Infectious diseases

To the Editor: The use of Bluetooth‐enabled apps like Australia's COVIDSafe to contact trace people exposed to coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) raises challenging moral and public health questions. Leins and colleagues1 rightly note that such tracing may endanger human rights. Yet the ethical decisions for governments and citizens are complex. The absence of vaccines and effective treatments, and the significant asymptomatic transmission of SARS‐CoV‐2, compels reliance on traditional tactics of social distancing, quarantine and contact tracing.2,3 Although the added value of digital contact tracing over manual tracing remains uncertain, even marginal improvements may interrupt disease transmission, save lives and improve public health resourcing. This could especially benefit vulnerable and disadvantaged people who suffer disproportionate harms,4 without treating digital contact tracing as a “silver bullet”. Whether, and which, digital contact tracing options are warranted depends on tough cost–benefit judgements. COVIDSafe's centralised storage of data on Amazon's servers facilitates access by governments with extraordinary power to interfere in citizens’ lives. Alternatively, decentralised data storage on smartphones has privacy advantages — but providing individual app users with the discretion to act on notifications of potential exposure to COVID‐19 may compromise disease control efforts. A hard choice exists between allowing personal data to be accessible by democratically elected governments versus powerful technology giants like Apple and Google which support decentralised data storage.5 Even greater invasions of privacy have been proposed, however, with location tracking options such as Norway's Smittestopp app (https://helsenorge.no/coronavirus/smittestopp) promoted as necessary to understand community interactions and the effects of social distancing policies for current (and future) outbreaks. While Leins and colleagues highlight significant ethical drawbacks, a full ethical analysis of digital contact tracing must also weigh its potential benefits. Certainly, citizens should agitate for strong protections to prevent abuse of power and misuse of personal information. However, even when governments offer ethically suboptimal contact tracing options, it may be permissible and even a moral requirement, all things considered, for citizens to support options to help protect the community. For its part, the Australian government should recognise that deploying digital tracing without sufficient transparency and community and expert input leaves citizens with harder moral decisions.

Simon Coghlan · Marc Cheong · Benjamin Coghlan

Objectives: Using echocardiographic screening, to estimate the prevalence of rheumatic heart disease (RHD) in a remote Northern Territory town. Design: Prospective, cross‐sectional echocardiographic screening study; results compared with data from the NT rheumatic heart disease register. Setting, participants: People aged 5–20 years living in Maningrida, West Arnhem Land (population, 2610, including 2366 Indigenous Australians), March 2018 and November 2018. Intervention: Echocardiographic screening for RHD by an expert cardiologist or cardiac sonographer. Main outcome measures: Definite or borderline RHD, based on World Heart Federation criteria; history of acute rheumatic fever (ARF), based on Australian guidelines for diagnosing ARF. Results: The screening participation rate was 72%. The median age of the 613 participants was 11 years (interquartile range, 8–14 years); 298 (49%) were girls or women, and 592 (97%) were Aboriginal Australians. Definite RHD was detected in 32 screened participants (5.2%), including 20 not previously diagnosed with RHD; in five new cases, RHD was classified as severe, and three of the participants involved required cardiac surgery. Borderline RHD was diagnosed in 17 participants (2.8%). According to NT RHD register data at the end of the study period, 88 of 849 people in Maningrida and the surrounding homelands aged 5–20 years (10%) were receiving secondary prophylaxis following diagnoses of definite RHD or definite or probable ARF. Conclusion: Passive case finding for ARF and RHD is inadequate in some remote Australian communities with a very high burden of RHD, placing children and young people with undetected RHD at great risk of poor health outcomes. Active case finding by regular echocardiographic screening is required in such areas.

Joshua R Francis · Helen Fairhurst · Hilary Hardefeldt · Shannon Brown · Chelsea Ryan · Kurt Brown · Greg Smith · Roz Baartz · Ari Horton · Gillian Whalley · James Marangou · Alex Kaethner · Anthony DK Draper · Christian L James · Alice G Mitchell · Jennifer Yan · Anna Ralph · Bo Remenyi

A rigorous and well supported primary care response to COVID‐19 is essential to protect the most vulnerable people in Australia In late December 2019, a pneumonia caused by a novel coronavirus (severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 [SARS‐CoV‐2]) was reported to the World Health Organization following identification in Wuhan, China. The outbreak was declared a public health emergency of international concern on 30 January 2020 and a pandemic on 11 March 2020. The respiratory disease complex was officially renamed coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) on 11 February 2020. On 27 February 2020, the Prime Minister of Australia announced the activation of the Australian Health Sector Emergency Response Plan for Novel Coronavirus (COVID‐19).1 Australia has a strong system of primary care provided by doctors, nurses and other health care workers, including allied health professionals, midwives, community pharmacists, dentists, and Aboriginal health workers. Comprehensive primary care services are available to all members of the community through general practice and Aboriginal community‐controlled health services, provided by general practitioners, primary care nurses, allied health and other health care professionals working at the forefront of the health system. Many of the nation's most vulnerable people also access services through aged care, home care and disability care services. Australia's primary care response to COVID‐19 acknowledges the need to protect vulnerable populations,2 to continue the provision of regular primary care services to the whole community for acute and chronic conditions, preventive care and mental health concerns,3 and the need to support and protect health care workers in community settings4,5 as well as in the nation's hospitals.6 In early March 2020, a targeted action plan was initiated by the Australian Government Department of Health to develop and refine the national COVID‐19 primary care response (Box 1). This action plan acknowledged the essential, first‐contact role of general practice in the nation's pandemic response,7 and was informed by lessons from previous epidemics and pandemics where primary care had limited involvement in both planning and response8,9 and by focused consultation with primary care stakeholder organisations. Consultation included a Primary Care COVID‐19 Preparedness Forum, led by Australia's Chief Medical Officer and held on 6 March 2020 with representatives from general practice and other medical specialties, nursing, allied health, pathology, pharmacy, practice management, rural workforce, Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander health, the disability sector, Primary Health Networks, and federal, state and territory governments. The Australian Government also established the National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Advisory Group on COVID‐19, co‐chaired by the Department of Health and the National Aboriginal Community Controlled Health Organisation (NACCHO). Issues considered in the framing of the primary care response included measures required to protect both the public and the primary care workforce from infection, the management of people presenting to general practice with fever and/or respiratory symptoms, the continued health care management of vulnerable people at increased risk of COVID‐19, concerns about seasonal influenza in winter, arrangements for pathology testing in the community, and the impacts on business continuity for community‐based health services. The primary care response was supported by a funding package of $2.4 billion announced by the Australian Government on 11 March 2020, which included $1.1 billion specifically allocated to support the COVID‐19 response in primary care.10 Key components of the primary care response included: funding of a whole of population model of telehealth (using telephone or video consultations); establishment of call centres to triage people with fever or respiratory symptoms, provide advice and direct them to the most appropriate health services; establishment of a nationwide network of respiratory clinics based in the community to complement state‐ and territory‐run fever clinics; development and delivery of online infection prevention and control training for all care workers; measures to safeguard the health of the members of remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities across the continent; and ensuring consistent messaging to members of the nation's primary care workforce. Telehealth New funding provided through Australia's Medicare Benefits Schedule (MBS) enabled a shift to the use of telehealth modalities for all appropriate consultations between patients and their health care providers. Telehealth initiatives were rolled out in a rapid, staged approach: beginning with support for the use of telehealth for members of the nation's most vulnerable populations; followed by items specific to obstetrics and midwifery, nurse practitioner care, and mental health care provision; then measures to enable vulnerable health care providers to continue providing care through telehealth; and then moving to whole of population telehealth consultations for all patients by all health care providers funded under the MBS (Box 2). On 30 March 2020, bulk‐billing incentives for people with concession cards and children aged under 16 years being seen in general practice were doubled to ensure there were no barriers for the population needing to access health care services and advice, and additional payments were introduced to support the ongoing viability of the nation's general practices.11 At the time of writing (2 June 2020), over 11 million telehealth services had been delivered to the people of Australia. National call centre People with fever or respiratory symptoms, or with concerns about possible exposure to COVID‐19, were encouraged to call Healthdirect — the Australian Government‐funded national call centre that provides free health information and advice. Healthdirect activity peaked at around 37 000 calls from members of the public per week in mid‐March 2020. The Healthdirect website also provided an online COVID‐19 symptom checker, which can be downloaded as an application for mobile phones and other devices (www.healthdirect.gov.au). Since 25 March 2020, up to 370 000 people per day have used the symptom checker. General practice‐led respiratory clinics Evidence from prior epidemics has demonstrated that neglect of usual care can be an unintended consequence of prioritising the emergency response, resulting in increased morbidity and mortality related to other causes.3,12 The establishment of a network of more than 120 general practice‐led respiratory clinics has redirected people with fever and/or respiratory presentations away from general practices and emergency departments. Primary Health Networks have had a crucial role in supporting general practices and Aboriginal community‐controlled health services, working with their local hospital networks to identify and help establish respiratory clinics. In addition to protecting other patients and health care staff from potential infection, the respiratory clinics allowed other general practices across the country to continue providing regular essential primary care services to their patients. Online infection prevention and control training A series of online education modules was created to provide consistent, evidence‐based information to health care workers and others working in community settings with vulnerable people. This series included eight modules targeting residential aged care workers and a 30‐minute online course, targeting all care workers, including those working in hospitals, primary care, aged care and disability care.13 It provided education on aspects of infection prevention and control for COVID‐19 and has been completed by over 800 000 health care workers at the time of writing. Protection of remote Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities The primary care response recognised that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people, as well as other people living in remote communities, are at increased risk of COVID‐19, due to pre‐existing health issues, difficulties with service access and high population mobility. Building on the strength of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander leadership and on measures initiated by many communities themselves, on 26 March 2020, the Australian Government enacted biosecurity restrictions on entry and travel to remote communities. Grants were provided to support remote communities in self‐determining appropriate planning and preparedness activities, adapting national plans and protocols for local use to enable early retrieval and evacuation of suspected cases, and establishing the mechanisms to support responses to any outbreak, including the deployment of appropriate health care workers. Communication with members of the primary care workforce Regular webinars with primary care doctors, nurses, mental health and allied health professionals were initiated, along with regular teleconferences with the representatives of national primary care professional organisations, with the aim of providing consistent and ongoing two‐way communication with the nation's primary care workforce.14 Since 19 March 2020, there have been over 100 000 live views of online webinars and over 130 000 accesses of online newsletters, along with use of the content by medical media outlets and reproduction by national professional organisations in their own newsletters and emails to their membership. The primary care response was supported by a series of government fact sheets and other COVID‐19‐specific resources developed to assist the primary care workforce in knowing how to protect their patients and themselves from COVID‐19. These have been made publicly available at www.health.gov.au. Primary Health Networks supported these initiatives through the provision of updates about the management of people with suspected or diagnosed COVID‐19. Conclusion Lessons from previous epidemics and pandemics have emphasised the critical importance of engaging early and effectively with primary care4 and the need for a single source of trusted information from health authorities for both clinicians and members of the public.5,15 Australia's primary care response has sought to achieve this, through early collaborative planning and ongoing two‐way communication with the nation's primary care workers. The Australian Government's investment in primary care during the COVID‐19 pandemic is an investment in essential elements of the nation's health system, enabling optimal frontline care while mitigating spread and protecting the ongoing health of the nation's most vulnerable citizens. Box 1 – Aligning Australia's coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) response with existing knowledge The known: Lessons learnt from previous epidemics and pandemics emphasise the frontline role of primary care and the need for strong, consistent communication with the primary care workforce and the wider community The new: Australia's primary care response to COVID‐19 has seen rapid implementation of initiatives to protect the nation's most vulnerable citizens, preserve existing health system function, support and treat people with COVID‐19, and optimise workforce capacity The implications: Australia's investment in the primary care response to COVID‐19 is enabling effective frontline care while mitigating spread, and protecting the ongoing health of the nation's most vulnerable people Box 2 – Staged introduction of Australia's coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) telehealth response Stage/date Description Stage 1 (13 March 2020) General practitioner consultations using telehealth for patients aged at least 70 years, Indigenous people aged at least 50 years, pregnant women, parents of children under 12 months of age, and those who are immunocompromised or have a chronic medical condition resulting in increased risk from coronavirus infection Stage 2 (16 March 2020) Supporting telehealth consultations by obstetricians, midwives, nurse practitioners, and some mental health providers Stage 3 (23 March 2020) Enabling vulnerable GPs and other medical specialists (in the same categories as in Stage 1) and providers authorised to use telehealth item numbers to provide care for their patients using telehealth Stage 4 (30 March 2020) Extending existing telehealth items to all Australians. This included a substantial investment in mental health support, with specific commitments to children and young people, older Australians, and health care workers Stage 5 (6–20 April 2020) Supporting expanded telehealth for many specialist medical services and allied health services, including consultant physicians, psychiatrists, geriatricians, public health physicians, neurosurgery, chronic disease management by nurses and Indigenous health workers, and group psychotherapy

Jane Desborough · Sally Hall Dykgraaf · Lucas Toca · Stephanie Davis · Leslee Roberts · Catherine Kelaher · Michael Kidd

Australia has managed the crisis well so far but we should now also plan for future waves and the recovery phase Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic management is focused on prevention, case finding and survival. Australia and New Zealand have done well and the numbers in our intensive care units (ICUs) are currently manageable. Our subacute sector is presently able to deal with patients requiring rehabilitation. However, rehabilitation needs following COVID‐19 are broad, complex and include cognitive, motor and respiratory sequelae to the infection, acute respiratory distress syndrome, and the thromboembolic response. Planning and anticipatory action has been Australia's strength so far. In the same vein, an active planning approach is now required for the post‐acute and rehabilitation response. This pandemic will inevitably have its waves, and will continue to threaten until a vaccine is rolled out. Not having a plan for possible surges is unconscionable, particularly when the consequences of the relaxation of restrictions are unknown. Currently, Australian numbers are at a trickle; however, the challenge has been front and centre in countries such as Italy,1 Spain, the United Kingdom and North America.2 In Wuhan, China, 36% of those with severe COVID‐19 had neurological complications such as stroke, critical care neuropathy, and the complications of prolonged bed rest (eg, venous thromboembolism, disseminated intravascular coagulation, acute kidney injury, delirium anxiety, post‐traumatic stress disorder).3 In Italy, rehabilitation physicians have been treating post‐extubation dysphagia, impaired mobility, critical care myopathy and neurocognitive losses,1 while the British Society of Rehabilitation Medicine has established a framework of partnership with acute services to improve patient flow, outcomes and access to ventilators.4 In the United States, hospitals have had to rapidly transition acute patients to rehabilitation hospitals. In New Orleans, a 1000 bed post‐acute hospital was dedicated to post‐COVID‐19 disability, with rehabilitation teams treating patients battling persistent hypoxia, stroke and mental illness.5 The majority of patients who are ventilated for more than 7 days suffer complications that require rehabilitation, 60% are unable to walk, and 17% die within a year.7 One‐third suffer neurological complications, many require inpatient rehabilitation for over 3 weeks, and some take over 150 days to regain their capacity to walk independently.8 Others with stroke or cardiac complications of COVID‐19 will require rehabilitation for up to 6 weeks, with some requiring lifelong support. Australia needs to plan now, not just for survivors in the initial post‐acute stage, but also to manage individuals affected in subsequent waves. Such patients may require rehabilitation, along with those, fearful of infection, who present to hospital late with non‐COVID‐19 conditions like stroke, and those with deteriorating chronic diseases who have not had access to hospital based services. That means not only estimating the patient population but also ensuring that subacute health workers have sufficient access to personal protective equipment, staffing and training. In the Australian Government's emergency response plan,9 the recovery phase devolves to the states, but there is no mention of the post‐acute phase. In April, the New South Wales Ministry of Health established a rehabilitation community of practice to advise it. This follows international experience, as the International Society of Physical and Rehabilitation Medicine's disaster committee lead, Australia's Fary Khan states: “early rehabilitation reduces disability and improves clinical outcomes”.10 Currently, many rehabilitation units are not prepared. Inpatient rehabilitation units (public and private) are almost always working to capacity. COVID‐19 patients will be expect to be accommodated in addition to usual patients (eg, strokes, spinal injuries, amputations). The NSW Rehabilitation Community of Practice has developed a staged COVID‐19 escalation plan,11 but the plans turn on one integral point — contagion. When COVID‐19 survivors come to rehabilitation wards will they no longer be infected? While a national statement exists,12 local de‐isolation protocols are yet to be implemented or updated in many hospitals and local health districts. Many people with severe COVID‐19 have positive nasal swabs for up to 37 days13 but are not considered infectious once 10 days have elapsed from after first symptoms. Attention to this timetable is critical should we need to make ICU beds readily available by shifting patients to rehabilitation. In some US rehabilitation hospitals, patients are assumed to always be infectious, which has a significant impact on personal protective equipment usage. To ensure de‐isolation, moderate and severe COVID‐19 patients transferring to rehabilitation must have negative swabs on 2 consecutive days, be symptom‐free for 2–3 days and be at least 10 days from symptom onset. In NSW, these criteria are currently being put in place and such a protocol will require discussion, review of the evidence, and leadership to execute. Once we have a de‐isolation protocol, we can confidently activate a staged escalation plan. While our ICUs are coping with current numbers, our subacute sector has been managing with innovative models of care, such as mobile rehabilitation teams.14 The NSW Rehabilitation Community of Practice's COVID‐19 response principles11 refer to mobile rehabilitation teams, variously called ART (acute care rehabilitation team) or SMART (specialist management with acute rehabilitation treatment) teams. They provide rehabilitation and discharge planning services to patients in the acute hospitals. It is a parallel care model in partnership with acute care that has been successful in decreasing length of stay and facilitating early discharge or transfer to inpatient rehabilitation facilities. These teams have discharged almost 50% of their patients directly home, avoiding inpatient rehabilitation admissions, and have been active in many NSW hospitals since 2009. Once home, tele‐rehabilitation physician consultations, supported by community‐based allied health practitioners, can be delivered, although additional resources are still being sought. Similar models exist or are under development in other jurisdictions as well. In the event that our acute hospitals start to face challenges in accommodating those needing COVID‐19 or ICU beds, the subacute sector will need to escalate to the next stage to create access. Options include decanting non‐COVID‐19 patients to the private sector, increasing resources to acute or mobile rehabilitation teams, scaled up tele‐rehabilitation services, and preparation for public hospital rehabilitation inpatient units to manage COVID‐19 patients. However, in order to decant to the private sector we need completed agreements with private hospitals, as flagged on 31 March by the Minister of Health.15 Many private hospitals have facilities that are well suited for rehabilitation patients. This would require delineating private hospitals as COVID‐19‐free facilities and would be dependent on appropriate triage and testing facilities. Managing the logistics will be a challenge in the subacute sector, particularly if planning is left as an afterthought. The efficient flow of disabled COVID‐19 patients from acute to rehabilitation care will likely produce better patient outcomes and improve safety. Egress from acute hospitals means access to intensive care and ventilation for the community. If Australia and New Zealand's success at flattening the curve continues, our existing subacute sector will manage. If not, mobile rehabilitation teams will need to be expanded, systems for patient flow to the private sector will need to be operational, and enhanced tele‐rehabilitation services will need to be working. This will require the same vision and leadership that made our acute COVID‐19 response world leading, collaborative and publicly supported. In the UK and the US, we see the brutality of this pandemic, with mass burials and the tragic toll on health care workers. Australia and New Zealand have avoided this so far, but it is because we have planned well. We now need to prepare for the recovery phase because surviving may not be the same as living.

Steven G Faux · Kathy Eagar · Ian D Cameron · Christopher J Poulos

Australia needs to improve vigilance in the global endeavour to eradicate poliomyelitis In 1988, there were over 350 000 cases of paralytic poliomyelitis globally.1 In 2018, there were 29 cases and in 2019 there were 112 cases2 — all in the only two remaining countries in the world where wild poliovirus (WPV) is endemic (Afghanistan and Pakistan). We are tantalisingly close to global eradication. What is poliomyelitis? Poliovirus is an enterovirus and exists as three serotypes: WPV types 1, 2 and 3. Spread via the faecal–oral route, poliomyelitis results in subclinical or self‐limited infection in most patients, but causes acute flaccid paralysis (AFP) due to anterior horn cell damage in about one in 200 cases.3 Ubiquitous distribution of polioviruses and epidemics of paralysis caused widespread panic throughout the world in the early 20th century. With an ambitious and unprecedented level of international public and private collaboration and funding, the Global Polio Eradication Initiative (GPEI) was launched in 1988.2 In recent years, significant achievements have been recorded (Box 1), but the target of global eradication is yet to be reached. The GPEI currently faces two main global issues. Firstly, addressing the eradication of WPV1 in Afghanistan and Pakistan, and secondly, dealing with the growing issue of vaccine‐derived poliovirus (VDPV).1 Vaccine strain virus can slowly accumulate mutations over time, which eventually result in reversion to neurovirulence — these strains are known as VDPV. Although extremely uncommon, this phenomenon becomes increasingly prominent in areas where there are long term low vaccination rates, allowing continued circulation of the attenuated poliovirus contained in the Sabin vaccine. Ironically, the modern prominence of VDPVs is a consequence of the GPEI's successful endeavours to reduce WPV. Poliomyelitis close to home VDPVs are appearing in areas with low immunisation rates in Africa, and recent emergence in closer neighbours puts poliomyelitis back on our doorstep. In 2018, there was an outbreak in Papua New Guinea involving 26 VDPV type 1 AFP cases, including a death.4 In late 2019, the Philippines reported 15 VDPV cases, and Malaysia reported three cases in 2019 and one in 2020.5 These countries had previously been declared poliomyelitis‐free.6 Between 2012–13 and 2017–18, the median number of annual arrivals for Philippine citizens to Australia was 141 813, with 8% of these arrivals being children younger than 15 years.7 Screening individuals at our borders is not an economically viable option to prevent poliomyelitis, thus highlighting the importance of optimal immunisation and high quality surveillance. Australia's commitment to World Health Organization targets Australia and all other Western Pacific region countries were certified as poliomyelitis‐free on 29 October 2000.6 As a signatory to the World Health Organization's International Health Regulations (2005),8 Australia reports annually on its compliance, with obligations to prevent and respond to acute public health risks of international consequence. This includes observing temporary recommendations issued when the WHO declared the risk of international spread of poliovirus a public health emergency of international concern in 2014, poliovirus containment activities, and reporting to the WHO Regional Certification Commission providing evidence that Australia's poliomyelitis‐free status has been maintained. This evidence requires Australia to meet WHO‐specified surveillance standards. The Australian National Enterovirus Reference Laboratory plays an important role in providing enterovirus testing and environmental surveillance for Australia and the Western Pacific region to meet these requirements. Environmental surveillance for polioviruses is costly and labour‐intensive and involves sampling sewage for detection and then characterisation of enteroviruses. There is currently inadequate capacity to routinely conduct environmental surveillance throughout Australia. Therefore, this capacity is currently directed at monitoring during high risk episodes; for example, when there is a cluster of AFP cases or after the importation of a confirmed case. The detection of any poliovirus in Australia is considered a likely importation event, as Australia stopped the use of the oral polio vaccine in 2005. Adequate clinical surveillance is based on two key WHO indicators. Firstly, achieving an AFP detection rate of at least one case per 100 000 children younger than 15 years. Secondly, the WHO requires enterovirus culture on two stool samples collected at least 24 hours apart, both within 14 days of onset of paralysis, for at least 80% of reported AFP cases.9 Submission of two samples ensures adequate sensitivity, required due to intermittent viral shedding.10 Meeting these targets provides national and international reassurance that there is timely investigation that excludes poliomyelitis as the cause of AFP. However, for Australian clinicians, awareness of this surveillance and its purpose is often not well understood. An overview of the AFP surveillance structure is provided in Box 2. Importantly, AFP cases need to be notified and investigated even if another diagnosis (eg, Guillain–Barré syndrome) is likely. Australia's performance in meeting World Health Organization targets While Australia has met the surveillance target for AFP notification for the past 11 years, we consistently fail to reach the WHO benchmark for stool submissions (Box 3).11 This is in marked contrast to many of our closest neighbours. Only New Zealand, the small Pacific Island countries and Papua New Guinea have a similarly low performance over recent years. In 2018, adequate stool collection was achieved in only 44% of Australian AFP cases and 2019 results are currently at 65%.12 The most populous states of New South Wales and Victoria consistently underperform, with rates of 33% and 42% respectively for 2018 (Bruce Thorley, Head of Victorian Infectious Diseases Reference Laboratory, Australia, personal communication, September 2019). In 2018, three cases of AFP and anterior horn cell abnormality on magnetic resonance imaging in young children were reported to WHO by Australia as “poliomyelitis compatible” because of a lack of adequate clinical information and appropriate stool sample collection (David Isaacs, Chair of Polio Expert Panel, Australia, personal communication, September 2019). In addition to providing robust public health surveillance, ensuring adequate investigation of AFP can produce relevant diagnostic information for an individual. A 3‐year‐old child with permanent significant disability following AFP in 2018 had the neuropathic enterovirus D68 (EV‐D68) in faeces sent for AFP surveillance purposes.13,14 The converse may also apply. Detection of a non‐polio enterovirus by polymerase chain reaction (PCR) in a clinical sample does not preclude the possibility of dual infection with poliovirus. Co‐infection and subsequent recombination of species C non‐polio enteroviruses with Sabin‐like poliovirus is an important precursor event in the development of VDPVs.15 Barriers to improvement A number of logistical issues affect successful stool sample collection; for example, late presentation of patients, discharge before sample collection, and constipation may all have an impact on stool collection rates.16 In some instances, pre‐examination by microbiology laboratories using enterovirus reverse transcriptase PCR (RT‐PCR) may occur. This does not exclude poliovirus infection and testing at the WHO reference laboratory is still required. Due to the extended viral shedding in the gastrointestinal tract, stool samples are the specimen type most likely to facilitate enterovirus identification. The collection of rectal or throat swabs is discouraged by WHO due to reduced sensitivity compared with faeces samples. Pragmatism may dictate that the former may be preferable to no testing at all in a particular child if barriers to faeces collection exist. Recognising poliomyelitis in a low prevalence community Cases of poliomyelitis present as acute and often painful weakness in affected limbs. The weakness is often asymmetrical, affecting lower limbs more frequently than upper limbs, with rapid onset and usually no further progression after 48 hours. Sometimes patients may present atypically, reinforcing the need for any AFP to be reported and investigated. Alternative presentations may include dyspnoea or dysphagia due to weakness of bulbar or respiratory muscles. Cerebrospinal fluid findings are suggestive of viral meningitis. There are usually no systemic symptoms, although a recent history of a mild upper respiratory tract infection with or without headache may be elicited.3 A history of exposure to a high risk area (eg, Central Africa, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea or Afghanistan) and/or lack of previous immunisation is important. A history of distant past immunisation will not exclude the diagnosis, particularly if this was received overseas.10 Call to action There appears to be a level of complacency among physicians due to the rarity of clinical poliomyelitis in Australia. In addition, there is a lack of awareness in the diagnostic chain regarding the importance of laboratory surveillance. In 2020, a comprehensive action plan was implemented by the Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance (PAEDS) network to improve faeces collections across the country. Clinicians should not fear that they are being alarmist in notifying AFP cases that they believe have negligible risk of poliomyelitis. The emphasis on detection and investigation of AFP cases despite an alternative diagnosis may seem pointless for an individual case, but at a national level, it allows confidence in the integrity of surveillance and, ultimately, achievement of poliomyelitis eradication. Conclusion The recent VDPV outbreaks in Papua New Guinea and the Philippines and the ongoing WPV1 circulation in Pakistan and Afghanistan emphasise the possibility of poliomyelitis re‐introduction into Australia. Clinical acumen is unlikely to provide a timely diagnosis. Clinicians are reminded that poliomyelitis as a diagnosis should be excluded in all cases of AFP; faeces collection from all AFP cases independent of age should be viewed as a priority to ensure the country remains poliomyelitis‐free and as an opportunity to maintain surveillance, even when another diagnosis is confirmed or highly likely. Box 1 – Selected achievements relevant for Australia in the history of the Global Polio Eradication Initiative2 Year Milestone 2000 Australia declared poliomyelitis‐free 2005 Inactivated polio vaccine replaces oral polio vaccine in Australia 2014 South‐East Asia declared poliomyelitis‐free 2015 Wild poliovirus type 2 declared eradicated 2017 99% of poliomyelitis eradicated globally 2019 Wild poliovirus type 3 declared eradicated Box 2 – Schematic overview of acute flaccid paralysis surveillance structure in Australia APSU = Australian Paediatric Surveillance Unit (www.apsu.org.au); PEP = Polio Expert Panel; PAEDS = Paediatric Active Enhanced Disease Surveillance Network (www.paeds.org.au); VIDRL = Victorian Infectious Disease Reference Laboratory (https://www/vidrl.org.au/surveillance/afp-surveillance1); WHO = World Health Organization. Box 3 – Percentage of acute flaccid paralysis notification with adequate stool sample collection, Australia, 1995–2018* WHO = World Health Organization. * Data reproduced, with permission, from Roberts et al.11

Meryta May · David Durrheim · Jason A Roberts · Rhonda Owen

To the Editor: There is marked concern among health care workers in Australia regarding the safety of caring for patients with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19), which partly relates to highly publicised reports of health care workers dying from COVID‐19 overseas. The concern has caused high levels of anxiety in many health care workers, the use of personal protective equipment (PPE) outside of government guidelines, and many seeking exemptions from being involved in the care of patients with COVID‐19. The reports of health care worker deaths overseas generally do not explore whether the infection was contracted caring for patients or through community contact, or whether appropriate PPE was worn. In March 2020, a clinic was established to screen staff from Royal Melbourne Hospital and neighbouring hospitals who had developed a fever or new respiratory symptoms. A targeted history was taken and a swab was performed according to public health department recommendations at the time. In addition to this, a public screening clinic run by the hospital was also available for health care workers practising in the broader community, so those working in non‐hospital settings could be identified and tested. At 6 April 2020, 1160 symptomatic staff had been assessed in the staff clinic and the majority had been swabbed for COVID‐19, while a number of health care workers also attended the public clinic. Across both staff and public screening clinics, 11 health care workers were found to be positive for COVID‐19. Of these, eight had a history of travel or close contact with a COVID‐19 case in the community. The other three had no obvious COVID‐19 contact in the workplace, during a period when fewer than ten patients with COVID‐19 were treated at the hospital. Two of the staff, while identifying as health care workers, did not work in a clinical hospital setting and were judged to be at low risk of contracting infection from an unwell patient in their workplace. The other worked in a hospital ward where no known COVID‐19 infected patients had been managed. Although a dedicated service for screening and supporting staff may not be feasible in all settings, it does provide access to rapid testing which gives valuable reassurance for staff. Importantly, monitoring the data helps to contextualise our local experience. These data indicate that COVID‐19 is very uncommon in health care workers at present, and that the large majority who have contracted COVID‐19 have done so away from work. There is already intensive training in the use of appropriate PPE in the workplace, and we continue to reassure health care workers that this affords high level protection. Victorian census data in 2016 suggest that approximately 12% of adults identify as health care workers,1 which gives some context to the state‐wide data suggesting that 11% of positive cases to date have occurred in health care workers.2 This is not to trivialise the risk that frontline health care workers face, particularly when caring for unrecognised cases without using PPE. Our data show that currently, community acquisition of COVID‐19 is likely to be occurring in health care workers more often than work‐related acquisition. Health care workers should focus on taking measures (eg, social distancing and hand hygiene) to protect themselves from COVID‐19 when away from work. Ongoing monitoring of the epidemiology related to staff clinic presentations may help provide information on local risks.

Stephen Muhi · Louis B Irving · Kirsty L Buising

How to deal with diabetes and COVID‐19 — do we just dial in? The emergence of severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS-CoV-2), and the subsequent announcement by the World Health Organization of a global pandemic, has altered health care across the public and private sectors. Clearly, coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) is having a huge impact on general practitioners, emergency physicians, respiratory physicians, intensivists and related staff, and is also impacting the day‐to‐day delivery of chronic health care. Conditions such as type 1 and type 2 diabetes require regular, usually face‐to‐face contact with GPs, endocrinologists, diabetes educators, dieticians and podiatrists to optimise glycaemic control. However, with recommendations regarding social isolation to minimise spread of COVID‐19,1 the delivery of such health care is increasingly being delivered using telehealth. This has been greatly facilitated in Australia with the announcement of temporary Medical Benefits Schedule telehealth (videoconference and telephone) item numbers during the COVID‐19 pandemic.2 The eligibility criteria for bulk‐billing include individuals who are immunosuppressed or with chronic health conditions, which include diabetes mellitus. Significantly, the eligibility criteria also include pregnancy. At a time when individuals are being asked to socially isolate to minimise exposure to SARS‐CoV‐2, many who greatly need ongoing health care are avoiding these appointments out of fear of infection from those also attending the clinic and perhaps from clinicians, who are recognised to be at high risk of infection. It is therefore crucial that telehealth care services are offered (and if not available, fast tracked). This may be via videoconference, or a phone call for those who are less able to use newer technologies or if videoconferencing services are not available. Services traditionally offered in a group setting, such as group education for those with gestational diabetes or type 2 diabetes, may also be delivered via this technology. The use of diabetes management technology can benefit health care and telehealth consultation. Continuous or flash glucose monitoring can be used with both type 1 and 2 diabetes with therapeutic benefit. Many of these devices upload automatically to cloud‐based software. Other devices such as insulin pumps and blood glucose meters can be uploaded by the user before the consultation, which places a greater burden on the individual. Involvement of parents, carers and diabetes educators before the appointment may be of benefit. This may lead to improvements in individual diabetes self‐management. The electronic medical record is vital in updating changes to medications, results and scheduled appointments. Many pathology providers facilitate electronic access to test results, but anecdotally some patients may avoid having pathology tests taken in order to minimise travel and exposure to others. The individuals who are at greatest risk of complications from COVID‐19 are still being determined. It seems clear that those with diabetes and other chronic comorbidities are at increased risk of morbidity. A number of small observational studies have analysed comorbidities in individuals with severe SARS‐CoV‐2 infection from China. Rates of diabetes (type unspecified, but most likely to be type 2 diabetes given the low incidence of type 1 diabetes in China3) are reported between 7.4% in confirmed cases infection,4 and up to 17% in cases with severe pneumonia.5 A recent meta‐analysis of six studies (including 1527 people) analysed the prevalence of comorbidities among individuals with severe and non‐severe COVID‐19.6 Diabetes complicated 11.7% of severe cases compared with 4% of cases of non‐severe COVID‐19. This did not reach statistical significance; however, this is clearly limited by a lack of statistical power and further analyses are required. Retrospective analysis of survivors and non‐survivors of the 2002–2003 SARS coronavirus outbreak suggested that diabetes was a predictor for mortality.7 This association seemed to be driven by glycaemic control, with an independent association with elevated fasting plasma glucose. This further highlights the need to maintain ongoing medical care to optimise glucose control throughout the current COVID‐19 pandemic. All people who currently smoke should be advised to cease smoking. In addition, receiving the recently available influenza vaccine, which is usually recommended for people with diabetes, would be advisable, although patients should be aware that this will not protect against COVID‐19. Individuals with both type 1 and type 2 diabetes need to have clear action and sick day plans in the eventuality that they become unwell, and should be encouraged to seek face‐to‐face care for complications such as myocardial infarction or high risk foot ulcer. This should be emphasised even for individuals with long standing diabetes, whose initial diabetes education may have occurred years ago. Individuals with type 1 diabetes should have ketone monitoring strips available (preferably blood continuous subcutaneous insulin infusion ketone test strips), know when to test for ketones, and be aware of the need for additional insulin doses (via injection or continuous subcutaneous insulin infusion) during an intercurrent illness. Excellent sick day management resources are available on the websites of the Australian Diabetes Educators Association (https://www.adea.com.au) and National Diabetes Services Scheme (https://www.ndss.com.au). Individuals using hybrid closed loop insulin pumps should be educated that during illness the wearer may need to exit automatic mode to enable more rapid correction of hyperglycaemia with manual correction boluses of insulin and a temporary increased basal rate.8 The algorithm within the hybrid closed pump may otherwise not adapt quickly enough to manage hyperglycaemia during acute illness. With the increased use of sodium–glucose cotransporter type 2 (SGLT2) inhibitors in Australia and internationally, all individuals treated with SGLT2 inhibitors should be educated on the need to withhold these drugs during illness to minimise the risk of ketoacidosis.9 This should be reiterated to GPs and emergency physicians to screen for SGLT2 inhibitor use in patients presenting with COVID‐19 or any illness. There have been mixed anecdotal reports as to whether non‐steroidal anti‐inflammatory drugs (NSAIDs) may predispose patients to COVID‐19. There has been suggestion that NSAIDs may upregulate angiotensin‐converting enzyme 2 (ACE2),10 and therefore potentially predispose by a similar mechanism suggested for angiotensin receptor blockers (ARBs). Currently there are no guidelines to avoid the use of NSAIDs. In relation to COVID‐19, there is also increasing interest in the use of ACE inhibitors and ARBs in individuals with type 1 or type 2 diabetes and other chronic care conditions, such as diabetes. SARS‐CoV‐2 binds to ACE2, allowing entrance into the host cells.11 ACE inhibitors and ARBs can result in upregulation of ACE2 in some tissues in both human and animal models.10,12,13 However, not all investigators have found a link between these antihypertensives and upregulation of ACE2.14 It has been proposed that ACE inhibitors and ARBs may theoretically increase susceptibility to COVID‐19 by increasing ACE2 levels. However, there is currently no evidence to link the use of these agents to increased risk or severity of COVID‐19. Indeed, other research groups have hypothesised that the use of ARBs may be a potential therapeutic modality.15 Following SARS‐CoV‐2 binding to ACE2, there is downregulation of ACE2 with subsequent increased angiotensin levels and exacerbation of COVID‐19 related lung injury. It has been proposed that the downregulation of ACE2 by ARBs might protect against such injury.15 Other groups have suggested that ARBs may stabilise the binding of ACE2 to the type 1 angiotensin receptor and may therefore reduce available binding sites for SARS‐Cov‐2.16 Currently, there is no evidence to suggest changing antihypertensive therapy, and multiple national and international bodies including the Australian Diabetes Society, Australian and New Zealand Society of Cardiac and Thoracic Surgeons, and the American College of Cardiology and European Society of Hypertension have recommended that ACE inhibitors and ARBs should not be ceased.17 Trials are currently underway to assess the impact of these agents during COVID‐19 infection (https://clinicaltrials.gov). Patients should be encouraged to continue their ACE inhibitor or ARB drugs, and if not prepared to do so, be offered alternative drugs for blood pressure control. This is a time of great concern to all individuals, and perhaps more so to those who have been informed they are at greater risk of COVID‐19 and its complications. This may necessitate a greater state of preparedness. The current advice is that there will be no shortage of insulin supplies or consumables needed for insulin pump therapy or blood glucose monitoring equipment, yet anecdotally, local pharmacy shortages of insulins, ketone strips and oral hypoglycaemic drugs have been reported and are being addressed by government prescription limits. Should patients be unable to obtain their usual prescriptions, suitable alternatives can be recommended to them by their diabetes care clinicians. It is critical that individuals with diabetes and other chronic conditions do not hoard these medical supplies and inadvertently create a critical supply shortage. Continuation of health care to at‐risk individuals is crucial throughout the pandemic. Telehealth is the key for the delivery of such care. It is important that people with diabetes are educated regarding the management of their condition during acute illness, including medication changes. It is also critical that there is no deterioration in the medical management of glycaemia and other complications of diabetes, which, if neglected, may result in increased morbidity and mortality independent of COVID‐19.

Emma S Scott · Alicia J Jenkins · Gregory R Fulcher

Beached by COVID‐19, orthopaedic surgeons have cooked up some new techniques to enhance skills There is a hidden danger in the enforced “shutdown” caused by COVID‐19. Bored certified orthopaedic surgeons who now have a lot of time on their hands, with very few patients to see and even less surgery to do, are stranded at home. This is a recipe for disaster. This communique outlines a superb technique designed to eliminate boredom and to enhance surgical skills. Marooned at home by the COVID‐19 isolation and because necessity is the mother of invention, rather than doing nothing, I travelled to the local store and bought a box of a Better known, do‐it‐yourself cake mix (Moist Vanilla 540 g). I had seen my mother make cakes in the past; it did not look that hard. Indeed, even the instructions were on the back of the box. This was as simple as Chemistry 101; they even specified the weights (and I had scales). So imbued with the unbridled hubris of a surgeon, I proceeded to make my first ever Moist Vanilla cake, with icing. Cake number one was perfect. I followed the instructions per the pack; added “A” to “B”, mixed, put it in a pan and cooked it for 55 minutes at 160°C. It turned out just like my mother used to bake; it was perfect. Buoyed by this success and bathed with arrogance, I became more adventuresome. I purchased another packet of the same stuff, and this time decided to make “Whisky Cake”, a self‐creation (Box 1). At a critical point of the mixing of the components, I added a very specific quantity of whisky (“specific” means a quantity greater than 25 cm3 but less than 100 cm3 or maybe a bit more). (Note spelling of “whisky” is without an “e” because it was Scotch. As my Scottish mother taught me, if the country has an “e” in it then so does the spelling of whisky. Irish whiskey can be substituted.) This creation went through the same cooking process and, once again, the “Whisky Cake” turned out to be beautifully moist and friends and acquaintances all enjoyed their sample, and even after consumption they were able to maintain verticality and appropriate social distancing measures. Praise was heaped upon me. Now, if the “Whisky Cake” was good, then, logically, a “Double Whisky Cake” must be better (please refer above for required quantity of whisky for the “Double Whisky Cake”). Sadly, the inescapable logic of arithmetic progression does not appear to have made it to the Annals of Cookery, in fact, what emerged at the end of 50 minutes of baking is what could be best described as “sludge”. Surgery training teaches you that complications occur … and physicians often joke that surgeons bury their complications. Emotionally crestfallen, the mutant, little less than successful “cake” was judiciously hidden from my friends and acquaintances and, loathing waste, the “Double Whisky Cake” sludge was offered to my four rescue dogs. They loved it and promptly slept all afternoon. However, physicians have no understanding of the logical approach that orthopaedic surgeons apply to problem solving (eg, problem: the square peg won't go into the round hole; solution: get a bigger hammer). But it takes much more than a bigger hammer, it takes sheer bloody‐mindedness and a certain strength of ego to soldier on when crestfallen. My inbred surgical fearlessness emerged, and knowing that failure is an important part of learning, I became emboldened by this “lesson”. The next experiment was a “Lemon Orange Single Whisky Cake” with added zest from the rinds of lemons and oranges. “Double Whisky” was thought to be the demon. (It emerged later that “Double Whisky Cake” was actually a Type II research error. A Type II error, as Wikipedia explains, means “the true fact is that the item is a weapon but the system keeps silent at this time”.2). The zest was boiled up together and added to the mix. Cake number four was very satisfactory. Current “scorebored”: good, good, disaster, and another good. Further emboldened by my newly discovered talent, I then went to the freezer where I had some mulberries (given to me by a patient many months ago, destalked and frozen). This time, I decided to make “Mulberry‐Apple‐Cointreau‐Single Whisky Roller Pie with Flaky Pastry”, another new creation — Cointreau was selected because (a) the whisky was nearly empty and (b) Cointreau was “on special”. The “Whisky Roller Pie” component is mentioned only because I did not have a roller and because I used the nearly empty whisky bottle to roll out the pastry. The flaky pastry was prepared exactly per selected internet recipe. About one hours’ worth of rolling, folding adding butter and folding again, all the time believing the words from the internet recipe when it wrote that, “You'll never go back to buying flaky pastry in the supermarket ever again”. One has now learnt not to believe everything one reads on the internet. Everything seemed to be going well. A specific amount of Cointreau was added per previous formula. Pie was baked and, at the end of one hour, it was removed, allowed to cool and then … it exploded. In many regards, the explosion was an epiphany, reminiscent of a major polytrauma. Mulberries are ferociously red … the smallest quantity of fluid stained everything and not only do the stains remain, the dispersed fluid clots like blood! It was just like being at work again. For the mulberry clot, see Box 2. It took me about a humbling hour and a half to clean it up. The four rescue dogs were very grateful to have this “Mulberry‐Apple‐Cointreau‐Single Whisky Roller Pie with (not so) Flaky Pastry” pie. Conclusions The COVID‐19 “shutdown” conveys hidden dangers. This research has unearthed some important facts and highlighted a number of issues: One should never underestimate the skill of your mother and her cooking ability. If this is a glimpse of what retirement might be like, then it is not going to be pretty. I recommend using the Better known brands of cake mix as they include the pre‐made icing. Pre‐made icing is important. Other brands of cake mix provide the icing sugar and “easy instructions” how to “make it yourself”. This is clearly a new definition of the word “easy”. My self‐made icing gracefully floated off the top of the cake on to the table then on to the floor. Rescue dogs to the rescue … again! Cooking and baking should be assigned CME points and should be included as an essential part of basic surgical training. Consideration should be given to creating a new specialist Royal Australasian College. Orthopaedic surgeons, who are often the butt of medical jokes, have demonstrated that we are the leading researchers into psychological support for the self‐isolated surgeon. Addition of flammable ingredients to cake mix should only be attempted by seasoned professionals who have sampled the agent in equal parts. “Double Whisky Cake” is a misnomer. The internet does not always tell the truth. Mulberries should be declared a Level 4 biohazard. This research suggests that further investigation needs to be done into “The Triple Whisky Cake”. Ethics approval from the RSPCA will be needed. Finally, this research illustrates the hidden danger that unoccupied orthopaedic surgeons pose not only to themselves but also to the wider community. This is obviously a specific concern during this COVID‐19 crisis and the MJA owes it to the general readership of this esteemed Journal to publish this article as a warning. Disclaimers The author did not receive any funds from any do‐it‐yourself cake mix company. No animals were harmed in the manufacturing and testing process. Besides the fact that the alcohol component is boiled off … any issues mentioned herein, which some might consider “controversial”, should be taken with a pinch of salt. No recipes will be available from the MJA. Box 1 – Irish whiskey cake1 Greenwood recently published “The Irish Whiskey Cake” in The Irish Times and reported, “Normally, I avoid adding alcohol to bakes that my children eat, but so far, this [Irish Whiskey Cake] doesn't seem to have resulted in any adverse effects”. My self‐created “Whisky Cake” (no “e”) appears to be a synchronous creation. Box 2 – Mulberry clot

John S Fox

Removing students from clinical placements may have significant implications for future workforce planning Clinical placements for medical students are central to teaching and learning in any medical program, with students in the later years generally undertaking rotations in disciplines, such as general practice, general medicine, paediatrics, psychiatry, surgery, anaesthesia, obstetrics and gynaecology. In our medical program, there are close to 300 students currently enrolled in the 2 final years. Despite the current coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic, Flinders University has remained committed to providing medical students with clinical placements, a stance that aligns with the Medical Deans of Australia and New Zealand,1 all state and territory health authorities, and the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee. The local consensus between stakeholders is that we have an obligation to treat all patients with appropriate safeguards in place. Given that the longer term response to COVID‐19 is unknown, removing students from clinical placements may not only affect their medical training but may also have significant implications for future workforce planning.1 However, there are extraordinary challenges in the clinical and university environments. While COVID‐19 represents a unique situation in terms of world involvement, there are other examples of large‐scale disruption to medical education, including the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak of 2003. In Canada, the local transmission of SARS in Toronto caused a significant interruption to usual teaching, particularly affecting the teaching of clinical methods skills and causing the cessation of third and fourth clerkships. This had an impact on all final year medical students and first year residency positions in Canada,2 an experience that was reflected in Hong Kong with the cancellation of ward teaching and delays in examinations.3 While we may wish to avoid this outcome, maintaining all medical students in their clinical placements can be challenging. There is heightened anxiety among the existing workforce, who are understandably concerned about the rapidly changing impact of COVID‐19, and this can lead to differing opinions among clinical supervisors as to the merits of continuing clinical placements. At our university, in partnership with medical students and health care providers, we have addressed this concern by writing and widely distributing clear guidelines for clinical placements. In some high risk placements, such as endoscopy and other aerosol generating procedures, we have encouraged clinical supervisors and students to negotiate appropriate activities that do not increase the risk of COVID‐19 exposure to the student, other staff or the patients, while still allowing the student to learn in the clinical environment. The SARS experience in Canada highlighted the variability in standard precautions and infection control practices and teaching.2 In our medical program, training on the use of personal protective equipment was previously embedded within clinical rotations. In response to COVID‐19, we have instigated refresher training for students on handwashing, N95 (or P2) mask fitting, and donning and doffing of protective clothing, with formal certification on completion. To date, students have chosen to remain on clinical placements. While they have concerns about their personal safety, they remain committed to both patient care and their own learning. This was also the case in Canada, where students took pride in their role as part of the health care team and understood that providing health care is not without risk.2 Furthermore, real‐life learning in the current situation may be invaluable. Students have seen health system governance operationalised, have witnessed senior clinicians act thoughtfully and with intent despite their own anxiety, and have watched professional practice in the provision of good communication and a sense of humanity and compassion for sick patients. COVID‐19 presents significant challenges to medical schools that embed teaching and learning within the clinical environment. Our final year students are the future medical workforce and it is our job to ensure they are competent, undifferentiated, work‐ready practitioners. Furthermore, the wider community has reasonable expectations that the newly graduated workforce will be prepared for pandemics in addition to the provision of routine care. This situation reinforces the case for competency‐based teaching and learning. Education that is discipline‐focused is likely to be significantly disadvantaged by the cancellation of risky placements or by placements that have undergone substantial modifications as a result of health care resource reallocation. However, it is important to remember that considerable clinical work unrelated to COVID‐19 still needs to continue. Ongoing evaluation of the actual educational experience that students are receiving will assist us in the provision of additional learning if deficits arise, and, in the worst case scenario, help us identify if clinical placements are no longer tenable.

Julie A Halbert · Alison Jones · Liam P Ramsey

COVID‐19 ARDS is a predictable serious complication of COVID‐19 that requires early recognition and comprehensive management “This disease is still too strange to us, and there are too many doubts”, says Dr Ling Qin (LQ), after reviewing more than 400 patients with coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pneumonia in Wuhan Union Hospital, China. COVID‐19 is a novel disease. We are familiar with acute respiratory distress syndrome (ARDS); however, when it occurs as part of COVID‐19, it has different features and there remain unanswered questions. So if someone has COVID‐19 ARDS, how does it compare and contrast with ARDS from other causes? To answer this question we provide a summary of the published literature (based on a PubMed search using the terms “COVID‐19” and “ARDS”, 17 April 2020) and current clinical experience from managing patients with COVID‐19 ARDS in Singapore (SHP) and Wuhan (LQ). Severe COVID‐19 represents viral pneumonia from severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2) infection leading to ARDS. Its manifestations can be viewed as a combination of the two processes, namely viral pneumonia and ARDS. COVID‐19 is a novel disease recognised initially in Wuhan, China, in December 2019, and is now pandemic. It is likely caused by zoonotic spillover of a β‐coronavirus type 2b that is now transmitted between humans. Along with the other serious coronavirus infections of severe acute respiratory syndrome and Middle East respiratory syndrome, which also cause ARDS, COVID‐19 represents an ongoing global threat as this virus family has the potential to mutate and infect non‐immune populations. Australia's living guidelines provide the latest recommendations and evidence.1 Diagnosis SARS‐CoV‐2 infection can be confirmed by positive detection of viral RNA in nasopharyngeal secretions using a specific PCR test. COVID‐19 illness can be confirmed by a consistent clinical history, epidemiological contact, and a positive SARS‐CoV‐2 test. COVID‐19 ARDS is diagnosed when someone with confirmed COVID‐19 infection meets the Berlin 2012 ARDS diagnostic criteria2 of (i) acute hypoxaemic respiratory failure; (ii) presentation within 1 week of worsening respiratory symptoms; (iii) bilateral airspace disease on chest x‐ray, computed tomography (CT) or ultrasound that is not fully explained by effusions, lobar or lung collapse, or nodules; and (iv) cardiac failure is not the primary cause of acute hypoxaemic respiratory failure. ARDS is underdiagnosed in intensive care settings.3 ARDS develops in 42% of patients presenting with COVID‐19 pneumonia, and 61–81% of those requiring intensive care.4 COVID‐19 ARDS follows a predictable time course over days, with median time to intubation of 8.5 days after symptom onset in Singaporean patients.5 This is similar to previous reports where ARDS developed at day 8 or 9 after symptom onset. It is therefore important to monitor patients for the development of ARDS as their COVID‐19 infection progresses. Respiratory rate and SpO2 are two important parameters for judging patients’ clinical condition and allowing early recognition of ARDS. A patient who fits any one of the following conditions may have severe disease and require further evaluation: respiratory rate ≥ 30 breaths/min; SpO2 ≤ 92%; and PaO2/FiO2 ≤ 300 mmHg. Blood tests can also be helpful. In Singapore, it was noted that raised C‐reactive protein levels and blood neutrophil counts along with lymphopenia were more common in patients requiring invasive mechanical ventilation for COVID‐19 ARDS.5 Lung pathology ARDS causes diffuse alveolar damage in the lung. There is hyaline membrane formation in the alveoli in the acute stage, and this is followed by interstitial widening and by oedema and then fibroblast proliferation in the organising stage. COVID‐19 ARDS causes the typical ARDS pathological changes of diffuse alveolar damage in the lung.6,7 As patients move through the course of their illness, the longer term outcomes of ARDS are being reported, with lung fibrosis appearing as part of COVID‐19 ARDS.8,9 A study reported that 17% of patients had fibrous stripes in chest CT scans,9 and considered that the fibrous lesions may form during the healing of pulmonary chronic inflammation or proliferative diseases, with gradual replacement of cellular components by scar tissues. Thrombosis Pulmonary thrombosis is common in sepsis‐induced ARDS. Coagulation dysfunction appears to be common in COVID‐19, and is detected by elevated D‐dimer levels. In fatal cases there is diffuse microvascular thrombosis, suggesting a thrombotic microangiopathy, and most deaths from COVID‐19 ARDS have evidence of thrombotic disseminated intravascular coagulation.10 This may explain some of the atypical or unexpected manifestations seen in the lung, such as dilated pulmonary vessels on chest CT, and episodes of pleuritic pain. Vascular enlargement is rarely reported in typical ARDS, yet was seen in most cases of COVID‐19 ARDS.9 Mortality COVID‐19 ARDS appears to have worse outcomes than ARDS from other causes. The intensive care unit and hospital mortality from typical ARDS are 35.3% (95% CI, 33.3–37.2%) and 40.0% (95% CI, 38.1–42.1%), respectively.3 For COVID‐19 ARDS, mortality ranged between 26% and 61.5% if ever admitted into a critical care setting, and in patients who received mechanical ventilation, the mortality can range between 65.7% to 94%.4 Risk factors for poor outcomes include older age; presence of comorbidities such as hypertension, cardiovascular disease and diabetes mellitus; lower lymphocyte counts; kidney injury; and raised D‐dimer levels. Death from COVID‐19 ARDS is due to respiratory failure (53%), respiratory failure combined with cardiac failure (33%), myocardial damage and circulatory failure (7%), or death from an unknown cause.4 Radiology The radiology of ARDS is distinctive, yet COVID‐19 pneumonia appears to have unique features. This likely results from the co‐occurrence of viral pneumonia and ARDS, and allows radiologists to be fairly specific in diagnosing COVID‐19 pneumonia. The most discriminating features for COVID‐19 pneumonia in China compared with viral pneumonia in the United States included a peripheral distribution of opacification (80% v 57%; P < 0.001), frosted glass opacities (91% v 68%; P < 0.001), and vascular thickening or enlargement (58% v 22%; P < 0.001).11 These imaging features appear to be typical for COVID‐19 pneumonia and can be helpful in early screening of highly suspected cases and in evaluation of the severity and extent of disease. As COVID‐19 lung disease progresses, the lesions are more likely to be bilateral, lower lung predominant and multifocal. They often have the appearance of rounded opacities, termed “COVID balls”. With the development of ARDS, the extent of lung involvement increases, and there is a consolidative component.12 The opacities resolve with recovery from COVID‐19;13 however, with ARDS, the lesions increase in their extent and density, and evolve to fibrotic bands. Ventilation The strategy of breathing support is very important in treating COVID‐19 ARDS, as is the case with typical ARDS caused by other pathogens.14 The key elements are: use oxygen by nasal cannulae to achieve SpO2 > 92%; use of high flow nasal oxygen is controversial and highly dependent on the treatment location; avoid non‐invasive ventilation; prone ventilation appears to be beneficial; and consider extracorporeal membrane oxygenation for rescue. Because of concerns about viral transmission to other patients and health care workers,15 the use of high flow nasal oxygen and non‐invasive ventilation (such as bi‐level positive pressure ventilation) for COVID‐19 ARDS is highly dependent on the health care setting. Australian COVID‐19 guidelines1 strongly recommend against the use of high flow nasal oxygen in emergency departments, but provide a strong recommendation for its use in negative pressure single rooms. Non‐invasive ventilation may be used in negative pressure rooms with appropriate viral transmission precautions.1 Clinical experience has found inconsistent benefit from non‐invasive ventilation and there is concern about aerosol generation and increased risk of viral transmission. Prone ventilation appears to be beneficial for COVID‐19 ARDS.1 Placing a person in prone position promotes more homogenous aeration of the lung in ARDS and can improve oxygenation. While prone ventilation is used in only about 16% of patients with typical ARDS,3,16 in COVID‐19 it is being used successfully earlier in the course of ARDS, and suggested use is for > 12 hours per day.16 Venovenous extracorporeal membrane oxygenation can be used as rescue for mechanically ventilated adults with COVID‐19 and hypoxaemia that persists despite optimised ventilation, use of rescue therapies and prone ventilation. Among critically ill patients treated in Wuhan, prone ventilation and extracorporeal membrane oxygenation treatment were not found to be as effective as for ARDS caused by other pathogens. Possible reasons include: COVID‐19 pneumonia was still progressing and was not under control; lung lesions were not completely gravity‐dependent under ultrasound, so the effect of the prone position was limited; the patient's immune status was not restored, and a secondary hospital‐acquired infection worsened the condition; and when case numbers are high from the epidemic, the management mode and human resource arrangement of the isolation wards still need to be discussed and strengthened. Anecdotal observations in Singapore (SHP) and investigations in the Netherlands17 suggested that patients ventilated for COVID‐19 ARDS tended to have plateau pressures < 30 cmH20 and driving pressures < 15 cmH20 despite high oxygen requirements. The lung protective ventilation strategy used in typical ARDS involves a low tidal volume (6 mL/kg) and higher positive end expiratory pressure targets. For COVID‐19 ARDS, a change to more generous tidal volume targets allowing up to 8 mL/kg and lower positive end expiratory pressure levels is suggested to prevent patient self‐inflicted lung injury. Adjunct treatment In typical ARDS, continuous neuromuscular blocking agents, high dose corticosteroids and recruitment manoeuvers were the most frequently used adjunctive therapies. In COVID‐19 ARDS, the evidence for systemic steroids is still scarce and they are only recommended in patients with concomitant shock which has been unresponsive to vasopressors. There are concerns that steroids may increase viral shedding and possibly lead to a higher mortality rate. Antiviral therapy Many patients with COVID‐19 receive antiviral or immunosuppressive therapy. In Australia, the National COVID‐19 Clinical Evidence Taskforce1 recommends administering antiviral medications or other disease‐modifying treatments in the context of clinical trials. Singapore was using empiric lopinavir–ritonavir plus subcutaneous interferon‐β 1b initially, but is now randomising patients to receive remdesivir. In Wuhan, a broad range of antiviral and immune therapies are being used. All patients also received treatment with Chinese medicine. COVID‐19 ARDS is a predictable serious complication of COVID‐19 that requires early recognition and comprehensive management. Research programs such as the Medical Research Future Fund 2020 Respiratory Medicine Clinical Trials Research on COVID‐19 grant opportunity are required to answer the important questions that remain about therapies for COVID‐19 ARDS.

Peter G Gibson · Ling Qin · Ser Hon Puah

The current reduced capacity of post‐release services may compound offender vulnerabilities, increasing their risk of harm to themselves and others The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic has affected many countries internationally and has been implicated in more than 445 000 deaths worldwide.1 The speed at which this infectious disease is transmitted has led to calls to immediately release prisoners from custody in some countries, including Australia, and has already led to the release of some prisoners in others. The reasons for these calls to action are intuitively rational. Custodial environments are susceptible to a COVID‐19 outbreak given the confined conditions and potential for overcrowding.2 Moreover, prison populations are often vulnerable, having poorer physical and mental health and other social challenges (eg, substance misuse, homelessness) compared with the general population.3 At the time of writing, Australian governments have yet to immediately release select prisoners into the community as part of efforts to mitigate the spread of COVID‐19, despite recent advocacy to do so. Experts across a number of sectors have recommended the early release of prisoners from vulnerable groups if possible, including Indigenous Australians, women, children, older prisoners, victims of domestic violence, and those with chronic health issues.4 However, the proposed early release strategy requires a nuanced assessment of its potential societal consequences and, most importantly, its immediate impact on the health and wellbeing of candidate prisoners for release. Victoria and New South Wales — Australia's most populous states — provide a useful case in point. Stage 3 restrictions — home confinement except for restricted essential activities5 — have been in effect for approximately 2 months. Some restrictions were eased in late May, although limits on public and private gatherings remain in place. Prisons in both Victoria and NSW have yet to record a single case of COVID‐19 within the inmate population. In Victoria, a number of safety mechanisms have been introduced by correctional centres to help manage the potential transmission of the virus.6 These include: temperature testing of all staff before entry to the facility; sending staff home who present with high temperatures and other flu‐like symptoms, and requiring them to undertake a COVID‐19 test before returning; isolating all new prison admissions for up to 14 days; isolating prisoners who display cold or flu‐like symptoms; adjusting programs to abide by physical distancing; and enabling prisoners to connect with family members via video calls on tablet devices (“video visits”) as an alternative to in‐prison visitation. Moreover, conventional medical, psychological and cultural support services continue to be available to prisoners. Similar precautions have been implemented in NSW correctional centres,7 which hold the largest proportion of prisoners in Australia. With no confirmed cases in both Victorian and NSW correctional centres and ongoing efforts to restrict the materialisation of COVID‐19 in custodial settings, the potential costs of releasing vulnerable prisoners into the community necessitates scrutiny. Any prisoners released under anti‐COVID‐19 preventive measures will return to a general community enduring social restrictions and society‐wide economic contraction. The post‐release community support services ordinarily available to released offenders are currently compromised or are experiencing significant delays.8,9,10,11 Moreover, government social security services (ie, Centrelink), which are heavily relied upon by individuals after release, are currently overwhelmed as they service thousands of newly unemployed clients.12 Mental health and crisis support services are also strained as they adjust to remote service delivery and contend with an elevated spike in community‐wide help seeking.13 The reduced capacity for intensive case management, monitoring and re‐entry assistance for released prisoners is a serious concern given their higher levels of complex mental and physical health needs, as well as histories of unemployment, addiction, social disadvantage and homelessness.3 Australian research points to high rates of mortality and self‐harm shortly after release from custody.14 Key predictors of post‐release mortality include mental disorder, suicide and substance misuse — concerns that transitional support programs and other post‐release interventions will be unable to optimally manage during the national lockdown. This scenario poses an increased health risk for released prisoners, compounding their vulnerability and increasing the likelihood of problem behaviour and recidivism. Without readily available coping strategies and assistance with pro‐social functioning, released prisoners with histories of violence, aggression, impulsivity and serious mental illness may put themselves and others (particularly cohabitants) at risk. Calls to release prisoners who are survivors of domestic violence must also consider the heightened risk of revictimisation after release. The social isolation, economic stress and reduced options for support during stage 3 restrictions may exacerbate unhealthy relationship dynamics, especially among those with complex needs. Moreover, physical distancing may not be adhered to by those whose behavioural and psychological needs are untreated. Proposals to immediately release vulnerable prisoners to avert the ostensible threat of COVID‐19 in Australian custodial environments warrant consideration. The potential for a COVID‐19 outbreak in custody is a genuine concern, notwithstanding proactive measures employed in Victorian and NSW correctional centres. However, this advocacy must consider the broader social context. A focus on early release cannot be uncoupled from the current compromised community environment prisoners will face after detainment. Community support services are increasingly strained at a time when released prisoners will have a greater need for them. As such, it is important to balance the relative health and safety trade‐offs of remaining in custody — in Victorian and NSW prisons, there are no confirmed cases of COVID‐19 and health supports remain available — with early release into a resource‐depleted community. The real prospect of harmful outcomes for immediately released vulnerable prisoners must be weighed heavily during this challenging period.

Stephane Shepherd · Benjamin L Spivak

A false impression of technological panacea may see much needed interventions overlooked and may introduce unintended consequences and risks In the face of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) limiting free movement, experts are scrambling to mitigate the profound impact that the disease is having on our lives. For many countries, this approach involves increased testing, isolation, and education about hygiene practices until a vaccine is found. To varying degrees, without much evidence as to their efficacy, countries are turning to technology to solve some of the current challenges.1 Increasingly, smartphone applications (apps) are being contemplated for tracking proximity of people to determine possible sources of transmission, with elements of technological solutionism. Such technical solutions require trust, and without honest and clear information about the possibilities and limitations of technologies, an app's benefits may be undermined by low adoption, or conversely a false impression of a technological panacea may see much needed interventions overlooked. For example, the Australian Government's target of a 40% uptake of the COVIDSafe app may or may not be effective in helping to control the disease, while 60% uptake is supported by independent modelling from the United Kingdom.2 Furthermore, such summary statistics do not clarify to the public the wide range of other factors and assumptions that must be considered in predicting the app's efficacy. Much is being written about the different technological models and whether they trace, track and comply with privacy and human rights frameworks, including whether this information can, in fact, ever be anonymised.3 Fully effective anonymisation is unlikely when collecting data as granular as regular interaction with others in addition to age, gender and postcode demographics, as has been demonstrated by previous attempts to de‐anonymise data.4 If these data are accidentally or deliberately linked with other datasets, such as births in hospitals or the public Myki public transport dataset,5 anonymity is virtually impossible to guarantee. Successful uptake of new technologies requires trust. When adoption is insufficient, collective benefits are not guaranteed. Civil society in the United Kingdom called for clear and comprehensive primary legislation to regulate data processing in symptom tracking and digital contact tracing applications, including with a strict purpose, access and time limitations.6 Such regulation may improve trust. Technology embeds values Even when people are told of the limitations of technology, they may have magical thinking about its capabilities.7,8 In early May 2020, the Australian Government furthered this magical thinking by direct messaging Australians that downloading the COVIDSafe app would help to keep people safe and ease restrictions, linking the two directly and potentially conflating the capability of COVIDSafe. Contact tracing apps may assist in manual tracing, in turn slowing the virus’ spread, but usage of an app does not render the individual protected from infection nor does it guarantee successful tracking without intensive manual efforts. Yet statements by those in authority have made strained assertions about COVIDSafe, likening the use of the app to the use of sunscreen9 or a digital vaccine: “You could think about contact tracing as a digital vaccine with our contact data being the virtual antibodies”.10 Such statements are incorrect representations of the app's capabilities.11 Even the technical details of the app are not immune from false messaging. For example, the app records all Bluetooth contacts, not just those that last 15 minutes or that are within 1.5 m. The filtering occurs after contacts are uploaded. Furthermore, there are some inaccurate statements on the official COVIDSafe website; for example, the frequently asked questions section states that “all information that is stored on the phone is digitally encrypted;” however, metadata, such as the device make and model for each contact, are stored unencrypted.12 Communication must be fact‐based, transparent and consultative, any short term gains in support from the use of emotive and persuasive messaging may be undone when they are ultimately demonstrated to be false. Centralised versus decentralised data collection The fundamental difference between centralised versus decentralised tracking is in who learns what. In the centralised approach, the central authority learns who an infected person has interacted with, whereas this does not occur in the decentralised system. Decentralised systems are no more challenging to implement but they better protect privacy. In a centralised approach (Box 1), such as TraceTogether (Singapore) or COVIDSafe (Australia): encrypted identifiers are issued by the central authority to each device; devices broadcast the encrypted identifiers via Bluetooth, and nearby devices listen for such broadcasts and record any that they receive; if a person tests positive, they report to the central authority all the identifiers they have received within a predetermined timeframe; and the central authority decrypts the identifiers and maps them to the individuals they were issued to and duly notifies them if they are deemed to be at risk. The above is a very high level description and there are many technical challenges in implementing such a system securely.13 In a decentralised approach (Box 2), as proposed by decentralised privacy‐preserving proximity tracing (DP‐3T), Covid Watch, Apple and Google: devices generate random identifiers that are not linked to an individual; identifiers are broadcast via Bluetooth and recorded by nearby devices; a person who tests positive publishes a list of the identifiers they have broadcast; and all apps on user devices download such lists and check if they received positive identifiers so as to identify likely contacts. While there are variations in the details, in the decentralised approach, the central authority does not map identifiers to individuals. Although the distinction between centralised versus decentralised tracking may seem small, from a privacy perspective, there is a significant difference. In the case of COVIDSafe, the identifiers are generated and provided to the phone individually rather than as a daily batch: the central authority can monitor whether the app is being used in at least 2‐hourly increments, and possibly as frequently as every 9 minutes, due to regular checks for new identifiers. Models reflect differing societal priorities. In Germany, where there are legal protections for both individual and group privacy, the decentralised app has been chosen. In fact, it has been suggested that a decentralised smartphone contact tracing system — as contemplated by DP‐3T, Apple, Google, and governments across Europe — would be likely to comply with human rights and data protection laws. In contrast, a centralised smartphone system would pose a greater risk to fundamental rights and would require significantly greater justification to be lawful.6 Even when consent for central data collection has been sought, it is unclear what users are consenting to in the absence of fully open code that includes server‐side code, a clear regulatory framework, and with omissions, such as the COVIDSafe's Privacy Impact Assessment and Privacy Policy failing to mention the collection of the devices’ make and model.14 In comparison, Singapore's TraceTogether is based on the same codebase and its frequently asked questions section notifies of such data collection.15 Efficacy and risks of using Bluetooth Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) is designed to be a low power communication technology, it was not designed to facilitate range finding. Accurately measuring the distance between two devices based only on the received signal strength is a challenge, with error margins often in the metres.16 The signal strength is relative not absolute, and thus, the scale of the reported values differ by manufacturer. Furthermore, the signal strength is influenced by many external factors, including the angle at which the device is held, whether it is in a pocket or a bag and any objects around or between it and the other device. Whether BLE can deliver the necessary accuracy remains an open question. While the use of Bluetooth avoids direct location tracking, many other risks remain. There are vast networks of Bluetooth beacons distributed around cities, which facilitate location tracking. Security advice is to disable Bluetooth when not in use. While the public might be expected to compromise for the common good, legislation could also move to limit Bluetooth beacons during the crisis. However, the Privacy Amendment (Public Health Contact Information) Act 202017 passed on 14 May provides no such protections.18 It provides an exemption to those accidentally collecting COVIDSafe data as part of a wider collection of non‐COVIDSafe data. This appears to be aimed at protecting commercial tracking, rather than protecting privacy. Legal and social implications are as important as the technical ones Given the many risks of using technology, the contemplation of any technological solutions to alleviate the impacts of COVID‐19 needs to be not only technical but also legal and social. Making the code open for audit provides some technical guard rails, much as providing open and transparent proof of test results ensures that no risks are overseen. But beyond technical questions there are also legal questions, including with whom the data may be shared. A recently published article refers to the multiple legal regimes potentially applicable to the app in Australia, as experts scramble to review the legal protections for individuals using COVIDSafe.19 Enacting emergency measures in the face of catastrophes is easy. Rolling back changes to technology, habits and even culture is far more difficult. If they are to be used, technological tracking solutions must have sunset clauses to ensure that human rights are protected. But even with sunset clauses, the large quantity of data collected are effectively out in the world, where they can be accessed and misused. Protections and limits for these data and their providers need to be contemplated before use, not only to protect individuals but also for group privacy. Increasingly, there is a risk of data being accessed by overseas agencies, which could have an impact on national security. It is vital that the technical, legal and social challenges are addressed in coordination. Any new legislation must be written within the context of existing technological practices, particularly around Bluetooth tracking. Likewise, where technical compromises are made, they must be justified to the public with clear, concise explanations, in a manner that is transparent and open to scrutiny. While many liberties have been curtailed during COVID‐19, all modifications to existing rights are required, under law, to be legal, necessary and proportionate. These same standards apply to the use of technology. Legal protections need to be in place to ensure that rights are protected, including the right to privacy. Without sound legal protections and safeguards, tracing apps will not only fail but will embed values that may not be those that represent the society we wish to be. Box 1 – The centralised approach of contact tracing wherein the central server learns user contact details Box 2 – The decentralised approach to contact tracing wherein no central authority learns user contact details

Kobi Leins · Christopher Culnane · Benjamin IP Rubinstein

All countries must increase medical capabilities and adopt a concerted whole-of-government approach to combat COVID-19

Ray Junhao Lin · Tau Hong Lee · David CB Lye

Combatting the resurgence of measles requires vigilant clinicians and sustained, high level vaccination coverage At the beginning of 2020, Samoa was in a state of emergency due to a measles outbreak. It resulted in over 5700 cases and over 80 deaths, the majority being in children under 5 years of age.1 There were concurrent outbreaks regionally, in New Zealand, Tonga, American Samoa and Fiji. Globally, there has been a massive resurgence of measles with over 360 000 cases reported to the World Health Organization between 1 January and 31 July 2019 — almost three times the number reported over the same period for 2018. We have also seen the re‐establishment of endemic measles in some countries, such as the United Kingdom, where it was previously eliminated.2 In 2019, Australia had 285 confirmed measles cases, the highest number reported since 2014, the year that it was verified by the Regional Verification Commission for Measles Elimination in the Western Pacific to have eliminated measles.3 Most infections occurred in, or were secondary to, unimmunised or underimmunised individuals returning from countries where measles is endemic or that have active outbreaks.4 Australian doctors cannot afford to become complacent about measles, particularly while large outbreaks affect popular tourist and business destinations in the region. Why must we care about measles? Measles is the most highly communicable human virus known, and has a basic reproduction number (R0; the average number of secondary cases generated from a single case in a fully susceptible, freely mixing population) between 9 and 18 — double that of smallpox and quadruple that of Ebola virus.5 It can therefore result in devastating and explosive outbreaks where immunity gaps exist. It is transmitted by respiratory droplets, and aerosolised particles can remain airborne for up to 2 hours, making infection possible well after a patient has left an enclosed space such as a clinic waiting room. Cases are infectious from 24 hours before prodrome onset until 4 days after onset of rash. As the characteristic, maculopapular rash does not appear until 3–7 days into the illness (Box 1), each case may unwittingly expose hundreds of contacts by the time of diagnosis.5,6 Although the majority of patients recover from measles, up to one child in every thousand infected in wealthy countries will die, usually due to pneumonia or encephalitis.5 The immunosuppression caused by the measles infection may last months to years, and rare but devastating neurological complications include acute disseminated encephalomyelitis, measles inclusion body encephalitis and subacute sclerosing panencephalitis.5 The dramatic decrease in subacute sclerosing panencephalitis in Australia since 1990 is a testament to the impact of effective immunisation programs.7 There is no specific antiviral therapy for measles. Management remains supportive, with fluids, vitamin A, and antibiotic therapy if secondary bacterial infections arise.5 The importance of preventing measles through vaccination cannot be overstated. Breakthrough infection While most measles cases still occur in underimmunised individuals, some countries, including Australia, have seen a small but increasing proportion of cases occurring in adults reporting previous measles vaccination.5,8,9,10 At the time of elimination verification in Australia, the estimated efficacy of measles vaccine was 96.7% for one dose and 99.7% for two doses.11 Thus, about one in 300 fully vaccinated people who are exposed to measles are vulnerable to “breakthrough” infection, resulting from either an inadequate response at the time of vaccination or waning of immunity over time.8,9 The latter is particularly seen in post‐elimination settings where regular immune‐boosting from circulating wild strain virus is absent, and there is concern that this may become more common as the time since elimination increases.10,12 Measles should therefore be considered in all patients presenting with fever and rash, particularly if there is a history of travel, exposure to a confirmed case, or when measles is known to be circulating locally, even if the patient has received two doses of measles vaccine. Breakthrough infections often present as modified measles with a mild to moderate rash and less pronounced prodrome.8,9,10 Virus burden and transmissibility appear to be lower in modified cases than in a typical infection; however, onward transmission may still occur, making isolation of cases and public health responses still necessary.8,10 Attenuated symptoms, alongside often undetectable IgM antibody levels, make diagnosis considerably more challenging and definitive laboratory testing using polymerase chain reaction all the more relevant. Advances in laboratory testing Detection of measles IgM antibodies through serological testing is a commonly used diagnostic method but relies on optimally timed specimens. IgM is detectable in 75% of cases 3 days after rash onset, and in almost 100% after one week, but may not be present early in the illness or in the setting of waning immunity.4,8 Specificity varies from 60% to 97% and serology cannot distinguish wild‐type infection from recent vaccination.13 Nucleic acid testing of respiratory and urine specimens using polymerase chain reaction has revolutionised measles diagnosis. Sensitivity and specificity approach 100% from the first day of rash but decrease after 2 weeks, at which point serology remains useful.4,13 Preliminary results may be available within 4 hours of receipt by an accredited laboratory, and can distinguish between wild‐type virus and vaccine strain (genotype A).6 Nucleic acid testing is now the preferred method of diagnosis (often in conjunction with serology), and has the additional advantage that swabs are often easier to collect than blood in young children.4 Virus genotyping enables source and cluster identification, tracking of global transmission and detection of emerging strains, and provides supportive evidence to confirm elimination of endemic measles. For epidemiological purposes, breakthrough infections may be differentiated by avidity analysis of IgG antibodies in serum.8 Avidity is the strength with which antibodies bind to antigens. Low avidity suggests an inadequate immune response at the time of vaccination, while high avidity suggests an initially adequate response to vaccination followed by waning immunity.14 Public health management If measles is suspected, the patient should be isolated at home or under airborne precautions in a health care facility until the diagnosis is excluded by laboratory testing or the case is no longer infectious. A public health unit should be notified on clinical suspicion of measles before laboratory confirmation is received.4 Public health management includes vaccination of susceptible contacts within 72 hours following exposure, and passive immunisation of susceptible high risk contacts (immunocompromised patients, pregnant women and infants under 12 months of age) with intramuscular normal human immunoglobulin within 144 hours of exposure.4 With such a highly transmissible virus, any delay in notification and initiation of public health actions can result in large scale outbreaks. Vaccination importance and update Vaccination remains the key to control and prevention of measles cases and complications. A population immunity of 95% is required to eliminate ongoing measles transmission, and every year a new, susceptible cohort is born, mandating that high quality immunisation efforts be maintained.12,15 While childhood vaccination coverage in 2019 was above 90% for all Australian states and territories, few met the 95% target for measles (Box 2).16 Further, national and state/territory rates can conceal pockets of low vaccination coverage where the introduction of a single case can be the catalyst for an outbreak. As of April 2019, infants travelling to a high risk setting can be given measles vaccine from 6 months of age. They still require the further two doses routinely given at 12 months and 18 months of age as part of the current National Immunisation Program.4 Previously, measles vaccination was not recommended for infants aged under 12 months because of the presence of maternal antibodies, which provide protection in early life and render the vaccine less effective. This immunity now appears to wane earlier in infants born to vaccinated mothers in an elimination setting.5 In Australia, the second dose of measles vaccine was first recommended in 1993, initially for 10–16 year olds, and introduced into the National Immunisation Program for 4–5 year olds in 1998.15 Thus, adults born between 1966 and 1982 may be susceptible, being born after circulating measles began to decline but unlikely to have received two doses of vaccine. Measles vaccine should therefore be offered to anyone aged 12 months or older (or 6 months or older as detailed above), born after 1965, who does not have formal documentation of immunity or receipt of two doses of measles vaccine, particularly before travelling overseas. It is safe to give an additional dose if it is unclear whether two doses have been previously administered. Because it is a live attenuated vaccine, measles vaccine is contraindicated in pregnancy and in immunocompromised patients.4 Although vaccine hesitancy is a concern and receives substantial media attention, access to services and other practical factors remain important barriers to vaccination uptake.17 Conclusion Measles virus is the ultimate opportunist and will capitalise on any gaps in immunity. National programs are important, but measles control cannot be achieved without effective local prevention and control measures, including diligent vaccination and prompt diagnosis by alert clinicians. With outbreaks occurring regionally, concerted effort is required to maintain Australia's elimination of measles and continue progress towards the goal of global measles eradication. Box 1 – Typical measles rash Photograph showing skin rash on a patient's abdomen 3 days after the onset of measles infection. Image captured at New York Hospital–Cornell Medical Centre. Photograph courtesy of CDC/Heinz F. Eichenwald, MD from Centers for Disease Control and Prevention Public Health Image Library ID# 3168 (https://phil.cdc.gov/details.aspx?pid=3168). Box 2 – Australian state and territory immunisation coverage rates for 1‐year‐olds at 31 December 2019 Data source: Australian Immunisation Register. Infographic courtesy of Australian Government Department of Health.16

Kirsten M Williamson · Tony Merritt · David N Durrheim

To the Editor: The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) outbreak has become a public health emergency globally.1,2 Until 26 May 2020, there were 7126 confirmed cases reported in Australia (https://coronavirus.jhu.edu/map.html). However, specimens of the severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2) independently isolated in Australia (in Sydney, the Gold Coast and Melbourne)3 exhibited very unusual mutations, which have not been identified in other countries (Box, A). Up to 29 April, 1319 sequences of the Australian SARS‐CoV‐2 isolates are available in the website of the Global Initiative on Sharing All Influenza Data (GISAID).3 Except for the NSW03 and NSW01 isolates, viral mutations are located at the stem‐loop II motif (s2m), an extremely conserved RNA element in the 3’ untranslated region (3’‐UTR) (Box, A). The NSW02 and VIC01 isolates have deletion of 41 and ten nucleotides respectively. All Queensland cases have single G‐to‐A substitution (nucleotides 29714/QLD01, 29736/QLD02, 29736/QLD04, and 29737/QLD03). Moreover, patients with NSW05, NSW06, NSW07, NSW15, NSW18, NSW19, NSW21, NSW24, NSW26, NSW28, or NSW31 (nucleotide 29696) have single G‐to‐U substitution at the same nucleotide. This substitution is only present in Australian patients and has not been found in SARS‐CoV‐2 isolates from other countries. Phylogenetic analysis showed that SARS and 30 other coronaviruses and astroviruses all possess the genetic element s2m, suggesting that this motif is conserved in both nucleotide sequence and secondary structure folding during evolution in an otherwise rapidly mutable RNA genome.3,5 The three‐dimensional crystal structure of the s2m RNA element of the SARS virus shows that guanosine (19), which is mutated in Australian isolates, is critical for tertiary contacts to form an RNA base quartet involving two adjacent G–C pairs (G19, C20, G28, and C31)4 (Box, B). Because s2m plays an essential role for the viral RNA to substitute host protein synthesis, we hypothesise that the disruption of s2m could alter the viral viability or infectivity dramatically. The s2m sequence of coronaviruses is highly conserved, and spontaneous mutations in this motif were not expected to have occurred during the apparent short period when SARS‐CoV‐2 has been present; therefore, it is highly likely that the changes are due to recombination.5 Because a high frequency of recombination events in coronaviruses occurs, RNA recombination could either enhance the adaptation process to its new host like humans or cause unpredictable changes in virulence during infection. Box – Mutations, deletions and recombination breakpoints in the stem‐loop II motif (s2m) of Australian severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2) isolates Panel A: Deletions and mutations in the primary, secondary and tertiary structures of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) s2m RNA genetic element based on the three‐dimensional crystal structure of the SARS virus. Conventional RNA helical base pairings are indicated in italics. Sequence complements are indicated using colour‐coded brackets. The G19 mutation (arrowhead) of the Australian SARS‐CoV‐2 is shown with purple colour. Asterisks label the RNA recombination breakpoints based on analysis of 1319 Australia SARS‐CoV‐2 sequences using Recco algorithm (https://recco.bioinf.mpi-inf.mpg.de/) (P < 0.002). Panel B: Schematic representation of the s2m RNA secondary structure of the SARS virus, with tertiary structural interactions indicated as long range contacts.4

Ting‐Yu Yeh · Gregory P Contreras

Investment is urgently needed in repurposed drugs which could ease the burden of the COVID-19 pandemic

Jennifer H Martin · Nikola A Bowden

The response to COVID-19 in Australia has been impressive, but our laboratory capacity must be used wisely

David W Smith

Advice for clinicians managing patients with cancer during the pandemic

Robert Weinkove · Zoe K McQuilten · Jonathan Adler · Meera R Agar · Emily Blyth · Allen C Cheng · Rachel Conyers · Gabrielle M Haeusler · Claire Hardie · Christopher Jackson · Steven W Lane · Tom Middlemiss · Peter Mollee · Stephen P Mulligan · David Ritchie · Myra Ruka · Benjamin Solomon · Jeffrey Szer · Karin A Thursky · Erica M Wood · Leon J Worth · Michelle K Yong · Monica A Slavin · Benjamin W Teh

To the Editor: On 11 March 2020, the World Health Organization declared COVID‐19 a pandemic. Australia has enacted public health measures to reduce the number and severity of cases.1 These measures, alongside disease burden, profoundly impact the health care system. However, the place of medical students in the COVID‐19 response is unclear. The gravity of the COVID‐19 crisis has led governments to take drastic measures. The graduation of over 10 000 Italian final year students has been expedited to supplement the overburdened workforce.2 In the United Kingdom, the Medical Schools Council has encouraged prioritising qualification of final year students to support the over‐encumbered National Health Service.2 Medical Deans Australia and New Zealand recognises the value of final year medical students, releasing a statement outlining appropriate roles.3 These involve routine aspects of care independent of the COVID‐19 response, in various clinical settings with which students are already familiar. Moreover, with clinical placements being disrupted, senior students may gain valuable practical exposure aligned with course requirements. Considering the noted mental health effects of COVID‐19,4 student contributions may relieve the burden on professional staff while alleviating any sense of helplessness, improving the mental wellbeing of students and staff alike. Importantly, medicine embodies altruism and humanity, with many students undertaking the vocation for this reason. As imminent doctors, senior medical students may therefore feel impassioned to contribute to the COVID‐19 response. Involving students, however, is not without risk. With the reported asymptomatic infectious period, expanding the workforce elevates infection risk. Exposure to patients with COVID‐19 should therefore be minimal. Further, the risk of litigation is pertinent as students are less experienced than professional staff. Responsibilities should be within capabilities, under supervision and institutional medico‐legal protection. Lastly, additional work hours may impede formal medical education; academic penalties should not be levied, on‐the‐job learning should be duly acknowledged, and accessibility of course materials should be maximised. Indeed, medical student involvement should be implemented following principles developed by key stakeholders.3,5 Extraordinary times call for extraordinary measures. With appropriate legal, operational and training safeguards, senior medical students have a role in the COVD‐19 response if they desire.

Jim H‐S Wang · Sarah Tan · Kyle Raubenheimer

To the Editor: The advent of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) has generated an unparalleled level of interest from the medical and non‐medical community. As clinician‐scientists, we watch in astonishment at the exponential growth of academic publications in journals. In January 2020, PubMed saw a sharp rise in the number of publications related to COVID‐19, which continues to grow (Box). We could not help but wonder if this has generated a race to publish. Of course, publishing is crucial to help confront one of the most devastating global health issues of the century. However, it is well recognised that external pressures to publish can muddle the intrinsic pursuit for scientific curiosity and excellence,1 and COVID‐19 has certainly provided the incentive for many clinicians and scientists alike to seek rapid publication. This may, unfortunately, fuel competition in the research/publishing field, which was exemplified by the concerning lack of research collaborations when humans were faced with natural disasters,2 including the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus (SARS‐CoV) outbreak.3 The urgent nature of this situation means a number of preliminary studies and publications on COVID‐19 are fast‐tracked through the peer review process — or not at all — in the hope of rapidly publicising important findings, opinions and experiences. However, hastily penned observations may mislead and do more harm than good. A recent non‐peer‐reviewed publication on a preprint server likening SARS‐CoV‐2 structurally to the human immunodeficiency virus (HIV) was quickly retracted after the scientific community highlighted serious flaws in the study.4 Furthermore, a preliminary study5 supporting the use of hydroxychloroquine as a COVID‐19 treatment prompted a flurry of off‐label use and media attention. The study was later criticised as being too small and biased, and provided insufficient evidence to recommend its use.6 In summary, rapid publishing allows extensive dissemination of knowledge and sharing of experiences; yet the astute clinician needs to keep an open mind and analyse what is being published, for this cannot take the place of rigorous scientific evaluation and best clinical practice. This is a challenging time in the academic world and COVID‐19 will, no doubt, test our abilities to untangle the vast range of literature available. Box – Monthly and cumulative published articles on coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19)* * We conducted an online search in PubMed and included all articles with the terms “coronavirus”, “COVID‐19”, “COVID” and/or “SARS‐CoV‐2”. The information is correct as of 30 April 2020.

Adrian YS Lee · Ming‐Wei Lin

In reply: Lee and Lin raise an important point about the need for caution in interpreting rapidly published articles in the era of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19). At the Medical Journal of Australia, we are acutely aware of the need to balance rapid dissemination of key data with the need to maintain our usual high standards of quality and accuracy. We have taken the view that in these unprecedented times, rapid sharing of information is critical, but we recognise the risk of errors this infers. In response, we have implemented a preprint and rapid review process for selected manuscripts of an urgent nature (Box). In order to minimise the risk of errors, all manuscripts are carefully reviewed by myself, our team of experienced and medically qualified editors and, where appropriate, our consultant biostatistician, before being selected for preprint in the MJA. Only where the editorial team have a high level of confidence in the validity and importance of the article will it be selected for rapid preprint publication. Before full acceptance of the manuscript to be published online and in print and, in selected cases, before we accept an article for preprint, we organise a rapid double blind peer review followed by revision in line with our usual stringent processes. In these circumstances, we endeavour to have this process completed within 7 days of preprint publication so that any errors can be quickly identified and corrected. We are very grateful to our reviewers who have been very generous in their assistance with this new process. One final check in our process on full publication is review and editing by our experienced scientific and structural editors, who meticulously check all articles for consistency, accuracy and referencing, while finessing them for readability and clarity of presentation — their expertise is invaluable in ensuring published manuscripts are presented accurately and in the best possible light. We acknowledge that contradiction and error may be inevitable during this rapidly evolving situation but would like to assure our readers that at the MJA, when errors occur, they will be rectified in a timely manner and with full transparency. While we are living in a world of rapid change, our commitment to providing Australian health and medical researchers, clinicians and policy makers with the world‐leading general medical journal they deserve stands strong. Box – MJA process for rapid publication of selected coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19)‐related manuscripts* * Timing is indicative and may vary according to the complexity of the manuscript.

Nicholas J Talley

During the COVID‐19 pandemic, people with heart disease are likely abandoning usual medical advice As the world watches the spread of the coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic, affecting the health of millions of people and the lives of everyone, common health conditions including heart disease, stroke, cancer and other chronic diseases continue. While there is no doubt that there are direct consequences for morbidity and mortality of COVID‐19, including its direct cardiovascular effects, it will be important to ensure that these are not matched by the indirect consequences. Countries are at different stages in the natural history of the pandemic, but there is a clear pattern. Overloaded health systems necessitate the hasty development of new protocols and pathways for common conditions that deviate from established guidelines and that may be caused by changes in community behaviour, either imposed or arising from fear. Unproven therapies are being tested in the field and, in the absence of evidence, there is the potential for theory to drive practice to an extent that is generally not seen in conditions with an established evidence base. During the COVID‐19 pandemic, emergency department (ED) attendances fell dramatically in England, with 89 584 attendances in the week after the lockdown (23–29 March 2020), down 25% compared with the 120 356 attendances during the previous week and almost 50% down on attendances in February 2020.1 This decrease in ED attendances has also been reported in Europe, Canada and Australia.2 ST elevated myocardial infarction (STEMI) rates fell by about 40% in reports from Austria3 and the United States.4 It is possible that COVID‐19 is associated with plaque stabilisation and lower rates of STEMI, but it seems more likely that people with heart disease are abandoning usual medical advice at a time when they may need it the most. In New York, US, a 50% decrease in ED visits for acute coronary syndromes has been reported at the same time as an eightfold increase in out‐of‐hospital cardiac arrest calls in the first week of April 2020.5 It is not clear how many of these calls are COVID‐19‐related, but there seems to be no doubt that people have a reluctance to attend hospital during the peak of the epidemic, which is having a significant cost in mortality. The angiotensin‐converting enzyme inhibitors and angiotensin II receptor blockers controversy In the midst of all this, a controversy has emerged about the safety and value of angiotensin‐converting enzyme inhibitors (ACEIs) and angiotensin II receptor blockers (ARBs) — commonly used for the treatment of hypertension and heart failure — in the context of the COVID‐19 pandemic. In ordinary times, these are considered to be among the safest, best tolerated and most effective drugs for the management of both hypertension and heart failure, with a strong evidence base showing a reduction in morbidity and mortality from these conditions.6,7 To date, there is insufficient clinical evidence that ACEIs, ARBs or other inhibitors of the renin angiotensin system are either harmful or beneficial in the acquisition of COVID‐19 or its subsequent clinical course in individual patients. A number of clinical trials of losartan and recombinant angiotensin‐converting enzyme 2 (ACE2) are underway, such as the Losartan for Patients with COVID‐19 Requiring Hospitalization trial (ClinicalTrials.gov, NCT04312009). The debate has arisen because of circumstantial arguments based on COVID‐19 pathophysiology and renin angiotensin system physiology.8,9 It is argued that ACEIs and ARBs may be harmful because: hypertension is overrepresented among people who develop the most severe complications of COVID‐19;10 severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2) gains entry to a cell using ACE2 and type II transmembrane serine proteases;11 ACE2 is highly expressed in the cardiovascular system, gut, kidneys and lungs (in the cardiovascular system, ACE2 is expressed in cardiomyocytes, epicardial adipose tissue, cardiac fibroblasts, vascular smooth muscle and endothelial cells);11 ACEIs or ARBs upregulate ACE2 in heart cells in some experimental models;12 these factors in theory may lead to a greater viral load and more serious infection. Several important links in this logic chain are contested. Early reports of high rates of hypertension in people dying of COVID‐19 or presenting with severe COVID‐19 were not adjusted for age. However, it is clear that most of these patients have comorbidities, including hypertension, heart failure and diabetes, all of which are more common in an older population. The mortality rate in the intensive care unit in 72 regional hospitals in Lombardy, Italy, was 26%. Most patients were male (82%) and had extensive comorbidities, especially hypertension (49% overall and 62% of deaths).10 ACE2 and COVID‐19 pathophysiology The relationship between COVID‐19 and the renin angiotensin system has been reviewed extensively.11 Although there is no doubt that ACE2 is a receptor for COVID‐19 and that the gene is widely expressed in the body, there is mixed evidence on whether it is upregulated by ACEIs or ARBs in animal models, and there is no evidence that it is increased de novo in tissues that have low expression.13 COVID‐19 suppresses ACE2.11 If ACE2 expression is increased by ACEIs or ARBs, it does not necessarily imply that this enhances the ability of SARS‐CoV‐2 to infect cells. The affinity of the virus for ACE2 is very high, and it is not clear that a small increase in expression due to renin angiotensin inhibition would increase intracellular viral load. Another counterargument to this hypothesis is that an increase in ACE2 expression would provide a counter to the suppression due to SARS‐CoV‐2 and allow the beneficial effects of ACE2, including anti‐inflammatory activity, to manifest; that is, ACEIs or ARBs may be beneficial. Trial design to resolve the matter In considering the possibility of interactions between COVID‐19 and medications, it is important to take into account the different stages in the evolution of the disease in an individual. The earliest stages are characterised by mild or absent upper respiratory symptoms and lymphopenia. A minority of people infected with SARS‐CoV‐2 subsequently develop pneumonitis and pulmonary complications. Even fewer people develop the most severe complications with hyperinflammation — also called “cytokine storm” — often with myocarditis and other major organ failures. It is quite likely that the renin angiotensin system and, by implication, drugs that interact with it, such as ACEIs or ARBs, have different actions at various stages of the condition according to the tissues affected. For example, ACE2 is protective in acute lung injury, suggesting that, although it facilitates viral entry through the epithelium, the ACE2 and its product, the angiotensin (1‐7) axis, could be used to reduce tissue injury caused by SARS‐Cov‐2, a potential target for therapy.11 This will be an important consideration in the design and setting of clinical trials. What clinicians can do in the meantime There are highly circumstantial arguments for and against the use of ACEIs and ARBs in patients with COVID‐19 and there are many more in the literature — as preprints and on social media. In the absence of good epidemiological and clinical trial data, there is no immediate and definitive resolution to the debate. What is clear is that people with hypertension and heart failure benefit from ACEIs and ARBs where indicated, and withdrawing treatment is likely to have serious consequences in some people. We are thus left with a situation where stopping ACEIs or ARBs in some people has known and potentially serious sequelae, whereas continuing them in people with or vulnerable to COVID‐19 has unknown consequences that, depending on how the experimental evidence is interpreted, may be negative, neutral or even positive. International and national authorities on cardiovascular disease, including the High Blood Pressure Research Council of Australia, the World Health Organization, the American Heart Association and the European Society of Cardiology, have been united in their recommendation that treatments with ACEIs or ARBs should be continued during the present pandemic pending evidence from clinical studies to the contrary.14,15 In a number of patient groups, ACEIs or ARBs are first line choices; for example, in patients with hypertension and proteinuria or in people with heart failure. Given the clear benefits they have provided over several decades, a decision to withdraw first line therapies should only be based on reasons supported by a strong evidence base. In other groups, such as in patients with uncomplicated essential hypertension, there are alternatives, including calcium channel blockers or diuretics. However, changing medications in patients with well controlled blood pressure requires careful monitoring and there is a risk in the short term that blood pressure will fall outside the optimal range. This may prove challenging during a period when telemedicine is the norm and given that not all households have home blood pressure monitoring equipment and training. As the ACEIs and ARBs controversy has been wisely canvassed in the media, health professionals will need to have a conversation with patients about the benefits or otherwise of continuing their present therapies. It is important that people understand that no concerns have been raised about other medications they may be taking, such as statins, antithrombotic agents, or treatment for diabetes. In recommending continuation of ACEIs or ARBs, physicians can draw comfort that they are backed by almost every cardiovascular health authority in the world. Nevertheless, the clinical trial results of both administration or withdrawal of ACEIs or ARBs cannot come quickly enough, and in the best case, they will allow us to turn practice into the right theory.

Garry LR Jennings

Clinical record A 70‐year‐old man with multiple myeloma was admitted to our hospital in 2018, having been hospitalised 10 months previously in the United Kingdom. Following admission to our facility, routine collection of clinical specimens was performed in the setting of an episode of febrile neutropenia. Candida auris was isolated in a urine specimen collected in the presence of an indwelling urinary catheter, without accompanying pyuria. Screening of ward contacts (n = 73) was subsequently performed by collection of composite axilla and groin skin swabs, together with swabbing of possible clinical sites of infection (eg, wounds, catheter sites). Swabs were plated onto Candida chromogenic agar and incubated aerobically for 48 hours at 35°C. Any colonies not typical for C. albicans or C. tropicalis were identified using matrix‐assisted laser desorption ionisation time‐of‐flight (MALDI‐TOF) mass spectrometry. The routine regimen of daily cleaning and disinfection of rooms with 1000 ppm sodium hypochlorite solution was continued. Enhanced infection control measures, including contact precautions and single‐room isolation were instituted. A multidisciplinary taskforce coordinated screening, laboratory and prevention strategies. Review of laboratory reports for the preceding 12 months confirmed this to be the first documented C. auris isolate at our facility. One ward contact, a 38‐year‐old man with diffuse large B cell lymphoma, was identified as colonised with C. auris. The organism was detected in a urine specimen collected in the presence of a long term indwelling urinary catheter. This patient had been admitted to a health care facility in the United Arab Emirates, before direct transfer to our facility about 3 months earlier. Colonised patients had been located in a common ward for 19 days, each in a single room with dedicated bathroom and patient care equipment. They had also been managed on an outlying ward for brief periods (3 and 2 days, respectively) separated in time by 2 days. Neither patient developed clinical features of urinary tract or disseminated C. auris infection and antifungal therapy was not administered. Isolates were confirmed as C. auris by MALDI‐TOF mass spectrometry (each with score of 1.75). Antifungal susceptibility testing by broth microdilution demonstrated isolates were resistant to fluconazole (minimum inhibitory concentration [MIC] > 256 mg/L) and susceptible to caspofungin (MIC, 0.25 mg/L) and anidulafungin (MIC, 0.12 mg/L for Patient 1 and 0.25 mg/L for Patient 2). To investigate relatedness of isolates, whole genome sequencing and bioinformatics analysis were performed. Phylogeographic analysis demonstrated that both were related globally to those contained in the India–Pakistan clade. The median pairwise single nucleotide polymorphism distance between the two isolates was 167, suggesting that while these isolates were related, it was not possible to confirm whether transmission had occurred. Discussion Candida auris is an emerging, drug‐resistant yeast, responsible for hospital outbreaks internationally.1 First recognised as a new species of Candida in 2009, cases have been reported in over 30 countries, including the United Kingdom and United Arab Emirates.1,2 In outbreak settings, bloodstream, urinary tract and deep tissue infections have been reported, in addition to colonisation. The majority of isolates are fluconazole resistant,3 with variable resistance to amphotericin B and the echinocandin class of antifungal agents. Infection is associated with a crude mortality of 30%.3 Key differences between C. albicans (the most frequently identified Candida species in Australia) and C. auris are summarised in the Box. Risks for C. auris acquisition include admission to a high dependency unit, presence of invasive medical devices, underlying immunocompromise or chronic disease and receipt of antibiotic or antifungal agents.4 One case of C. auris invasive disease has previously been reported in Australia,5 but to our knowledge the two cases identified at our facility represent the first possible transmission of C. auris in Australia. Identification of C. auris is challenging, with potential misidentification by routine biochemical methods. If C. auris is included in the reference profile database, MALDI‐TOF mass spectrometry may be used to confirm diagnosis. DNA sequencing also provides confirmation, together with data regarding origins and potential transmission in health care settings.3 Collection of bilateral axilla and groin skin swabs as a combined screening specimen is recommended for optimal yield.6 European and United States guidelines recommend screening of all room contacts of patients with C. auris.6,7 Screening of additional patients (eg, whole ward) is necessary where more than one case is identified. Targeted surveillance of patients who have recently had at least one overnight stay in an overseas facility is also recommended, especially if from a country reporting C. auris cases.6,7 Our experience highlights the importance of this strategy. Clinicians should be aware of risks for C. auris acquisition, including overseas health care encounters. In high risk settings, and where a case of C. auris infection has been identified, timely screening of patients is required to ensure that appropriate control measures are instituted. Lessons from practice Candida auris is an emerging drug‐resistant yeast, now reported in Australian health care facilities. In contrast to C. albicans, which is commonly isolated in community and health care settings, C. auris is generally only identified in high risk hospitalised populations. Risks for acquisition include intensive care or high dependency unit admission, presence of invasive medical devices, underlying immunocompromise or chronic disease, and receipt of broad spectrum antibiotics or antifungal agents. Strict infection control measures, including contact precautions and isolation, are required to reduce risks of transmission. Screening for colonisation is an important element of infection control strategies, and a composite skin swab of axilla and groin is recommended. Timely detection requires laboratory identification. MALDI‐TOF mass spectrometry may be used for confirmation, and whole genome sequencing may provide additional information on possible transmission events. Health care facilities must ensure processes are implemented for screening of patients who have received health care in overseas hospitals. Box – Comparison of clinical and epidemiological characteristics of Candida albicans and Candida auris Candida albicans Candida auris Colonisation Colonisation of patients in community and health care settings is common; a commensal of skin and gut of immunocompetent and immunocompromised hosts Colonisation of patients associated only with hospital outbreaks or transmission, also identified in environment and equipment in hospital outbreak settings Infection Infection most frequently at mucosal sites (eg, oropharyngeal, vulvovaginal); bloodstream and urinary tract infections less frequent Bloodstream, urinary tract and wound infections reported Risks for infection ICU or HDU admission, invasive medical devices, major abdominal surgery, solid tumours, haematological malignancies, broad spectrum antibiotics ICU or HDU admission, invasive medical devices, underlying immunocompromise or chronic disease (eg, diabetes, chronic lung disease, renal failure, cardiovascular disease, or malignancy), broad spectrum antibiotics or antifungal agents Geographical distribution Ubiquitous, community and health care settings Reported only in health care settings, expanding global distribution Laboratory identification Culture using selective chromogenic media Culture together with MALDI‐TOF or DNA sequencing Antifungal resistance Generally susceptible to fluconazole Resistance to fluconazole is likely* HDU = high dependency unit; ICU = intensive care unit; MALDI‐TOF = matrix‐assisted laser desorption ionisation time‐of‐flight mass spectrometry. *Note: agreed fluconazole minimum inhibitory concentration breakpoints for C. auris have not been established

Leon J Worth · Simon J Harrison · Michael Dickinson · Annaliese Diemen · Jennifer Breen · Susan Harper · Caroline Marshall · Deborah A Williamson · Karin A Thursky · Monica A Slavin

Usual care must be rapidly adapted to isolate, assess and test large numbers of patients during the COVID‐19 pandemic Coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19), which is caused by severe acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2), emerged in China in late 2019.1 COVID‐19 is an example of a high consequence infectious disease that may present to an Australian hospital. These infections are uncommon in Australia and, in most cases, were imported from overseas. Less frequently, there is onward local transmission, such as during the influenza A(H1N1)pdm09 pandemic in 2009. High consequence infectious diseases present unique challenges to Australian hospitals. Their rarity leads to unfamiliarity and loss of institutional knowledge between events. Many hospitals operate at near maximal capacity between outbreaks and have limited surge capacity.2 Protocols designed to manage single patients require adaptation to situations where larger numbers of patients require isolation, assessment and testing for infection. While every Australian hospital has a mass casualty or disaster protocol, these are developed for all hazards and may not address problems specific to high consequence infectious diseases, including: the need to rapidly identify and isolate potentially infectious patients to prevent nosocomial transmission; the complexity of rapid triage and assessment on frequently evolving epidemiological and clinical grounds; the difficulty of differentiating high consequence infectious diseases from more common but clinically similar conditions;3 the absence of rapid diagnostic tests to aid clinical decision making; and the potential for a prolonged surge for weeks to months during which time the workforce may be affected by both infection and absenteeism. Here we describe the strategic approach of the Royal Melbourne Hospital to triage and screen patients who have presented at risk (or concerned that they are at risk) during the early phases of COVID‐19. Our resources may be of value to other organisations refining their triage and clinical algorithms. The Royal Melbourne Hospital response The Royal Melbourne Hospital is an adult tertiary referral centre and the designated state‐wide provider for quarantinable diseases. The emergency department (ED) treats over 80 000 patients annually. From 6 January 2020, we instituted tools to identify at triage those patients with risk factors for COVID‐19 and rapidly isolate them. Initially, there was capacity to assess patients in one of three existing negative pressure rooms. On 25 January, the first patient with COVID‐19 in Australia, who had arrived in Melbourne on a flight from Guangzhou, was confirmed. The Victorian Department of Health and Human Services informed all passengers on the flight of their possible contact with the patient, leading to a significant surge in presentations to the Royal Melbourne Hospital. Box 1 presents an overview of the challenges in managing high consequence infectious diseases and details of our coordinated approach. Key components that can be used by other services are detailed below. Governance Unlike other major incident responses, which tend to be short‐lived, response to an outbreak requires a sustained response that will inevitably have an impact on other clinical services. A governance process that includes executive sponsors and senior clinical leaders is essential. The Royal Melbourne Hospital COVID‐19 response leveraged an existing code brown (external emergency) pandemic subplan and clinical code yellow (internal infectious disease emergency) plans as a governance framework. A governance group including medical and nursing executives and senior clinicians from the ED, infectious diseases, infection prevention services and microbiology meet regularly. A single standard operating procedure exists on our hospital intranet that provides all clinically relevant information for frontline health care workers (eg, personal protective equipment guidelines, current case definitions, patient assessment algorithms). It is updated frequently given the dynamic situation and, thus, functions as a living document for staff. This document provides 24/7 access to an authoritative source that supports junior and senior staff alike to feel confident in their practices and approach. Infrastructure Establishment of a fever clinic. A particular design feature that may be adopted by other facilities is the rapid establishment of an out‐of‐department fever clinic. In response to the first surge of patients, we rapidly repurposed the nearby hospital transit lounge, which was closed for the weekend, into a fever clinic (Box 2). The clinic received its first patient within 2 hours of notification from the Victorian Department of Health and Human Services of the first local case. In its first 7 days, we assessed 109 patients. We discharged over 90% of patients within 4 hours of arrival. We retain this model as patient numbers continue to increase. In this model of care, patients are physically segregated from the rest of the ED into a dedicated rapid assessment and treatment space from their arrival, limiting exposure to other patients. The main benefit of this approach is that cases yet to be identified can be an important contributor to nosocomial transmission; therefore, early separation and detection are vital.4,5 However, immediate recognition of cases is difficult due to unfamiliarity with the disease, overlap in clinical presentation with more common illnesses, and due to patient wait times. Our fever clinic model of care was based on the success of this model in Toronto and Taiwan during the severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) outbreak,6 where no transmission was reported in these facilities despite hospital exposure being implicated in the majority of cases in these regions (eg, it was the presumed source of exposure for 72% of patients in Toronto7,8). It has also been reported as an effective strategy for triaging patients in Wuhan for COVID‐19.9 Similar approaches appear to have been used in other countries, but detailed descriptions are not yet available in the literature. In Australia, segregation of major incident patients was exemplified by the Royal Darwin Hospital, which functioned as the forward receiving hospital for medically evacuated patients during the 2002 Bali bombings.4 The benefits of establishing a fever clinic include: protecting an existing environment for the maintenance of business continuity; facilitating protocolised interventions for spatially clustered groups of patients; providing a physical location to send additional disaster resources without cluttering areas of core business; and enhancing record‐keeping. Limitations of our approach include the additional staffing required, operational impact of loss of transit lounge, staff unfamiliarity with the location of resources (such as resuscitation trolleys), and a slightly further distance from resuscitation bays if patients deteriorate. Moreover, we were also concerned about the risk of stigmatisation of patients who are seen to be segregated from the main ED waiting room cohort. Implementation of electronic self‐registration and self‐screening. A surge related to an emerging infectious disease provided our clerks’ department with a confluence of unique administrative and logistical challenges. These included: a high proportion of patients came from a non‐English speaking background; contact tracing and follow‐up requires accurate registration and an extended suite of contact details, but usual disaster response medical records protocols generate only anonymised patient registrations; non‐clinical staff (ward clerks) unfamiliar with personal protective equipment would be required to extensively interview patients to confirm details at some point; patients came in bursts, producing delays in registration; manual screening paperwork and registration papers provide a potential fomite for disease transmission; and our ED is paper‐free under usual circumstances. We developed a novel solution to this problem, leveraging the fact that over 91% of Australian citizens and over 96% of Chinese citizens own a smartphone5,10 and converted an initial paper‐based bilingual screening tool to an online one. This is hosted using the research electronic data capture (REDCap) tool (www.projectredcap.org).11 Patients are directed to a secure website optimised for use on a smartphone. The registration portal is free to use. They answer questions regarding their epidemiological risk (such as a detailed travel history, or being a health care worker), clinical risk factors (such as being immunocompromised) and symptoms. Results are immediately fed to remote clinical computers where ward clerks can register the patient without direct patient contact and clinicians can see screening information before their clinical encounter. While not yet tested under a pandemic scenario, we anticipate this method of self‐registration may be particularly useful in the event of a significant surge in patient numbers. Triage sieve and sort of patients can be rapidly undertaken by clinicians who are fed real‐time registration data. Compared with usual mass casualty principles, the inclusion of epidemiological data in the electronic tool is valuable for triage in this setting to screen out the relatively high proportion of patients with perceived, but not actual epidemiological risk factors. Our REDCap infrastructure is available in the Supporting Information for adaptation by other health services. Conclusion The importation of emerging infections into Australia is rare, and onward transmission is rarer still. As the Royal Melbourne Hospital received a surge in patients who required screening for COVID‐19 relatively early during the current outbreak, our recent observations may provide opportunities for other hospitals to enhance their preparedness and response plans. We prioritise prevention of nosocomial transmission (using a scalable, separated fever clinic) early planning for worsening surge (adopting scalable solutions) and clear clinical governance (providing malleable and accessible centralised resources). Box 1 – Elements of the Royal Melbourne Hospital clinical response Element of response Challenges Approach used Clinical governance Multiple clinical units involved, with tangible impacts on business as usual activity and frequent changes to the model of care and the expectations Where possible, we operated within existing plans and policies. Daily executive and head of unit level huddles were instituted initially, and then stepped down to weekly as needed, producing hospital agreement on messaging and expectations of all teams and sharing of information between executive, infectious diseases (ID), infection prevention services (IPS) and emergency medicine (EM). COVID‐19 multidisciplinary working groups were formed within the ED and ID clinical units Infrastructure A space was needed to accommodate the extra patients while maintaining infectious isolation among them, and between them and the rest of the ED census A graduated response used with existing ED negative pressure rooms used for small numbers, a cohort subwaiting area was created when several patients were present in the ED at once, and a separate fever clinic was created in the nearby transit lounge used for surge response Infection prevention and control practices Transmission dynamics are incompletely understood and there is a risk of nosocomial amplification (especially during aerosolising procedures) Education sessions, posters, and videos used to reinforce PPE training; nebulisers removed from dedicated treatment space; hand sanitiser stations; PPE stations and infectious waste bins deployed; and a SOP employed for aerosolising procedures (Supporting Information) Clinical care (including triage, assessment and testing) There is rapidly evolving understanding of clinical and epidemiological characteristics of the disease. Staff lack familiarity with the disease and with the roles performed (concierge nurse, fever clinic doctor), while the normal ED and hospital functions need to continue alongside Creation of a SOP including clinical algorithms for triage, assessment and biological sampling as a living document hosted on the hospital intranet, and updated as needed and used as a single source of truth for clinical staff. Gradual transition to algorithm‐driven assessment by junior medical staff to free up senior staff for unwell patients. Action cards with role descriptions were provided in the SOP for all fever clinic staff Communication with patients Initially, most patients were Mandarin‐speaking Bilingual signage (English and Mandarin) deployed in the fever clinic, and bilingual patient resources and screening questionnaire generated. Discharge information sheets specific to different tiers of risk were translated into Mandarin and provided to all patients discharged from the fever clinic Human resources Maintenance of staff competence and confidence essential for safety and prevention of absenteeism Regular education sessions to provide updated clinical information and epidemiology, train in PPE, and answer questions COVID‐19 = coronavirus disease 2019; ED = emergency department; PPE = personal protective equipment; SOP = standard operating procedure. Box 2 – Floor plan of the Royal Melbourne Hospital fever clinic and guiding principles for a fever clinic COVID‐19 = coronavirus disease 2019; PPE = personal protective equipment; SOP = standard operating procedure.

Amanda M Rojek · Martin Dutch · David Camilleri · Emma Gardiner · Emma Smith · Caroline Marshall · Kirsty L Buising · Nicola Walsham · Mark Putland