Issues
Volume 165 Issue 5
Editorials Autism: time for a national approach to early assessment and management Bruce J Tonge (MJA 1996; 165: 244)Epilepsy: progress in solving mysteries and dispelling myths Samuel F Berkovic, Peter F Bladin (MJA 1996; 165: 245)Changing perceptions of osteoarthritis Nicholas Bellamy (MJA 1996; 165: 247) Research Bicycle riding and oral/maxillofacial trauma in young children Caroline H C Acton, James W Nixon, Ronald C Clark (MJA 1996; 165: 249)Managing chronic back pain: impact of an interdisciplinary team approach Hilary A Flavell, Gino P Carrafa, Clayton H Thomas, Peter B Disler (MJA 1996; 165: 253)An outbreak of Japanese encephalitis in the Torres Strait, Australia, 1995 Jeffrey N Hanna, Scott A Ritchie, Debra A Phillips, Jack Shield, M Clare Bailey, John S Mackenzie, Michael Poidinger, Bradley J McCall, Phillip J Mills Article - Abstract (MJA 1996; 165: 256) Notable Cases A diving fatality due to oxygen toxicity during a "technical" dive Christopher H Lawrence Article - Abstract (MJA 1996; 165: 262) Managing HIV Protecting the blood supply from HIV Brenton R Wylie, Roger Y Dodd (MJA 1996; 165: 264)HIV prevention in the community: injecting drug users Alex Wodak, Kate Dolan (MJA 1996; 165: 266)Epidemiological surveillance for HIV and AIDS John M Kaldor, Nick Crofts (MJA 1996; 165: 268) Point of View Price competition, professional cooperation and standards Peter C Arnold (MJA 1996; 165: 272) MJA Practice Essentials - Dermatology Advances in topical therapy for skin diseases Elizabeth M Willsteed (MJA 1996; 165: 274) Ethics The clinical and ethical implications of hepatitis C for organ transplantation in Australia Ian H Kerridge, Peter Saul, Robert G Batey Article (MJA 1996; 165: 282)
Research
An outbreak of Japanese encephalitis in the Torres Strait, Australia, 1995
An outbreak of Japanese encephalitis in the Torres Strait, Australia, 1995 Jeffrey N Hanna, Scott A Ritchie, Debra A Phillips, Jack Shield, M Clare Bailey, John S Mackenzie, Michael Poidinger, Bradley J McCall and Phillip J Mills MJA 1996; 165: 256-260 Readers may print a single copy for personal use. No further reproduction or distribution of the articles in whole or in part should proceed without the permission of the publisher. For copyright permission, contact the Australasian Medical Publishing Company Journalists are welcome to write news stories based on what they read here, but should acknowledge their source as "an article published on the Internet by The Medical Journal of Australia <http://www.mja.com.au/>". Abstract - Introduction - Methods - Results - Discussion - Acknowledgements - References - Authors' details - Register to be notified of new articles by email - - ©MJA1996 Abstract Objectives: To determine the distribution of virus infection during an outbreak of Japanese encephalitis (JE) in the Torres Strait, and to describe the environmental factors facilitating the outbreak. Design: Human and porcine serological surveys for JE virus activity throughout the Torres Strait, and mosquito and household surveys on the island of Badu. Setting: The island of Badu (where the clinical cases occurred) and the other islands of the Torres Strait, Australia, during April-May 1995. Results: The serological surveys identified recent JE virus infection among residents or domestic pigs on at least nine outer Torres Strait islands. A JE virus, confirmed by nucleotide sequencing, was isolated from two asymptomatic Badu residents. Virus isolations and mosquito surveys implicated Culex annulirostris as the major vector involved in the outbreak. There was prolific Cx. annulirostris breeding in a variety of water bodies close to and within the Badu community. Over half (53%) of the households kept pigs in pens, and many (63%) of the pigpens were situated near standing water; in 56% of these "wet" pigpens Cx. annulirostris was breeding. Conclusions: There was evidence of widespread JE virus activity throughout the outer islands of the Torres Strait. We suggest that migratory birds and/or wind-blown mosquitoes could have imported the virus into the Torres Strait from a focus of viral activity, possibly in Papua New Guinea, thereby initiating the outbreak. A combination of environmental factors, with large numbers of domestic pigs in close proximity to human dwellings and mosquito breeding sites, undoubtedly facilitated the outbreak on Badu. MJA 1996; 165: 256-260 Introduction Over a two-week period in March-April 1995, three cases of Japanese encephalitis (JE) occurred among residents of the island of Badu in the Torres Strait, Australia 1 ( Box 1). Although JE is widespread throughout Asia, 3 the Torres Strait outbreak is the first time that it has been recognised in Australia. J E is caused by a mosquito-borne flavivirus, and results in an acute illness characterised by headache, fever, convulsions, depressed level of consciousness and coma. It has a high case-fatality rate and there is a high prevalence of neurological sequelae in those who survive the acute illness. However, infection with the JE virus does not invariably cause disease; there is a high ratio of asymptomatic to symptomatic infections. 3 The JE virus is maintained in a natural cycle involving water birds such as egrets and herons. Pigs are very efficient amplifying hosts for the virus and therefore almost always contribute to outbreaks of JE in human populations. However, humans and other large verte brates, such as horses, are not efficient amplifying hosts, and are therefore "dead-end" hosts for the JE virus. 3 The outbreak was assumed to have been caused by a mosquito-borne virus, and Murray Valley encephalitis (MVE) virus (the major cause of arboviral encephalitis in Australia) was first suspected. Although the current status of flavivirus infections in the Torres Strait is uncertain, MVE and other Australian flaviviruses (Alfuy, dengue, Kokobera, Kunjin, Stratford and Sepik viruses) have been reported from either Cape York or Papua New Guinea (PNG). 4 Once laboratory findings confirmed the outbreak as JE, further investigations were undertaken. Methods Serological survey In April 1995, a serological survey was undertaken among residents of Badu. A non-random convenience sample was used. Human sera were screened for the presence of (i) flavivirus IgG and IgM by enzyme-linked immunosorbent assay (ELISA) 5 and haemagglutination inhibition assay, 6 and (ii) antibodies to JE, MVE and Kunjin viruses by plaque reduction neutralisation assay. 7 Sera testing positive for flavivirus IgM by ELISA were fractionated by ultracentrifugation over a sucrose gradient. IgM fractions were then tested for haemagglutination-inhibiting antibodies against JE, MVE and Kunjin viruses. 8 A diagnosis of a recent JE virus infection was made if there was a fourfold or greater rise in haemagglutination-inhibiting antibody titres in paired sera tested in parallel, or if JE virus IgM antibody and JE neutralising antibody were detected in serum at significantly higher titres than antibody to MVE and Kunjin viruses. Blood samples for serological studies were also collected from domestic animals, in particular pigs, on Badu. The animal sera were screened for the presence of total (i.e., IgM and IgG) antibody to JE, MVE and Kunjin viruses by haemagglutination inhibition assay. A portion of the sera positive for total JE antibody by haemagglutination inhibition assay was then tested by plaque reduction neutralisation assay. The presence of neutralising antibody at significantly higher titres to JE virus than to MVE and Kunjin viruses was considered evidence of exposure of an animal to JE virus. Isolation of virus Virus isolations were attempted from human sera obtained from residents of Badu: 100 m L of serum was inoculated onto confluent monolayers of C6/36 ( Aedes albopictus ) cells. 9 Viral growth was monitored by testing the culture super natant for haemagglutinating ability. Box 2 details the method used for identification of virus isolates. Mosquito survey Because the outbreak was initially suspected to be MVE, mosquito surveillance focused on the primary vector of MVE in Australia, Culex annulirostris . 4 Commencing on 7 April, larval and adult mosquito surveys were conducted within a 1-km radius of the centre of the Badu community. Mosquito larvae were sampled with a 350 mL dipper and adult mosquitoes were trapped with Centers for Disease Control light traps -- eight, each baited with 1 kg of dry ice (carbon dioxide) and 1-octen-3-ol (octenol; release rate 10 mg/h), 16 were run overnight at locations throughout the community on four occasions throughout April 1995. Household survey In May 1995, environmental health staff undertook a house-to-house survey to interview one adult resident of each household on Badu about household characteristics that may have contributed to the outbreak of JE. These included the presence of backyard pigs and horses and the state of repair of waste disposal (drainage and sewerage) systems. Survey of other communities To determine the extent of recent JE infection, blood was taken from convenience samples of people residing on 12 other outer islands, three inner islands and seven Cape York communities. Blood was also taken from pigs from eight other outer islands, three inner islands and two Cape York communities. Results Serological survey Two hundred and fifteen Badu residents were tested for JE infection: 35 people had serological evidence of recent JE infection (Box 3), and 21 of these had a fourfold or greater rise in JE-specific antibody titres in paired sera. All 11 pigs from Badu (tested by plaque reduction neutralisation assay) showed serological evidence of JE infection (Box 3). Most of the horses (7/10) and dogs (10/16) tested also showed serological evidence of JE infection, but not one of six chickens was positive. Isolation of virus JE virus was isolated from the sera of two Badu residents, both of whom remained asymptomatic. Nucleotide sequences obtained by reverse transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction (RT-PCR) amplification showed that the two viruses (designated FU and NO) were definitely strains of JE, with a 90% nucleotide homology with other strains of JE virus but with less than 70% homology with other flaviviruses. Both Badu isolates were very closely related, with 99% homology with each other. Detailed sequence comparison of the prM region of the viruses with that of other JE virus isolates showed that the Badu viruses were most closely related (92% homology) to other viruses of genotype III, 12,13 especially WTP-70/22 (from Malaysia) and B1065 (from southern Thailand) (Figure 1). The nucleotide sequences of JE-FU and JE-NO have been deposited in GenBank (the international computerised depository of genomic-sequence information), with accession numbers L43565 ( prM ) and L48968 ( NS5 ) for JE-FU, and L43566 ( prM ) and L48967 ( NS5 ) for JE-NO. Mosquito survey Numerous water bodies contained large numbers of Cx. annulirostris larvae. There were extensive swampy areas close to the community, and those contaminated by horse faeces had high larval densities ( >= 10 larvae/dip). A waterhole on the inland side of the community contained a large amount of grass clippings, rubbish and horse faeces; high larval densities were found along the margins. Many of the concrete-lined drains running through the community were overgrown with vegetation and contained mosquito-infested accumulations of water. High densities were also found in some of the defective household waste disposal systems (see below), and in pools in horse hoofprints. A total of 22 190 adult mosquitoes were trapped in the Badu community in April. Aedes kochi , Aedes culiciformis and Cx. annulirostris comprised 99% of the collection, with means of 364, 243 and 127 adult mosquitoes per trap, respectively. While the largest collections of Cx. annulirostris (up to 607 per trap) were taken from swampy areas near the community, collections of more than 100 per trap were taken within the community and close to houses. Eight JE viruses were isolated from 2871 Cx. annulirostris mosquitoes collected at Badu, but not from any other species (S A Ritchie, D A Phillips and A K Broom, unpublished data). Six of the isolates were from mosquitoes collected from within the community. Household survey An adult resident from 97 of the 102 houses in the community was interviewed for the household survey. Fifty-one (53%) of the households kept pigs; 35 (69%) of the pigpens were within 50 metres of the house. There were 179 domestic pigs in the community, an average of 3.5 (range, 1-11) per pig-rearing household. On inspection, 32 (63%) of the pigpens were situated either over or surrounded by standing water, and in 18 (56%) of these "wet" pigpens Cx. annulirostris was breeding. The householders of 15 (15%) of the houses owned a total of 18 horses; they were all kept in paddocks within 500 metres of the houses. The interviewees reported that 62 (64%) of the 97 houses had defective waste disposal systems: 49 of these houses had either waste water or raw sewage overflowing from septic tanks either into the house or into the yard, with 10% of the defective septic tanks containing Culex larvae. Survey of other communities A total of 1242 human serum samples were collected from the other communities. Twenty people from three other outer islands had serological evidence of recent JE virus infection. There was no evidence of JE infection in those tested from the inner islands or from the Cape York communities (Box 3). There was no evidence of any prior infection (i.e., only IgG JE antibodies) in any individual. Of the 182 pig sera collected from the other communities, 121 (66%) were tested by plaque reduction neutralisation assay. There was serological evidence of JE infection in pigs from all eight other outer islands, but no evidence of infection in pigs from the inner islands and Cape York Peninsula (Box 3). Discussion The human serological survey indicated that people from four outer islands had been recently infected with the JE virus. The porcine serological survey found evidence of JE activity in pigs from another five outer islands. Therefore, the two surveys indicated widespread, and presumably recent, JE virus activity in at least nine of the outer Torres Strait islands. There was no evidence of either human or porcine infection in the communities surveyed on the inner islands or on Cape York. The lack of evidence of prior infection in those tested suggests that the 1995 outbreak was the first incursion of the JE virus into the Torres Strait. Nucleotide sequencing studies clearly defined the virus strains isolated from the two people from Badu (and presumably the virus that infected people and pigs throughout the outer Torres Strait islands) as JE virus, and that the isolates were distinct from, but related to, virus strains that were circulating in southern Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia between 1968 and 1983. 12 The virus differed, however, from a newly recognised genotype known to be circulating in Indonesia in 1980-1981. A strain (JKT-6468, Figure 1) of this latter genotype has been isolated from culicine mosquitoes collected from Flores, east of Bali, and is therefore the closest known isolate to Australia. 13 JE virus has not been isolated or reported as causing human disease in either PNG or Irian Jaya. Although no evidence of JE virus has been demonstrated conclusively in a number of serological surveys, there was possible JE seropositivity in a few single-serum specimens collected in 1956-1957 in the Western Province of PNG. 17 More recently, antibody to JE virus was detected by competitive ELISA in at least 23% of human sera collected in the Western Province in 1989 (R A Hall and J S Mackenzie, unpublished data), and 49% of porcine sera collected in the Western Province in 1995 were positive for neutralising antibody to JE virus (J Shield and R A Lunt, unpublished data). Thus, it seems possible that JE virus has become enzootic in parts of southwestern PNG. The northwestern islands (Boigu, Dauan and Saibai), because of their closeness to PNG, receive Papuan visitors virtually every day, raising the question of whether a viraemic visitor could have brought the JE virus across from PNG to the Torres Strait. However, humans, as "dead-end" hosts of the JE virus, have a low level of JE viraemia of short duration. 3 On the other hand, a viraemic pig imported from PNG, being a very efficient amplifying host, might have initiated the Torres Strait outbreak. However, the Australian Quarantine Act 1908 (Cwlth) prohibits the movement of live animals from PNG to the Torres Strait. The ban is actively enforced and respected; since the appointment of the first indigenous Quarantine Officers in 1982 they have not had occasion to seize even one illegally imported pig (P Stephen, Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service, personal communication). Therefore, we believe it most unlikely that an imported pig initiated the outbreak. Over 100 species of bird migrate annually between Australia and New Guinea, usually in a predictable seasonal pattern. 18 A further 63 species cross the Torres Strait at irregular intervals; these include numerous aquatic species, including wading birds. 18 The rufous night heron ( Nycticorax caledonicus ), for example, is a common nomad found throughout the Torres Strait; 18 it is closely related to the black-crowned night heron ( N. nycticorax ), a principal bird species implicated in the natural JE virus bird-mosquito cycle in Asia. 19 Experimental JE virus infection of the rufous night heron produces levels of viraemia that are quite adequate to infect the most efficient JE vector in Asia ( Culex tritaeniorhynchus ). 20 From December to April the prevailing wind in the region is from the northwest, raising the possibility that the dispersal of "wind-blown" mosquitoes could have carried the JE virus from New Guinea to the Torres Strait. Indeed, it has been reported that female Cx. annulirostris mosquitoes "can disperse at least 12 km and probably further"; 21 the northernmost outer islands are all less than 10 km from the PNG coastline (Box 1). We therefore suggest that two natural phenomena -- viraemic migratory birds and/or infectious wind-blown mosquitoes -- are plausible mechanisms for the importation of the JE virus from New Guinea to the Torres Strait, thereby initiating the outbreak. Cx. annulirostris was undoubtedly the major vector at Badu, and presumably at the other outer islands. Multiple JE virus isolations were made from Cx. annulirostris but not from any other mosquito species. The very small (fewer than one adult mosquito per trap) collections of Culex quinquefasciatus and Culex bitaeniorhynchus (both recognised as being either "marginal" or "occasional" vectors of the JE virus in Asia) 3 indicate that these species were of no importance in this outbreak. Cx. annulirostris was breeding in abundance in a variety of sites close to the community. However, the natural surface waters were extensive, and produced the most mosquitoes. The waterhole with run-off watercourses passing through the community meant that there was extensive mosquito breeding close to the $omestic pigs and to the people. The close proximity of the blocked drains to many of the houses also made them a significant risk. Defective waste disposal systems may also have contributed to the outbreak. The most striking combination of environmental factors contributing to the outbreak was the large number of domestic pigs adjacent to human dwellings and prolific mosquito breeding sites (Figure 2). The density of pigs, the abundance of the vector species and the human population density are all critical factors in determining the risk of human infection. 3,22 Horses, although "dead-end" hosts for the JE virus, 3 nevertheless contributed to the outbreak by providing numerous hoofprint breeding sites, nutrient (i.e., faeces) to the larvae and bloodmeals for female mosquitoes. 23 We need to determine the likelihood of future incursions of the JE virus into the Torres Strait. At the same time there is a clear need not only to reduce the mosquito breeding potential but also to improve the environmental conditions on the islands. Meanwhile, an inactivated JE vaccine has been offered to the inhabitants of the outer islands to confer protection while these risk assessment studies and risk reduction interventions are being implemented. 24 Acknowledgements Many people assisted with the investigation of the outbreak. We thank the staff of the Community Health Centers throughout the Torres Strait, Torres Strait Public Health Program, Tropical Public Health Unit, Australian Quarantine and Inspection Service, Queensland Department of Primary Industries, Laboratory of Microbiology and Pathology and the Australian Animal Health Laboratory. We are particularly grateful to Dr Ted Tsai (Division of Vector-Borne Viral Diseases, Centres for Disease Control and Prevention, USA) for his expert advice and support. References Hanna J, Ritchie S, Loewenthal M, et al. Probable Japanese encephalitis acquired in the Torres Strait. Commun Dis Intell 1995; 19: 206-208. The Torres Strait Health Workshop Working Party. Torres Strait Health Strategy. Thursday Island: Torres Strait Health Council, 1993. Vaughn DW, Hoke CH Jr. The epidemiology of Japanese encephalitis: prospects for prevention. Epidemiol Rev 1992; 14: 197-221. Mackenzie JS, Lindsay MD, Coelen RJ, et al. Arboviruses causing human disease in the Australasian zoogeographic region. Arch Virol 1994; 136: 447-467. Burke D, Nisalak A, Ussery M. Antibody capture immunoassay detection of Japanese encephalitis virus immunoglobulin M and G antibodies in cerebrospinal fluid. J Clin Microbiol 1982; 16: 1034-1042. Clarke DH, Cassals J. Techniques for haemagglutination and haemagglutination inhibition with arthropod borne viruses. Am J Trop Med Hyg 1958; 7: 561-573. Gorman BM, Leer JR, Filippich C, et al. Plaquing and neutralization of arboviruses in the PS-EK line of cells. Aust J Med Technol 1975; 6: 65-71. Field PR, Murphy AM. The role of specific IgM globulin estimations in the diagnosis of acquired rubella. Med J Aust 1972; 2: 1244-1248. Igarashi A. Isolation of a Singh's Aedes albopictus cell clone sensitive to dengue and chikungunya viruses. J Gen Virol 1978; 40: 531-544. Pierre V, Drout M-T, Deubel V. Identification of mosquito-borne flavivirus sequences using universal primers and reverse-transcriptase-polymerase chain reaction. Res Virol 1994; 145: 93-104. Sellner LN, Coelen RJ, Mackenzie JS. A one-tube, one manipulation RT-PCR reaction for detection of Ross River virus. J Virol Methods 1992; 40: 255-264. Chen W-R, Tesh RB, Rico-Hesse R. Genetic variation of Japanese encephalitis virus in nature. J Gen Virol 1990; 71: 2915-2922. Chen W-R, Rico-Hesse R, Tesh RB. A new genotype of Japanese encephalitis virus from Indonesia. Am J Trop Med Hyg 1992; 47: 61-69. Ni H, Barrett ADT. Nucleotide and deduced amino acid sequence of the structural protein genes of Japanese encephalitis viruses from different geographical locations. J Gen Virol 1995; 76: 401-407. Sumiyoshi H, Mori C, Fuke I, et al. Complete nucleotide sequence of the Japanese encephalitis virus genome RNA. Virology 1987; 161: 497-510. Ritchie SA, Kline DL. Comparison of CDC and EVS light traps baited with carbon dioxide and octenol for trapping mosquitoes in Brisbane, Queensland (Diptera: Culicidae). J Aust Entomol Soc 1995; 34: 215-218. Anderson SG, Price AVG, Nanadai-Koia, Slater K. Murray Valley encephalitis in Papua and New Guinea: II. Serological survey, 1956-1957. Med J Aust 1960; 2: 410-413. Draffan RDW, Garnett ST, Malone GJ. Birds of the Torres Strait: an annotated list and biogeographical analysis. The Emu 1983; 83: 207-234. Buescher EL, Scherer WF, McClure HE, et al. Ecologic studies of Japanese encephalitis virus in Japan. IV. Avian infection. Am J Trop Med Hyg 1959; 8: 678-688. Boyle DB, Dickerman RW, Marshall ID. Primary viraemia responses of herons to experimental infection with Murray Valley encephalitis, Kunjin and Japanese encephalitis viruses. Aust J Exp Biol Med Sci 1983; 61: 655-664. Bryan JH, O'Donnell MS, Berry G, Carvan T. Dispersal of adult female Culex annulirostris in Griffith, New South Wales, Australia: a further study. J Am Mosq Control Assoc 1992; 8: 398-403. Gingrich JB, Nisalak A, Latendresse JR, et al. Japanese encephalitis virus in Bangkok: factors influencing vector infections in three suburban communities. J Med Entomol 1992; 29: 436-444. Kay BH, Boreham PFL, Fanning ID. Host-feeding patterns of Culex annulirostris and other mosquitoes (Diptera: Culicidae) at Charleville, southwestern Queensland, Australia. J Med Entomol 1985; 22: 529-535. Hanna J, Barnett D, Ewald D. Vaccination against Japanese encephalitis in the Torres Strait. Commun Dis Intell 1996; 20: 188-190. (Received 9 Feb, accepted 27 May 1996) o Authors' details Tropical Public Health Unit, Queensland Health, Cairns, QLD. Jeffrey N Hanna, MPH, FAFPHM, Public Health Physician. Scott A Ritchie, PhD, Medical Entomologist. World Health Organization Collaborating Centre for Arbovirus Reference and Research, Laboratory of Microbiology and Pathology, Queensland Health, Brisbane, QLD. Debra A Phillips, BSc, MASM, Supervising Scientist. Queensland Department of Primary Industries, Cairns, QLD. Jack Shield, BVSc, Veterinary Officer. Torres Strait Public Health Program, Queensland Health, Thursday Island, QLD. M Clare Bailey, MAIEH, Environmental Health Officer. Department of Microbiology, The University of Queensland, Brisbane, QLD. John S Mackenzie, PhD, FASM, Professor of Microbiology. Michael Poidinger, PhD, Research Officer (NHMRC). Southern Zone Public Health Unit, Queensland Health, Upper Mount Gravatt, QLD. Bradley J McCall, MPH, FAFPHM, Public Health Physician. Queensland Health, Thursday Island, QLD. Phillip J Mills, Executive Officer, Torres Sector. Reprints: Dr J Hanna, Tropical Public Health Unit, Queensland Health, PO Box 1103, Cairns, QLD 4870. Email: troppubATcitec.qld.gov.au - Register to be notified of new articles by email - - To top of article - ©MJA1996 < URL: http://www.mja.com.au/> © 1996 Medical Journal of Australia.
Jeffery H Hanna · Scott A Ritchie · Debra A Phillip · Jack Shield · John S Mackenzie · Michael Poidinger · Bradley J McCall · Phillip J Mills
Notable cases
A diving fatality due to oxygen toxicity during a
A diving fatality due to oxygen toxicity during a "technical" dive Christopher H Lawrence An experienced diver drowned after a generalised seizure caused by oxygen toxicity during a 19-minute "technical" dive to a depth of 47 m. He had used a 50% oxygen/nitrogen gas mixture inappropriately during the dive. This case attests the risk of oxygen toxicity from oxygen-enriched air during deep dives, the shortcomings of the diver's equipment, and the need to examine, with knowledge of diving physiology and practice, both the body and equipment. (MJA 1996; 165: 262-263) Introduction Scuba diving carries the risks of decompression illness and nitrogen narcosis; these risks increase the deeper the dive. Therefore, recreational scuba divers have been encouraged to avoid depths over 40 m. 1 In the past five years, some recreational divers have used highly specialised equipment and techniques to enable diving to greater depths (known as "technical" diving). These techniques include the use of surface supply and rebreather diving apparatuses and gas mixtures with a lower nitrogen concentration than compressed air to reduce the absorbed nitrogen load, allowing a longer bottom time with less decompression. Another technical diving technique uses oxygen-enriched gas mixtures during decompression to accelerate shedding of absorbed nitrogen from the body ("enriched- air", or "nitrox", diving). Unfortunately, higher concentrations of oxygen may have a toxic effect on the brain, causing generalised convulsions which may lead to drowning. The extent of the toxic effect depends on duration of exposure and is increased by exertion and immersion in water. An oxygen tension limit of 161 kPa (1.6 atm) is often adopted in practical diving for exposures of less than 30 min (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration guidelines). 2,3,4 However, oxygen toxicity can occur at tensions as low as 121 kPa (1.2 atm). 2 The "safe" level is currently under review and is clearly dependent on duration of exposure. The dangers of "technical" diving have been shown in a report of eight fatalities during technical dives in the United States in 1992. 4 We report the death of an experienced diver in Australia during a technical dive using an oxygen-enriched gas mixture. This case attests the risk of oxygen toxicity from oxygen-enriched air during deep dives, the shortcomings of the equipment used and the importance of an integrated approach to examination of the body and equipment by those experienced in diving practice and physiology. Clinical record A 47-year-old experienced underwater cave diver, with no significant medical history, was diving with two tanks -- one containing compressed air, the other a 50% mixture of oxygen and nitrogen (nitrox). Towards the end of the 47-m, 19-min dive, he was seen floating head down, unresponsive, with his mouthpiece out of his mouth and "his fins [flippers] moving as if he was shivering" (as reported by another diver to the Coroner). The body was carried up to 15 m depth and then allowed to ascend freely as the other divers decompressed. Cardiopulmonary resuscitation was attempted, but abandoned after 43 minutes as there was no response. Autopsy findings Erect postmortem x-rays and autopsy of the body performed 24 hours after death revealed large amounts of gas in the venous system of the trunk and limbs and in both sides of the heart (Figure 1). The heart weighed 380 g and was normal, apart from foamy blood and gas in all chambers. Analysis of gas from the right ventricle showed O 2 (20.6% by volume), and N 2 (75.9%). There was bruising of the tongue and petechiae on the lungs and heart. The brain (1740 g) showed mild cerebral oedema and a microscopic perivascular haemorrhage in the floor of the fourth ventricle. Figure 1: Postmortem erect chest x-ray, showing gas in both sides of the chest and in the neck veins (a combination of postmortem decompression, perimortem barotrauma and, possibly, decomposition). Examination of diving equipment Examination of the subject's diving equipment (Figure 2) re-vealed that he had been breathing the 50% oxygen/nitrogen mixture for most of the dive. Each tank had a separate first stage connected in an unusual fashion by a two-way switch, which the diver had had made by a local engineering shop. This allowed the diver to switch from one tank to another rapidly. This switch supplied a single second-stage mouthpiece. The two tanks were different colours; the circuit from the black (compressed-air) tank was marked with yellow tape, while the circuit from the yellow (nitrox) tank was unmarked. Figure 2: Equipment used by the diver, showing the 50% oxygen/nitrogen gas tank (yellow, right), compressed-air tank (black, left), yellow tape marking the compressed-air circuit, and two-way valve which controlled the source of the air supply (inset shows close-up of valve). The regulator had a small tear and a bite mark in the mouthpiece. The diver wore a facemask and separate mouthpiece rather than a full facemask, which covers eyes, nose and mouth. Discussion The cause of death, as determined by the Coroner, was drowning after oxygen toxicity. 5 The "shivering" movements and the biting of the tongue and mouthpiece suggested fitting. Using a 50% oxygen/nitrogen mixture at 47 m depth, the diver had been exposed to a partial pressure of oxygen of 291 kPa (2.9 atm), possibly for as long as 19 min. During diving, this gas mixture should be used only at depths less than 14-18 m (depending on the duration of exposure). Cerebral gas embolism and decompression illness were unlikely causes of death, as the subject was unresponsive before ascent. The gas observed at autopsy probably resulted from a combination of postmortem decompression (release of tissue nitrogen), perimortem barotrauma and, possibly, a degree of decomposition. 6 This death resulted from several compounding problems: The diver may have turned the switch to the unmarked nitrox circuit, thinking he was using the circuit to the compressed air in the black tank (the yellow label marked the circuit from the black [compressed-air] tank, not the circuit from the yellow [nitrox] tank). Alternatively, as the two-way valve needed very little pressure to turn, it could have been accidentally switched from a safe to an unsafe gas mix. The diver was using a separate facemask and mouthpiece. During the seizure, the mouthpiece fell out. A full facemask, covering both the mouth and nose, should be worn by divers using oxygen-rich mixtures or carrying out deep diving on compressed air, to reduce the chance of drowning should an oxygen convulsion occur. This technical diving fatality and those reported in the United States in 1992 4 were in experienced divers, who should have understood the dangers. The standard of equipment and of diving practice during technical dives should be that of a commercial operator, with planning of the dive to stay below an appropriate oxygen pressure for the duration of the dive (e.g., below 161 kPa [1.6 atm] for a 19-min dive), 2 use of a full facemask, proper analysis of gas mixtures and access to surface decompression facilities after long deep dives. Use of home-made equipment is not appropriate. During the inquest the New South Wales State Coroner declined to recommend legislation to regulate recreational technical diving, preferring that it remain subject to a voluntary code of conduct. 5 Acknowledgements I thank Sergeant John Marshall, New South Wales Police Divers, for the examination of the equipment. References Moon RE, Vann RD, Bennett PB. The physiology of decompression illness. Sci Am 273: 54-61. Gorman DF. Oxygen and carbon dioxide toxicity. In: Gorman DF, editor. Diving and hyperbaric medicine. 2nd ed. Adelaide: Hyperbaric Medicine Unit, Royal Adelaide Hospital, 1993: 26.2-26.4. Clark JM. Oxygen toxicity. In: Bennett PB, Elliott DH, editors. The physiology and medicine of diving. 4th ed. Philadelphia: WB Saunders, 1993. Menduno M. Safety first, an analysis of recent technical-diving accidents. Technical Diver 1993; 2: 3-10, reproduced in SPUMS J 1993; 23: 177-184. New South Wales State Coroner. Coroner's Court, 1995. File number 94/574. Williamson JA, King GK, Callanan VI, Rich KW. Fatal arterial gas embolism: detection by chest radiography and imaging before autopsy. Med J Aust 1990; 153: 97-100. Author's details NSW Institute of Forensic Medicine, Sydney, NSW. Christopher H Lawrence, BSc(Med), FRCPA, Forensic Pathologist; and Clinical Lecturer in Pathology, University of Sydney, Sydney, NSW. Reprints: Dr C H Lawrence, NSW Institute of Forensic Medicine, PO Box 90, Glebe, NSW 2037. E-mail: IOFM AT OZEMAIL. COM. AU Make a comment - Register to be notified of new articles by email - - To top of article - ©MJA1996 < URL: http://www.mja.com.au/> © 1996 Medical Journal of Australia. We appreciate your comments.
Christopher H Lawrence
Ethics
The clinical and ethical implications of hepatitis C for organ transplantation in Australia
The clinical and ethical implications of hepatitis C for organ transplantation in Australia Ian H Kerridge, Peter Saul and Robert G Batey Current Australian policy prohibiting transplantation of organs from hepatitis C-infected donors raises questions about patient autonomy and medical paternalism. MJA 1996; 165: 282-285 Readers may print a single copy for personal use. No further reproduction or distribution of the articles in whole or in part should proceed without the permission of the publisher. For copyright permission, contact the Australasian Medical Publishing Company Journalists are welcome to write news stories based on what they read here, but should acknowledge their source as "an article published on the Internet by The Medical Journal of Australia <http://www.mja.com.au/>". Introduction - HCV infection - Transmission of HCV by organ transplantation - Implications of HCV infection after organ transplantation - Ethical issues - Conclusions - Acknowledgements - References - Authors' details - Register to be notified of new articles by email - - ©MJA1996 Case 1 A 42-year-old man presented to a liver clinic for assessment as he had recently been found to be hepatitis C virus antibody (anti-HCV) positive. Liver function test results had been normal in the two years preceding this appointment, and the patient felt perfectly well. There were no signs of chronic liver disease, and a liver biopsy (undertaken at the patient's request) 12 months earlier had shown minimal inflammatory damage and no fibrosis. One of the main points for discussion at the outpatient clinic was that this patient had been rejected as an organ donor by the transplantation service. He was indignant that his offer of organs was rejected, particularly as he felt that it would be appropriate in the event of his death for his liver to be made available to another HCV-positive patient. He asked for advice as to why HCV-positive patients were unable to donate organs for transplantation. Case 2 A 48-year-old man presented with advanced alcohol-related liver disease and is awaiting liver transplantation. His clinical progress had improved slowly after cessation of alcohol intake but his liver function had deteriorated in the preceding six months. He had been advised that liver transplantation might be required within 12 months but had not yet been placed on the active transplantation list. This patient asked if he could have a liver transplant earlier if he agreed to accept an HCV-antibody positive liver. This request was motivated by his frustration at being unable to work and his awareness that patients with hepatitis C were receiving transplants and apparently doing well. He was advised, that at present, there is a policy banning the use of organs from all HCV-positive donors in Australia. He agreed to abide by these rules but insisted that this issue be investigated further. Introduction D uring the past decade, advances in immunosuppression and transplantation technology have increased the demand for organ transplantation without a corresponding increase in the number of donors. In June 1995, 1869 Australians were on waiting lists for solid-organ transplantation, with a further 1435 awaiting corneal transplants. Waiting-list numbers increased by 17% in the first six months of 1995, while the Australian organ donation rate continued to fall. 1 The relative donor shortage and its impact on both waiting lists and the length of time patients wait for transplantation highlights the importance of efficient and effective organ procurement and use. 2 Viruses which may be transmitted by organ transplantation (such as cytomegalovirus, herpes simplex virus, Epstein-Barr virus, human immunodeficiency virus, hepatitis A virus, hepatitis B virus, hepatitis D virus and human T-cell lymphotropic virus type 1) have become one of the major causes of morbidity and mortality in organ transplant recipients. 3 For this reason, potential organ donors are routinely screened for the presence of viral infection. After the identification of the hepatitis C virus, and the recognition that it may be transmitted by organ transplantation, transplantation organisations have restricted the use of organs from anti-HCV-positive organ donors. 4 There is no international consensus about the use of HCV-positive organs in transplantation. Three recent studies from the United States highlight the variation in policies for the transplantation of organs from HCV-positive donors. Milfred et al. 5 found that, for heart and lung transplantation, 22% of the centres studied would accept organs from anti-HCV-positive donors irrespective of recipient HCV status, 45% would accept such donors only for anti-HCV-positive recipients, 27% would never accept these donors, 2% did not screen donors, and 4% did not have a defined policy. 5 By contrast, studies by Ramos et al. 6 and Schweitzer et al. 7 found that most US transplant centres would not accept organs from anti-HCV-positive donors for renal transplantation. Part of the reason for the lack of consensus is that the consequences of transplantation of organs from anti-HCV donors (including the degree of HCV transmission, the prevalence of liver disease and the impact of HCV infection on survival) remain unclear. 8-11 Furthermore, any guidelines must incorporate ethical considerations relating to resource allocation, prognostic uncertainty, medical paternalism and limitation of patient autonomy. In New South Wales, the Transplant Advisory Committee policy currently excludes transplant of all HCV-positive organs and tissues, including transplant to known HCV-positive recipients. The implications are that one in 50 potential organ donors are lost to the transplant program and that certain individuals therefore lose the right to choose potentially life-sustaining organ transplantation with an organ they know to be infected with HCV. These cases raise questions about the current Australian policy of excluding transplantation of HCV-positive organs and whether this constitutes unjustifiable paternalism. As with many questions of ethics in clinical practice, further understanding depends upon a number of factual issues concerning the transmission of HCV during transplantation and the consequences of HCV infection for the graft recipient. HCV infection HCV infection is now the most frequently reported notifiable disease in Australia. 12 Its true prevalence is unknown, but studies of Australian blood donors demonstrate a prevalence of 0.3%-0.7%. 13,14 Most estimates suggest that there are at least 100 000 cases in Australia. International studies reporting the incidence of HCV in cadaveric organ donors have shown wide variation (1.5%-16.7%), 15-17 probably reflecting both geographical variation in HCV prevalence and the different testing methods used for HCV identification. Second generation enzyme-immunoassays used to detect anti-HCV have a sensitivity and specificity of about 90% and 99%, respectively, resulting in a positive predictive value in Australian blood and organ donors of less than 50%. 18 Confirmatory assays (e.g., radioimmunoblot assay [RIBA-2] and polymerase chain reaction techniques) can provide further evidence of actual HCV infection but may also give false positive or false negative results. 19 Genotyping assays are now available and may prove to be important for prognosis, determining epidemiological research and monitoring response to treatment. Most cases of hepatitis C in Australia can be traced to a history of parenteral exposure through intravenous drug use (50% of cases) 20 or blood products (10%-15% of cases). 21 Since the introduction of routine donor screening for hepatitis C, the risk of transmission by infected blood products has reduced substantially. 22 Accurate information about the natural history of hepatitis C is extremely limited because diagnoses of acute hepatitis are rarely made, serum transaminase levels are poor predictors of liver disease and most studies of long-term outcome are limited to a 10-year follow-up. It is estimated that 50%-80% of infected patients develop chronic hepatitis C and 20%-30% of these will progress to cirrhosis. An unknown number (varying from 10%-75%) will develop hepatocellular carcinoma (HCC). 23 The mean interval between infection and diagnosis of cirrhosis is estimated to be 20 years. The cornerstones of managing hepatitis C virus infection are education about its natural history and counselling to prevent transmission or worsening of the disease (e.g., avoiding the sharing of needles, restricting alcohol intake and practising "safe-sex"). Interferon alfa is available for treatment of chronic HCV under the Pharmaceutical Benefits Scheme but is extremely expensive; the long term response rate after a standard six-month course is approximately 20%-25%. 24 End-stage liver disease in patients with HCV can be managed medically or by liver transplantation. Reinfection of the graft is almost universal. Despite the need for immunosuppressive therapy, the resultant liver disease is generally benign and graft survival in the medium term (up to five years) is equivalent to that of other causes of liver disease requiring transplantation. Hepatitis C is now the most frequent indication for liver transplantation in Australia. 25 Transmission of HCV by organ transplantation There is conflicting evidence about the risk of transmission of HCV with organ transplantation. 26-30 Retrospective studies indicate that hepatitis is evident in approximately 50% of recipients of HCV-antibody-positive kidney transplants. 31 The type of solid organ transplanted (heart, lung, liver or kidney) does not appear to influence the transmission of HCV from an infected donor to a recipient. Recent studies have also demonstrated the transmission of HCV through bone marrow transplantation 32 and bone, ligament and tendon allografts. 33 Given the likely high degree of HCV transmission by organ transplantation, there is considerable interest in the work of Zucker et al., which suggests that washing donated kidneys can remove 99% of the viral burden. It is not known whether this has any significant impact on the transmission of HCV. 34 Implications of HCV infection after organ transplantation There is evidence that liver disease is more frequent in recipients of anti-HCV-positive organs, 35 that immunosuppression may enhance HCV replication 36 and that immunocompromised patients infected with HCV may have a more aggressive course of infection. 37 A number of studies have also shown that, when HCV infection develops after renal transplantation, it will become chronic in approximately 85% of recipients and may progress to cirrhosis. 38 There is also evidence to suggest that HCV infection may increase the risk of rejection and infection; 39,40 however, no study has consistently demonstrated a significantly increased rate of mortality or graft loss in recipients of anti-HCV-positive organs. 41 The effects of HCV infection on transplanted livers in immunocompromised hosts can be partly surmised by examination of HCV-positive patients who receive HCV-negative liver transplants -- early reinfection occurs almost uniformly 42 and may range in severity from asymptomatic viraemia to cirrhosis and hepatic failure. A small number of patients develop fulminant hepatic failure after organ transplantation, but reinfection is usually not clinically significant, producing only mild inflammation. In general, primary infection with HCV and reinfection in a transplanted patient follow a similar course. 43 Growing awareness of the heterogeneous nature of HCV genotypes has led to suggestions that anti-HCV-positive organs could be safely made available for transplantation into anti-HCV-positive recipients. 44 Unfortunately, a number of studies have suggested that patients may become infected with multiple viral genotypes, 45 and there may not be sufficient cross-immunity between different HCV subtypes. 46 Furthermore, there is some evidence to suggest that repeated exposure to the virus may result in repeated bouts of hepatitis. 47,48 Thus, host seropositivity for HCV may provide no absolute assurance that a patient receiving an HCV-positive organ will have less risk of infection and liver disease. In general terms it seems likely that transplant-related infection may follow a similar course to primary infection with hepatitis, 43 but the long term implications of HCV infection after organ transplantation remain unclear. Importantly, the use of interferon alfa for chronic hepatitis C does not appear to increase the risk of graft rejection. 49 Ethical issues With the increasing scarcity of organs, maximum use of donors is essential to realise the full potential of organ transplantation. However, in attempting to meet the health needs of both individuals and society, all attempts must be made to maximise the benefit and minimise the risks of transplantation to the recipient. The high probability of transmitting HCV by organ transplantation and the uncertain long term consequences of HCV infection in immunocompromised hosts have led the Transplantation Advisory Committee to ban the transplant of HCV-positive organs in New South Wales. This policy is clearly medical paternalism; the question is, is it justifiable paternalism? Should informed patients be able to request transplantation of HCV-positive organs, in the light of their own wishes, beliefs and values, or do policies such as these constitute justifiable limits of autonomy? The uncertain risks of HCV may add to the mortality and morbidity associated with organ transplantation, but this is not in itself sufficient reason for preventing patients from choosing an HCV-positive organ. It is well accepted that competent patients may have the right to choose medical interventions which have significant or uncertain side effects, provided they are aware of the nature and likelihood of such complications. This is especially the case when alternative forms of therapy are associated with high rates of morbidity and mortality. For example, young patients with acute myeloid leukaemia will always be offered bone-marrow transplantation, despite its significant risks, because other treatments for this condition have such poor outcomes. This is not to suggest that patient autonomy is, or should be, unrestricted. Patients may not request treatment that is ineffective, that endangers others, or that is judged by health care professionals and, ultimately, by society to be of insufficient value to be allocated scarce health resources. It may well be that current policy should continue for non-life-threatening conditions (such as renal transplantation in chronic renal failure) because of the uncertain long-term consequences of HCV infection and the small number of donor organs that would be gained from relaxing the prohibition on the use of HCV-positive organs. On the other hand, for patients awaiting heart, lung or liver transplantation, the risk of liver disease after organ transplantation from an HCV-positive donor may well be more acceptable than the risk of death or poor quality of life without transplantation. A further difficulty is that, whereas the transplantation of an HCV-positive organ may benefit the individual, this may be to the detriment of the wider community. The use of HCV-positive organs would clearly generate a potential source of preventable infection which may impact significantly on the lives of others (such as sexual partners) and inevitably demand further expensive treatment. The cost of a six-month course of interferon alfa is $3200 and the cost of liver transplantation for end-stage liver disease is $120 000, plus $7000-$10 000 per annum postoperatively. A conservative estimate of the cost of treating a patient with chronic hepatitis C (including hospitalisations) over five years is approximately $100 000. The effects on the present system of waiting-lists of a separate pool of "sub-standard" HCV-positive organs may also become increasingly complicated. Should a patient be able to "jump the queue" to a position higher up the waiting list if they are willing to accept such an organ? Should a patient at the top of the queue have the right to refuse an HCV-infected organ? Should there be a separate list of patients who are eligible only for HCV-infected organs? Conclusions Much of the uncertainty about the significance of hepatitis C infection in organ transplantation will only be resolved by further research. Until then, the obligations suggested by the ethical principles of autonomy, non-maleficence, beneficence and justice suggest a number of alternative approaches to the management of HCV-positive donors, shown in the Box. The decision to transplant an HCV-infected organ remains a complex issue in which benefit must be weighed against harm and individual choice against the wider demands of society and scarce health resources. Ultimately, such issues may only be resolved through an approach based on shared and informed decision-making between doctors and patients, recognising the many clinical and epidemiological uncertainties involved in these circumstances. That there are organ recipients willing to accept HCV-positive organs, but prevented from doing so by current policy, reflects tension between professional guidelines and individual needs or between medical paternalism and patient autonomy. We believe that there are circumstances in which transplantation of HCV-infected organs may be indicated, particularly in the case of life-saving transplantation. Decisions that deny choice to informed, competent patients are the subject of increasing scrutiny by the medical and legal professions and the community at large. If patients who are aware of the risks and complications are to be denied the choice of an HCV-infected organ, such denial must be carefully considered and explicitly justified. Acknowledgements We acknowledge the contributions of Dr Michael Lowe for his editorial assistance and of members of the John Hunter Hospital Clinical Ethics Committee for advice on the formulation of this paper. References Australian Coordinating Committee on Organ Registries and Donation (Gladesville, Sydney, NSW). Newsletter, October 1995 (distributed to all intensive care and renal transplant units). Shiener PA, Mor E, Schwartz ME, Miller CM. Use of hepatitis C-positive donors in liver transplantation. Transplant Proc 1993; 25: 3071. Aswad S, Mendez R, Weingart RG, Mendez R. 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Lack of protective immunity against reinfection with hepatitis C virus. Science 1992; 258: 135-140. King P. Renal transplantation. N Engl J Med 1994; 331: 1719. Fray C, Gigou M, Samuel D, et al. Direct evidence for a more pathogenic effect of HCV type II: the model of liver transplantation. J Hepatol 1993; 28 Suppl 1: 54. Shorrock C, Neuberger J. The changing face of liver transplantation. Gut 1993; 34: 295-298. Authors' details Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences, The University of Newcastle, NSW. Ian H Kerridge, BMed(Hons), MPhil, Lecturer in Clinical Ethics, Health Law and Ethics Programme, and Haematology Registrar, John Hunter Hospital. John Hunter Hospital, Newcastle, NSW. Peter Saul, FANZCA, FFICANZCA, Intensive Care Specialist; Robert G Batey, MD, FRACP, Associate Professor and Director, Department of Gastroenterology. No reprints will be available. Correspondence: Dr I H Kerridge, John Hunter Hospital, Lookout Road, New Lambton Heights, NSW 2305. - Register to be notified of new articles by email - - To top of article - ©MJA1996 < URL: http://www.mja.com.au/> © 1996 Medical Journal of Australia.
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