustainability of routine emergency care through system strengthening, facilitated by multisectoral collaboration between clinicians, governments, technical organisations and donors.3 This effort should be informed by existing guidance for the enhancement of human resources, infrastructure, governance and processes to improve regional emergency care capacity.7 Australian agencies, such as the Indo–Pacific Centre for Health Security, have a key role to play in resourcing this activity. The pandemic provides a unique opportunity for the Australian Government to advance its commitment to strengthening health care systems and deliver on the promise of its Pacific Step‐up.5,8 It also offers a chance to leverage Australia's expertise in emergency care for the benefit of the region.3 Conclusion Time will determine the full impact of COVID‐19 on the Indo–Pacific, but global trends suggest that ED capacity may be severely stretched. Responses should target the unique challenges for disease control and emergency care delivery across the region. Although local ED clinicians are already demonstrating leadership and adaptability in their surge planning, the pandemic provides an opportunity to build resilience in emergency care systems and enhance future capacity for both routine care and outbreak response. Australian clinicians, organisations and governments have a key role to play in supporting this effort. Box 1 – Challenges for COVID‐19 preparedness and response in emergency departments (EDs) Variable Challenge (and selected examples) Systems Disaster and surge plans Many EDs and hospitals do not have standard operating procedures for surge events and communicable disease outbreaks: “ED COVID‐19 operations need a focal point of command at hospital executive level so that ED preparatory activities can be prioritised and fast tracked” (Solomon Islands) Triage Some EDs have no formalised triage systems. Implementing a triage system, for the first time, during a pandemic is fraught with difficulty Patient flow Overcrowding, interdepartmental communication barriers and a lack of ward beds can delay care for both COVID and non‐COVID patients Space Isolation and resuscitation areas Many EDs lack the physical space and infrastructure to adequately provide safe and effective routine care. In the context of the pandemic, a lack of dedicated isolation and resuscitation areas will be a major challenge Storage capacity Attempts have been made stockpile essential resources; however, there is a lack of dedicated on‐site storage space at many hospitals Supplies Personal protective equipment (PPE) and cleaning agents PPE supply is a major and ongoing concern: “There is not a standby supply of PPE … in a normal working day. [There is no] process to ensure a consistent supply of PPE in the department” (Fiji) “Our hospital is not a central level hospital, [so] we [were not given] much supplies” (Myanmar) Laboratory testing There is often limited laboratory capacity, and staff have competing priorities beyond EDsMany testing facilities are offsite or overseas, resulting in delayed isolation, identification and treatment of patients with COVID‐19, placing staff and other patients at risk Oxygen There is a lack of portable oxygen cylinders and oxygen concentrators in many facilities. Relatively few facilities have capacity for intubation and ventilation Novel therapies There is uncertainty surrounding the therapeutic benefits of agents such as hydroxychloroquine, azithromycin and remdesivir. In some countries, these medications are difficult to source, and with international demand increasing, supply will become even more scarce. This will impact the availability of these medications for patients who require them for other indications Staff Critical care training There are few formally trained critical care staff in many EDs. Additionally, there are concerns about workforce shortages and the reliance on volunteers Some hospital staff do not appreciate the importance of early recognition and treatment: “[Some staff lack an] initial understanding of the role of ED in the approach to COVID‐19” (Fiji) Staff morale and safety concerns Many staff are concerned about the risk to themselves and their family members if they are required to care for patients with suspected COVID‐19 without adequate protection: “[There are] difficulties in commuting due to strict curfew/modified lock down and restrictions on inter district transport. [There is] COVID phobia created by the media” (Sri Lanka) “I don't want them to infect, I don't want them to exhaust, I don't want them to depress, I want to create safe and less stress environment” (Myanmar) Box 2 – Strategies for optimising emergency department (ED) preparedness and response* Systems Ensure ED processes are consistent with broader public health and hospital management strategies Utilise local case definitions to identify suspected cases Establish a clearly marked screening and triage process at the entrance to the hospital, and stream patients based on the acuity of their presentation. For example, low acuity patients might be redirected to a co‐located surge clinic Maintain infection prevention and control to the highest possible standards. Ensure patients and staff practice physical distancing, cough etiquette and hand hygiene Minimise the volume of patients in the ED and isolate symptomatic patients from others by establishing a respiratory zone Develop clear admission/discharge criteria and establish ceilings of care for the facility Space Establish a clearly marked screening and/or triage station at the entrance to the facility Ensure the ED and surge clinic (if established) have designated waiting areas for patients with respiratory symptoms Allocate separate areas in the ED for the management of symptomatic, medium and high acuity patients Supplies Anticipate equipment needs and stockpile to the extent that is possible, especially disposable items that will be in high demand (oxygen cylinders, antipyretics, personal protective equipment, etc) Follow World Health Organization guidelines on resource stewardship. For example, implement clear thresholds for providing supplemental oxygen, such as SpO2 < 90% on room air for stable patients, SpO2 < 92% on room air for pregnant women, and SpO2 < 94% on room air for patients with respiratory distress Avoid use of therapies that are likely to increase virus transmission (eg, nebulisers) Develop safe processes for cleaning and reusing equipment based on World Health Organization infection prevention and control advice Staff Make sure that all staff feel included, empowered, motivated and supported Update the staff contact list and plan for absenteeism Identify staff who are high risk for infection and reallocate them to other areas Train staff in the systems and processes that have been developed Remind staff that they should not work if they have acute respiratory symptoms Use ancillary staff and other community members for non‐technical tasks Remind others that COVID requires a whole‐of-government, whole‐of-health and whole‐of-hospital response; the ED cannot do it alone Ensure ED staff are involved in the post‐pandemic review process to promote ongoing systems improvement and sustainability * Adapted from Australasian College for Emergency Medicine. Managing COVID‐19 across the Indo‐Pacific: a guide for resource limited EDs. Melbourne: Australia, 2020. https://acem.org.au/getmedia/3930cc60-abb1-4517-b7af-36da918a3f7b/Managing-COVID-19-across-the-Indo-Pacific-(G763) (viewed Aug 2020). Box 3 – Examples of successful COVID‐19 preparedness and response strategies employed across Indo–Pacific emergency departments (EDs) Variable Strategy (and selected examples) Systems Leadership and coordination Many countries have developed national coordinating bodies that include ED clinicians as key stakeholders. This is a recognition of their pivotal role in crisis coordination: “Once there were initial reports of care in China, the Ministry of Health had formed a National Taskforce and … ED was invited to participate in it as stakeholders” (Fiji) Identification of key leaders at each stage of the patient journey has been essential: “The hospital formed its Taskforce and we had devised operating procedures and a flow chart with important contact persons at each stage” (Fiji) Triage, screening and patient flow There has been a rapid development of triage, screening and flow systems based on specific criteria: “For patients with respiratory symptoms and fever … the high acuity patients can be stabilised in the ED respiratory resus and transferred to ICU. Medium acuity patients to be stabilised in the step down area of the respiratory section of the ED. Ambulance will transport patients to the isolation wards and ICU” (Solomon Islands) Space Isolation and resuscitation areas Guided by experience from Africa during the Ebola outbreak, EDs in Solomon Islands, Fiji, Myanmar and Sri Lanka have undergone significant restructuring of limited spaces to facilitate separate areas for screening, isolation, resuscitation and storage Supplies Infection prevention and control, and personal protective equipment (PPE) Drawing on experience during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, EDs have adapted guidelines for the judicious use of PPE, while emphasising that staff safety is a priority: “Within the storage area in ED of consumables, a cupboard is allocated to store PPE kits and this is tallied and replenished by the Hospital Infection Control team” (Fiji) “Health care worker exposure assessment protocol was designed” (Sri Lanka) “Luckily we have many people who want to donate what we need so we are still ok” (Myanmar) Resource utilisation Early decisions have been made about distribution of limited resources: “No CPR will be done on COVID‐19 high acuity patients who have (deteriorated) despite maximal non aerosol generating treatment” (Solomon Islands) “We decided to do respiratory team with only three people, because … when positive case came to our ED only these three need PPE” (Myanmar) Novel therapies These are not being used until there is proven evidence of benefit. Local guidelines have been developed: “Cautious use of fluids except in shock. Use of metered dose inhalers (rather than nebulisers) for asthma exacerbations” (Solomon Islands) Staff Critical care training Countries have begun re‐training staff in critical care and there has been redeployment and re‐training of staff from non‐essential areas to the ED. Non‐medical staff are also being utilised to assist with operational requirements such as cleaning and transportation Staff morale and safety There is a focus on open communication and staff wellbeing: “We did meeting every night with zoom and discussed the problems faced in their duty time … we asked their working capacity … and redrew duty roster” (Myanmar) “Special quarantine centres with all the facilities were designated for staff members who had problems in home isolation” (Sri Lanka) “Staff are undergoing medical checks. Staff with comorbidities will not be working in the respiratory section of the ED” (Solomon Islands)

Isobelle G Woodruff · Rob D Mitchell · Georgina Phillips · Deepak Sharma · Patrick Toito'ona · Krishantha Jayasekera · Khine Shwe Wah · Megan Cox · Gerard M O'Reilly

Although infection risks posed by COVID-19 influence all aspects of adult cardiac arrest management, the basic principles of resuscitation remain the same

Simon Craig · Mya Cubitt · Ashish Jaison · Steven Troupakis · Natalie Hood · Christina Fong · Adnan Bilgrami · Peter Leman · Juan Carlos Ascencio‐Lane · Guruprasad Nagaraj · John Bonning · Gabriel Blecher · Rob Mitchell · Ellen Burkett · Sally M McCarthy · Amanda M Rojek · Kim Hansen · Helen Psihogios · Peter Allely · Simon Judkins · Lai Heng Foong · Stephen Bernard · Peter A Cameron

For most patients, life continues beyond the intensive care unit, and this is where action is needed

Paul J Secombe · Alex Brown · Michael J Bailey · David Pilcher

Objectives: To assess long term outcomes for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander (Indigenous) Australians admitted non‐electively to intensive care units (ICUs). Design: Data linkage cohort study; analysis of ICU patient data (Australian and New Zealand Intensive Care Society Adult Patient Database), prospectively collected during 2007–2016. Setting: All four university‐affiliated level 3 ICUs in South Australia. Main outcomes: Mortality (in‐hospital, and 12 months and 8 years after admission to ICU), by Indigenous status. Results: 2035 of 39 784 non‐elective index ICU admissions (5.1%) were of Indigenous Australians, including 1461 of 37 661 patients with South Australian residential postcodes. The median age of Indigenous patients (45 years; IQR, 34–57 years) was lower than for non‐Indigenous ICU patients (64 years; IQR, 47–76 years). For patients with South Australian postcodes, unadjusted mortality at discharge and 12 months and 8 years after admission was lower for Indigenous patients; after adjusting for age, sex, diabetes, severity of illness, and diagnostic group, mortality was similar for both groups at discharge (adjusted odds ratio [aOR], 0.95; 95% CI, 0.81–1.10), but greater for Indigenous patients at 12 months (aOR, 1.14; 95% CI, 1.03–1.26) and 8 years (adjusted hazard ratio, 1.23; 95% CI, 1.13–1.35). The number of potential years of life lost was greater for Indigenous patients (median, 24.0; IQR, 15.8–31.8 v 12.5; IQR, 0–22.3), but, referenced to respective population life expectancies, relative survival at 8 years was similar (proportions: Indigenous, 0.78; 95% CI, 0.75–0.80; non‐Indigenous, 0.77; 95% CI, 0.76–0.78). Conclusions: Adjusted long term mortality and median number of potential life years lost are higher for Indigenous than non‐Indigenous patients after intensive care in hospital. These differences reflect underlying population survival patterns rather than the effects of ICU admission.

William G Mitchell · Adam Deane · Alex Brown · Shailesh Bihari · Hao Wong · Rajaram Ramadoss · Mark Finnis