Volume 213 Issue 8

An evolving public health policy in response to the COVID-19 pandemic must address the needs of older people

Nicolette R Holt · Johannes T Neumann · John J McNeil · Allen C Cheng

Resource‐limited emergency departments responding to the COVID‐19 pandemic face many challenges — their strength lies in their unique solutions The coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19) pandemic is stretching hospital resources around the world. Emergency departments (EDs) are on the frontline of care and have been impacted significantly by the surge of patients with both suspected and confirmed infection.1,2 Resource‐limited EDs in low and middle income countries are particularly vulnerable. Pre‐existing issues, including a limited workforce supply, have been exacerbated, and new threats, such as a lack of personal protective equipment (PPE) and oxygen, have emerged.1,2 This article explores the impacts of the COVID‐19 pandemic on resource‐limited EDs across the Indo–Pacific. It considers the unique challenges for the region and describes opportunities for building system resilience at a time of unprecedented demand for emergency care. Emergency departments and the COVID‐19 pandemic Emergency care systems are essential for universal health coverage.3 Effective emergency care improves health outcomes, and is critical to achieving the health‐related Sustainable Development Goal targets.4 EDs are the cornerstone of emergency care systems, enabling access to facility‐based care for patients with acute illness and injury. They provide an interface between community and hospital care, and address unmet needs for vulnerable patients. These roles are augmented during communicable disease outbreaks, when EDs fulfil surveillance, triage and clinical care functions.3,4 Since the World Health Organization (WHO) declared COVID‐19 a global pandemic in March 2020, most low and middle income countries across the Indo–Pacific have reported cases. About 20% of patients require hospital admission, and early recognition and resuscitation can help reduce mortality.1 EDs therefore have a key role to play in risk‐stratifying patients, providing initial therapy, establishing goals of care, and identifying patients who may benefit from advanced interventions. Pandemic preparedness The Indo–Pacific encompasses the eastern Indian Ocean and Western Pacific regions, connected through South‐East Asia. The region is characterised by cultural, geographical and economic diversity.5 The Global Health Security Index reflects a country's ability to detect, communicate and respond to a communicable disease outbreak.6 Most low and middle income countries across the Indo–Pacific score below the average preparedness level of 40.2 (on a scale of 0–100) and are among the least prepared countries.6 These findings reflect pre‐existing gaps in health care capacity that are likely to be exacerbated during a public health emergency.7 A historical lack of investment in emergency care systems across Indo–Pacific low and middle income countries means that many EDs have limited resilience in times of increased demand.3,4 Emergency care has not been a focus for international donors,4 and sequential reductions in the Australian Government's development assistance budget for health have further compromised capacity building efforts.8 Although these projections foreshadow a devastating impact on low and middle income countries across the region, the global experience of the COVID‐19 pandemic has illustrated the limitations of preparedness modelling. Several of the most prepared countries are now disease epicentres with overstretched health services, in part reflecting an initial reluctance to follow WHO advice regarding testing and contact tracing.9 Indo–Pacific nations may have strengths that protect against this trend, such as recent epidemic experience.10 Nimble and innovative responses may help build resilience, potentially providing globally relevant lessons that would typically be expected from high income countries. Challenges in public health response A major determinant of the pandemic's impact on EDs will be the success of broader public health interventions. Low and middle income countries, including those in the Indo–Pacific, will face unique challenges in disease containment.2 As demonstrated by several Pacific countries, island states have greater ability to shut their borders and limit inward passage of the virus. However, a freeze on international access will have a significant socio‐economic impact and is unlikely to be sustainable. It may also affect the supply of essential medical equipment, surveillance capacity (given that certain countries rely on foreign pathology services for COVID‐19 testing) and retrieval systems. An important mechanism to disrupt community transmission of COVID‐19 is physical distancing. This is antithetical to many sociocultural practices across the Indo–Pacific, where communal living is common and regular congregation at community meeting places is the norm. Modelling from a Papua New Guinean setting has demonstrated that physical distancing measures in that community were 60–70% less effective compared with Australia.11 Public health responses across the region have already been complicated by extreme weather events and humanitarian crises. Examples include Cyclone Harold, a category 5 cyclone that recently affected the South Pacific, and the climbing infection rate in the worlds’ largest refugee camp at Cox's Bazar in Bangladesh.12 Worsening climate change will further exacerbate the incidence and severity of natural disasters and disease outbreaks. Challenges for emergency departments As community transmission increases, demand for ED care will escalate. The impact may be more pronounced among Indo–Pacific communities as a result of high rates of non‐communicable disease.13 COVID‐19 appears to be more severe in patients with diabetes, hypertension and chronic pulmonary illness, all of which are prevalent across the region.13 Increasing demand is likely to expose pre‐existing deficiencies in ED systems and resources, including scarce critical care capacity.1,2 A survey of emergency care clinicians in the Pacific recently identified minimal integration of surge response with routine emergency care, and a lack of essential processes, such as triage and patient flow.7 Consistent with these data, Box 1 lists key challenges in systems, spaces, supplies and staff that have become evident to Indo–Pacific clinicians during COVID‐19 response planning.2 Emerging data suggest that frontline clinicians are at an increased risk of death from COVID‐19, in part due to suboptimal PPE.14 Limited access to PPE is a major threat and will place ED clinicians at increased risk of infection. Low and middle income countries face challenges in PPE procurement because of supply chain limitations as well as market‐based competition with high income countries.1,2 Illness among health care workers will stretch an already fragile health care workforce. In the event of a surge, EDs will require significant increases in staffing, and the challenge may be exacerbated by high rates of comorbidities, absenteeism and inadequate training.7,13 Additionally, many Indo–Pacific EDs rely on a sole medical leader for clinical and administrative decision making.15 The pandemic may place these clinicians at risk of burnout, illness and death, thereby exacerbating the mismatch between supply and demand for care. Unintended consequences To meet these challenges, EDs will need to make substantial changes to their processes. However, there is a risk that distraction from pre‐existing health priorities will worsen the overall impact. Patients with chronic disease have poor outcomes at times of increased health system stress, as occurred in West Africa during the 2014 Ebola epidemic when resources were diverted away from routine care.16 Lockdown measures will make it difficult for some patients to access emergency care, and fear of acquiring COVID‐19 in hospital may create a further barrier to ED attendance. Additionally, the socio‐economic consequences of public health interventions are likely to contribute to poor health outcomes in the longer term. There is also a risk that donor funding will target resource intensive equipment (such as ventilators) that may be unsuitable in a low and middle income country context. Many resource‐limited ED clinicians are accustomed to a low cost essential care approach.1 Rather than emphasising expensive and high risk interventions, a focus on simple measures such as rigorous infection control and oxygen therapy is likely to be advantageous.1 The pandemic has already had a gendered impact, exacerbating the “triple burden” of productive, reproductive and community work responsibilities imposed on women.17 This has been particularly evident in low and middle income countries, where women make up a larger proportion of frontline workers and are disproportionately expected to fulfil unpaid household duties.17 Addressing immediate needs Addressing these challenges requires urgent action. While high level guidelines such as the WHO Emergency and Disaster Risk Management Framework18 exist, these often neglect the practical challenges faced by EDs. COVID‐19 guidance for Indo–Pacific EDs must complement WHO recommendations, and be culturally appropriate, fiscally responsible and immediately actionable2 (Box 2). Indo–Pacific ED leaders are already implementing COVID‐19 response plans. Examples from across the region are profiled in Box 3. These early success stories highlight the capacity of local clinicians to lead disaster response activities and provide meaningful care in the face of escalating health care demand. The Australian Government has provided some support for this effort by contributing funds to the WHO response plan and deploying specialist advisors to selected Indo–Pacific countries.8 Opportunities An increasingly interconnected world, combined with climate change and mass migration, will result in more frequent communicable disease outbreaks. COVID‐19 provides an opportunity to build resilient EDs that are better prepared for this challenge. The pandemic is also a chance to enhance the sustainability of routine emergency care through system strengthening, facilitated by multisectoral collaboration between clinicians, governments, technical organisations and donors.3 This effort should be informed by existing guidance for the enhancement of human resources, infrastructure, governance and processes to improve regional emergency care capacity.7 Australian agencies, such as the Indo–Pacific Centre for Health Security, have a key role to play in resourcing this activity. The pandemic provides a unique opportunity for the Australian Government to advance its commitment to strengthening health care systems and deliver on the promise of its Pacific Step‐up.5,8 It also offers a chance to leverage Australia's expertise in emergency care for the benefit of the region.3 Conclusion Time will determine the full impact of COVID‐19 on the Indo–Pacific, but global trends suggest that ED capacity may be severely stretched. Responses should target the unique challenges for disease control and emergency care delivery across the region. Although local ED clinicians are already demonstrating leadership and adaptability in their surge planning, the pandemic provides an opportunity to build resilience in emergency care systems and enhance future capacity for both routine care and outbreak response. Australian clinicians, organisations and governments have a key role to play in supporting this effort. Box 1 – Challenges for COVID‐19 preparedness and response in emergency departments (EDs) Variable Challenge (and selected examples) Systems Disaster and surge plans Many EDs and hospitals do not have standard operating procedures for surge events and communicable disease outbreaks: “ED COVID‐19 operations need a focal point of command at hospital executive level so that ED preparatory activities can be prioritised and fast tracked” (Solomon Islands) Triage Some EDs have no formalised triage systems. Implementing a triage system, for the first time, during a pandemic is fraught with difficulty Patient flow Overcrowding, interdepartmental communication barriers and a lack of ward beds can delay care for both COVID and non‐COVID patients Space Isolation and resuscitation areas Many EDs lack the physical space and infrastructure to adequately provide safe and effective routine care. In the context of the pandemic, a lack of dedicated isolation and resuscitation areas will be a major challenge Storage capacity Attempts have been made stockpile essential resources; however, there is a lack of dedicated on‐site storage space at many hospitals Supplies Personal protective equipment (PPE) and cleaning agents PPE supply is a major and ongoing concern: “There is not a standby supply of PPE … in a normal working day. [There is no] process to ensure a consistent supply of PPE in the department” (Fiji) “Our hospital is not a central level hospital, [so] we [were not given] much supplies” (Myanmar) Laboratory testing There is often limited laboratory capacity, and staff have competing priorities beyond EDsMany testing facilities are offsite or overseas, resulting in delayed isolation, identification and treatment of patients with COVID‐19, placing staff and other patients at risk Oxygen There is a lack of portable oxygen cylinders and oxygen concentrators in many facilities. Relatively few facilities have capacity for intubation and ventilation Novel therapies There is uncertainty surrounding the therapeutic benefits of agents such as hydroxychloroquine, azithromycin and remdesivir. In some countries, these medications are difficult to source, and with international demand increasing, supply will become even more scarce. This will impact the availability of these medications for patients who require them for other indications Staff Critical care training There are few formally trained critical care staff in many EDs. Additionally, there are concerns about workforce shortages and the reliance on volunteers Some hospital staff do not appreciate the importance of early recognition and treatment: “[Some staff lack an] initial understanding of the role of ED in the approach to COVID‐19” (Fiji) Staff morale and safety concerns Many staff are concerned about the risk to themselves and their family members if they are required to care for patients with suspected COVID‐19 without adequate protection: “[There are] difficulties in commuting due to strict curfew/modified lock down and restrictions on inter district transport. [There is] COVID phobia created by the media” (Sri Lanka) “I don't want them to infect, I don't want them to exhaust, I don't want them to depress, I want to create safe and less stress environment” (Myanmar) Box 2 – Strategies for optimising emergency department (ED) preparedness and response* Systems Ensure ED processes are consistent with broader public health and hospital management strategies Utilise local case definitions to identify suspected cases Establish a clearly marked screening and triage process at the entrance to the hospital, and stream patients based on the acuity of their presentation. For example, low acuity patients might be redirected to a co‐located surge clinic Maintain infection prevention and control to the highest possible standards. Ensure patients and staff practice physical distancing, cough etiquette and hand hygiene Minimise the volume of patients in the ED and isolate symptomatic patients from others by establishing a respiratory zone Develop clear admission/discharge criteria and establish ceilings of care for the facility Space Establish a clearly marked screening and/or triage station at the entrance to the facility Ensure the ED and surge clinic (if established) have designated waiting areas for patients with respiratory symptoms Allocate separate areas in the ED for the management of symptomatic, medium and high acuity patients Supplies Anticipate equipment needs and stockpile to the extent that is possible, especially disposable items that will be in high demand (oxygen cylinders, antipyretics, personal protective equipment, etc) Follow World Health Organization guidelines on resource stewardship. For example, implement clear thresholds for providing supplemental oxygen, such as SpO2 < 90% on room air for stable patients, SpO2 < 92% on room air for pregnant women, and SpO2 < 94% on room air for patients with respiratory distress Avoid use of therapies that are likely to increase virus transmission (eg, nebulisers) Develop safe processes for cleaning and reusing equipment based on World Health Organization infection prevention and control advice Staff Make sure that all staff feel included, empowered, motivated and supported Update the staff contact list and plan for absenteeism Identify staff who are high risk for infection and reallocate them to other areas Train staff in the systems and processes that have been developed Remind staff that they should not work if they have acute respiratory symptoms Use ancillary staff and other community members for non‐technical tasks Remind others that COVID requires a whole‐of-government, whole‐of-health and whole‐of-hospital response; the ED cannot do it alone Ensure ED staff are involved in the post‐pandemic review process to promote ongoing systems improvement and sustainability * Adapted from Australasian College for Emergency Medicine. Managing COVID‐19 across the Indo‐Pacific: a guide for resource limited EDs. Melbourne: Australia, 2020. https://acem.org.au/getmedia/3930cc60-abb1-4517-b7af-36da918a3f7b/Managing-COVID-19-across-the-Indo-Pacific-(G763) (viewed Aug 2020). Box 3 – Examples of successful COVID‐19 preparedness and response strategies employed across Indo–Pacific emergency departments (EDs) Variable Strategy (and selected examples) Systems Leadership and coordination Many countries have developed national coordinating bodies that include ED clinicians as key stakeholders. This is a recognition of their pivotal role in crisis coordination: “Once there were initial reports of care in China, the Ministry of Health had formed a National Taskforce and … ED was invited to participate in it as stakeholders” (Fiji) Identification of key leaders at each stage of the patient journey has been essential: “The hospital formed its Taskforce and we had devised operating procedures and a flow chart with important contact persons at each stage” (Fiji) Triage, screening and patient flow There has been a rapid development of triage, screening and flow systems based on specific criteria: “For patients with respiratory symptoms and fever … the high acuity patients can be stabilised in the ED respiratory resus and transferred to ICU. Medium acuity patients to be stabilised in the step down area of the respiratory section of the ED. Ambulance will transport patients to the isolation wards and ICU” (Solomon Islands) Space Isolation and resuscitation areas Guided by experience from Africa during the Ebola outbreak, EDs in Solomon Islands, Fiji, Myanmar and Sri Lanka have undergone significant restructuring of limited spaces to facilitate separate areas for screening, isolation, resuscitation and storage Supplies Infection prevention and control, and personal protective equipment (PPE) Drawing on experience during the 2009 H1N1 pandemic, EDs have adapted guidelines for the judicious use of PPE, while emphasising that staff safety is a priority: “Within the storage area in ED of consumables, a cupboard is allocated to store PPE kits and this is tallied and replenished by the Hospital Infection Control team” (Fiji) “Health care worker exposure assessment protocol was designed” (Sri Lanka) “Luckily we have many people who want to donate what we need so we are still ok” (Myanmar) Resource utilisation Early decisions have been made about distribution of limited resources: “No CPR will be done on COVID‐19 high acuity patients who have (deteriorated) despite maximal non aerosol generating treatment” (Solomon Islands) “We decided to do respiratory team with only three people, because … when positive case came to our ED only these three need PPE” (Myanmar) Novel therapies These are not being used until there is proven evidence of benefit. Local guidelines have been developed: “Cautious use of fluids except in shock. Use of metered dose inhalers (rather than nebulisers) for asthma exacerbations” (Solomon Islands) Staff Critical care training Countries have begun re‐training staff in critical care and there has been redeployment and re‐training of staff from non‐essential areas to the ED. Non‐medical staff are also being utilised to assist with operational requirements such as cleaning and transportation Staff morale and safety There is a focus on open communication and staff wellbeing: “We did meeting every night with zoom and discussed the problems faced in their duty time … we asked their working capacity … and redrew duty roster” (Myanmar) “Special quarantine centres with all the facilities were designated for staff members who had problems in home isolation” (Sri Lanka) “Staff are undergoing medical checks. Staff with comorbidities will not be working in the respiratory section of the ED” (Solomon Islands)

Isobelle G Woodruff · Rob D Mitchell · Georgina Phillips · Deepak Sharma · Patrick Toito'ona · Krishantha Jayasekera · Khine Shwe Wah · Megan Cox · Gerard M O'Reilly

Modelling suggests that elimination could have been achieved if Victoria had gone into stage 4 lockdown immediately from 9 July Victoria is the unlucky state in a lucky country. Australian states and territories, other than New South Wales, have achieved elimination of community transmission of the sudden acute respiratory syndrome coronavirus 2 (SARS‐CoV‐2): 28 days of no locally acquired cases where the source is unknown; twice the maximum incubation period. The situation in NSW is mixed. On one hand, NSW had ongoing case notifications of 10–20 per day in the month to mid‐August 2020, arising largely from imported cases from Victoria. On the other hand, on 16 July there had only been three locally acquired cases of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection with no known source in the preceding 28 days, suggesting NSW was on the cusp of elimination.1 If NSW successfully contains the current outbreak, it may resume its prior trajectory towards the elimination of local transmission, leaving Victoria isolated as the only state with community transmission. As of late August, Queensland is also experiencing community transmission — possibly ending its elimination status (28 days of no locally acquired cases where the source is unknown), subject to investigation of the new cases. It seems unlikely that states and territories that have eliminated local transmission will relinquish their status by freely opening borders and engaging with Victoria (and NSW if community transmission remains). Indeed, on 17 August the Queensland Premier stated: “Let me make it very clear, we will always put Queenslanders first and … we do not have any intentions of opening any borders while there is community transmission active in Victoria and in New South Wales”.2 Australia proceeding with two separate systems (six or seven states and territories having eliminated the virus, one or two not) is a significant concern. There are three general strategic policy responses to the challenge of coronavirus disease 2019 (COVID‐19): elimination, suppression, and mitigation (or herd immunity). No response is free of economic, social and health harms; rather, it is about minimising harm. Society has largely rejected a mitigation response because of concerns about the likely high morbidity and mortality arising from such a response. On 24 July, the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee recommended “that the goal for Australia is to have no community transmission of COVID‐19”,3 and on the same day Prime Minister Scott Morrison accepted and affirmed this recommendation, stating “The goal of that is obviously, and has always been no community transmission”.4 Unfortunately, this first clear statement that Australia's goal is to eliminate community transmission was late in coming, as the Victorian outbreak was already in full swing, with case numbers peaking at a 5‐day average of about 500 per day from 29 July to 5 August, resulting in a stage 4 lockdown in metropolitan Melbourne from 6 pm on 2 August. Elimination strategy We know from New Zealand (population, 5.0 million)5 and Taiwan (23.8 million)6 that elimination of community transmission is achievable in island jurisdictions, with NZ having no community transmission for 102 days until 11 August. The advantage of elimination is that despite international border closures or strict quarantine, citizens can go about life with a near‐normal functioning of their society and economy. Elimination presents challenges. First, there is the extra effort to achieve it, and the fact that aiming to achieve elimination does not guarantee success. Second, having achieved elimination, there is the constant risk of the virus re‐entering due to quarantine breaches (eg, the current outbreak in NZ). How frequently a COVID‐19‐free jurisdiction with tight border controls will retain elimination status is unclear, although we know that NZ lasted 102 days with no community transmission and that Western Australia, Northern Territory, South Australia, Australian Capital Territory, Queensland and Tasmania achieved over 100 days without a locally acquired case with no known source (although the status of Queensland is unclear as of early September). Was elimination achievable with a 6‐week stage 3 lockdown as implemented in Victoria from 9 July, or a more stringent lockdown? Lockdowns are effective for COVID‐19 pandemic control.7,8 Our case for an explicit elimination strategy in Victoria at lockdown commencement in early July was that given Victoria was going into a lockdown for 6 weeks, there was probably only a marginal extra cost of “going hard” with a rigorous public health response that increased the probability of achieving elimination. But was elimination achievable within 6 weeks? We examined four policy scenarios using an agent‐based model, a type of microsimulation of individuals. The model accurately reflects the prior experience of both NZ and Australia ( https://github.com/JTHooker/COVIDModel), and here we adapted it to Victoria (including the case counts up to 14 July; see Supporting Information for details). The four policy approaches, all simulated from 9 July 2020, were: Standard: reflecting the first Australian stage 3 lockdown (calibrated to case numbers as described at https://github.com/JTHooker/COVIDModel), with key parameters including 85% of people observing physical distancing; those observing physical distancing doing so 85% of the time; 30% of adult workers being essential workers; 93% of people asked to isolate doing so; 20% uptake of the COVIDSafe app; but no closure of schools and no mask wearing. Standard with masks at 50%: Standard, plus 50% of people wearing masks in crowded indoor environments. Stringent with masks at 50%: Standard with masks at 50%, plus schools closed and essential workers restricted to 20% of workers. Stringent with masks at 90%: Stringent, with mask use increased to 90% (ie, close to stage 4, which was implemented in Melbourne from 6 pm on 2 August after the 5‐day moving average case numbers increased from 300 to 500 in the first 3 weeks of stage 3). Box 1 shows the percentage likelihood of elimination in Victoria, defined as the date of clearance of infection by the last case, and the date of last acquisition of infection. The model is omniscient about infectious status; in the real world, based on a definition of 28 days of no cases, elimination would occur about 2 weeks after the clearance dates shown in Box 1, A. Under the “standard” policy approach (ie, equivalent to stage 3 without masks), there was no chance that all infected people would have cleared their SARS‐CoV‐2 infection by 19 August (6 weeks after lockdown commenced; Box 1, A). The probabilities for the other three policy approaches achieving elimination 6 weeks after implementation (Box 1, A) were 0% for “standard with masks at 50%”; about 4% for “stringent with masks at 50%”; and 30% for “stringent with masks at 90%”. The probabilities of the last actual infection occurring by 19 August were more encouraging at 0%, 1%, 45% and 90%, respectively (Box 1, B). Of particular note, given that the stage 3 lockdown imposed on 9 July failed because caseloads increased to an average of 500 per day, in our simulations 48% of the 1000 iterations of the “standard” scenario (stage 3, no masks) and 22% of the 1000 iterations for “standard with masks at 50%” had peaks in the first 3 weeks in excess of 400 per day. This is consistent with what eventuated, and further speaks (in hindsight) to the desirability of entering a stage 4 lockdown on 9 July; the “stringent with masks at 90%” scenario had no instances of peak cases greater than 400 per day in the first 3 weeks. Undertaking simulation modelling of SARS‐CoV‐2 policy options is challenging and the uncertainties are still considerable even when using the best estimates available. Nevertheless, our results lend weight to the proposition that elimination was achievable if Victoria had gone into stage 4 lockdown with mandatory wearing of masks immediately from 9 July. A ten‐point plan to maximise the chance of elimination in Victoria Box 2 lists enhancements to the stay‐at‐home orders of the 9 July lockdown. The first and critical point was leadership. As above, we did get a clear statement of an elimination goal from the Chief Health Officers (who comprise the Australian Health Protection Principal Committee membership) and Prime Minister Scott Morrison on 24 July, but with the benefit of hindsight it was perhaps too late. Target‐setting is still not occurring (eg, a target number of cases per day could be set for when we step out of stage 4 under both elimination and suppression strategy options). Moreover, an expert advisory group on elimination was not convened, limiting the capacity for an optimal evidence‐informed policy response. Nevertheless, since the 9 July lockdown, progress with other aspects of the ten‐point plan has been made with the closure of schools, mandatory mask wearing, and commitments to improve contact tracing capacity. Conclusion We argued in the preprint version of this article on 17 July that Melbourne and Victoria should not waste the opportunity that the (then) 6‐week lockdown presented and go hard and early. By learning from the lessons on social and preventive measures to lower SARS‐CoV‐2 transmissibility,7,8,12,14 and specifically the lessons from NZ,3 Taiwan and the six Australian jurisdictions that have achieved elimination, Victoria could have increased its chances of also eliminating community transmission. Our work and that of others who have independently considered the alternatives consistently demonstrates that elimination was possible, and if achieved would have been optimal for health and for the economy in the long term.15,16,17 In this article, we modelled the situation as at mid‐July — we are now updating modelling under the current situation. Authors’ note: This Perspective was submitted to the MJA on 16 July 2020 and published as a preprint on 17 July.9 The revised version, submitted on 23 August, retains the simulation modelling of the original but the uncertainty of inputs was updated to include uncertainty other than stochastic uncertainty. Our aim was rapid modelling to estimate the probability of virus elimination during the planned 6‐week stage 3 lockdown that Victoria had just commenced. The revised version was also published as a preprint on mja.com.au on 4 September, following full peer review and prior to typesetting, pagination and proofreading. Box 1 – Percentage likelihood of elimination of community transmission of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection in Victoria, by date of clearance of last active infection (A) and date of acquisition of last infection (B)* * Across 1000 Monte Carlo simulations in an agent‐based SEIR (susceptible, exposed, infectious, recovered) model. The vertical dashed line is the date 6 weeks after implementation of the lockdown policies. Compared with modelling published in the preprint version of this article,9 the only change here is the inclusion of additional parameter uncertainty in addition to stochastic uncertainty (see Supporting Information), resulting in increased sloping in the curves due to a wider range of potential parameter values (ie, the time distribution to elimination is wider). Box 2 – A ten‐point plan to maximise the chance of successful elimination of community transmission of SARS‐CoV‐2 in Victoria, based on the planned 6‐week lockdown from 9 July 2020 (as published on 17 July 2020)9 Strong and decisive leadership with strategic clarity. An explicit goal of elimination should be articulated, learning from the New Zealand experience (Prime Minister Jacinda Ardern, government ministers and senior officials).10 A clear set of targets for loosening of policies needs to be articulated, so citizens know what is likely to happen and when. Convene an advisory group of experts in the elimination strategy and SARS‐CoV‐2 public health response, reporting weekly to the Victorian Chief Health Officer, with the agenda, papers and minutes made publicly available. Close all schools. Although children do not usually suffer severe illness from SARS‐CoV‐2 infection, the virus still transmits between children and staff in schools.11 Accordingly, schools need to close until such time as the daily rate of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection without a known source falls beneath a target set by the Chief Health Officer. Tighten the definition of essential shops to remain open. Supermarkets and chemists need to remain open. However, department stores and hardware stores should be closed. A staged re‐opening based on set target levels of daily numbers of SARS‐CoV‐2 infection without a known source should then be implemented, so long as mask wearing by both staff and patrons is mandatory, along with hand sanitiser use on entry and exit from stores. Require mask wearing by Melbourne residents in indoor environments where 1.5 m physical distancing cannot be ensured, such as supermarkets and (especially) public transport. While no panacea, the wearing of masks reduces the chance of infected people spreading the virus.12 Tighten the definition of essential workers and work. There is currently a loose definition of who is an essential worker and what is essential work. This needs urgent tightening; for example, as per the NZ definitions used in their level 4 lockdown.13 Require mask wearing by essential workers whenever they are in close contact with people other than those in their immediate household. Ensure financial and other supports to businesses, community and other groups most affected by more stringent stay‐at-home and lockdown requirements, and provide enhancements, targeted where warranted, to programs such as JobKeeper and JobSeeker. Further strengthen contact tracing to ensure the majority of notifications (and their close contacts) are interviewed within 24 hours of the index case notification and placed in isolation if necessary. The use of smart phone and digital adjuncts needs to be improved, be that for initial contact tracing (eg, the COVIDSafe app, or a South Korean‐style use of telecommunications data) or monitoring of adequacy of isolation (eg, text message follow‐up, GPS monitoring, or electronic bracelets). Extend suspension of international arrivals into Victorian quarantine and divert resources. To allow a stronger focus on elimination within Victoria, extend the suspension of international arrivals to Victoria. Quarantine capacity can be redeployed for isolation of Melbourne residents infected with SARS‐CoV‐2 (and potentially high risk close contacts) if they do not have satisfactory home environments for self‐isolation.

Tony Blakely · Jason Thompson · Natalie Carvalho · Laxman Bablani · Nick Wilson · Mark Stevenson