Letters
Ethics Women's health
Volume 189 - Issue 1

Pregnant women with fetal abnormalities: the forgotten people in the abortion debate

Authors:  Simon B Gerber and John T Wenham

Med J Aust 2008; 189 (1): 53-55. || doi: 10.5694/j.1326-5377.2008.tb01907.x
Published online: 7 July 2008
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To the Editor: Superficially, de Crespigny and Savulescu make a compelling case for clarifying late-term abortion law.1 However, at a deeper level, it is disappointing that alternative points of view were not discussed in their article. The only solution offered in the case of a potentially imperfect child is to abort the pregnancy and try again. Unfortunately, this ignores several important issues.

First, the consequences of abortion for the mother, both physical and psychological, are neglected.2 Our experience, as general practitioners, is that late-term abortions only lead to heartache and regret, even depression and anxiety, as the mother tries to deal with what has happened to her. Every time she sees either a “normal” or an “abnormal” child, her loss is re-lived. A patient of one of us (S B G) has developed Asherman syndrome as a result of a late-term abortion; she is now infertile.

Second, without a definition of “child”, any discussion regarding abortion law is, at best, futile; at worst, it is emotionally charged and reliant on anecdotes. If a fetus is defined as a child, then that child has a right to live, whatever the disability. If not, then any disability up to the defined age could potentially justify “abortion” (ie, destruction).

Third, the references given to support the assertion that women might “refuse to consider motherhood” without genetic testing described women who carry germline monogenic abnormalities (eg, thalassaemias, Huntington genotypes). These women would be eligible for earlier antenatal screening, such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling — all of which are available well before the current legal time frames in question.

Fourth, de Crespigny and Savulescu’s premise for allowing late-term abortion is that there is a life-threatening fetal abnormality and the mother wishes to have children. However, a consequence of liberalising the law for the benefit of these women would be that women with non-life-threatening fetal abnormalities, and also those who simply did not want a child, could also access late-term abortion more easily. This is obviously a major concern.

Finally, use of the term “child destruction” in the law is important when considering these situations. A helpful definition of the purpose of the law is to prevent injustice.3 As seen by the ability for women to access “legal” abortion before 20 weeks’ gestation, any law that protects children needs to stand. The pregnant woman clearly has a voice; unfortunately, the unborn child does not have the same ability to state his or her case before an ethics committee.

Authors

  • Simon B Gerber1
  • John T Wenham2
  • 1. Park Family Practice, Sydney, NSW.
  • 2. The Gill Medical Centre, Manchester, UK.

Correspondence: sbhgerber@gmail.com

References

View this article on Wiley Online Library