Pregnant women with fetal abnormalities: the forgotten people in the abortion debate

To the Editor: The recent article by de Crespigny and Savulescu1 is nominally about the medical care of pregnant women, but its ramifications extend more widely into power relations, law and ethics, and matters of life and death.

The article is entirely adult-centred: its authors never hint that a doctor who is treating a pregnant woman has not one but two patients. There is never the faintest suggestion that the fetus is a separate human being with his or her own medical interests. The “research” reported is a survey of 20 obstetricians, who all agree with the authors on abortion for fetal abnormality. Unsurprisingly, most said they would prefer fewer constraints on such abortions.

Which abnormalities are grounds for termination? The authors never say, although terminations are performed in Victoria for conditions as readily treatable as cleft lip.2 The authors cite an estimate that where Down syndrome is identified in Victoria, 95% of pregnancies are terminated. Yet people with Down syndrome do not appear to find their lives intolerable: is the misery we want to put Down syndrome children out of their misery, or their parents’?

The authors insist that in Victoria, “uncertain laws compromise good prenatal care”. The prenatal care they seem to have in mind can hardly be called care of the child: can it be called care of the mother? In one of the cases cited, a woman at Melbourne’s Royal Women’s Hospital was threatening suicide unless her pregnancy was terminated after a diagnosis of dwarfism at 31 weeks.1 Instead of providing her with urgent psychiatric care (had they never encountered a suicidal patient before?), the doctors terminated her pregnancy. If she had demanded the amputation of her left arm, would they have called in the surgeons? The surgical mutilation of an adult patient would not have been considered for a moment, but the surgical killing of a fetal patient was an available and practised routine. This woman was already not well, and the “prenatal care” she received put her further at risk.

This case illustrates how true prenatal care is compromised, not by the few remaining legal limits on child destruction and abortion, but by their ready availability. Readers of the literature on post-abortion syndrome will have encountered many other illustrations of what should be obvious: that you are not likely to help a woman by destroying her child. Experienced and attentive general practitioners and psychiatrists will be able to give their own examples.

Doctors need to pay close attention to the short paragraph on conscientious objection.1 The authors declare that “a doctor’s conscience should not be allowed to interfere with medical care” and that if “some individuals or institutions have moral objections ... those objections cannot compromise patient care”. If that does not mean that the authors want to exclude anyone who disagrees with them about what constitutes “medical care” from medical practice, what does it mean? There could hardly be a plainer threat to doctors’ personal professional judgement.