A case for altruistic surrogacy
Author: Marc J N C Keirse
Published online: 1 August 2005
Comment: Morton feels that women for whom pregnancy poses a substantial risk should be offered altruistic surrogacy, so that they can still have a child that is genetically their own. The suggestion is commendable but opens a hornets’ nest.
First, “genetic ownership” is a bit of a fiction at best, given that the only item genetically owned by the mother is an egg with 23 chromosomes and some cytoplasm. Admittedly, Morton refers to couples rather than to women, but few are the men who have incontrovertible evidence of any genetic stake in their alleged offspring,1 and, given the rate with which partnerships change, thousands willingly care for children in whom they know they have no genetic stake at all. After implantation of the fertilised embryo, the carrier of the pregnancy owns whatever there is to be owned, irrespective of where some of the genes came from. At birth, genetic ownership changes again, and the child becomes its own “genetic owner”. So, how much “genetic ownership” of a child can there be?
Second, who would qualify for altruistic surrogacy? It seems reasonable that women with Eisenmenger syndrome should not embark on a pregnancy given the high mortality associated with it. But how do we know that collecting ova and all it entails, and the subsequent years caring for a baby/toddler/child/teenager, would not be an even greater challenge to the woman’s health than pregnancy?
Third, where will these surrogates come from (especially for women without sisters or other suitable family volunteers), and how do we ensure that they will be happy to hand back the child to its “genetic owners”? How will we protect these altruistic women in subsequent years against potential law suits for alleged failures in duty of care to the child that they carried (for example, by exposure to toxins during the pregnancy)?
Fourth, is there not a far easier and more logical solution to this problem, provided that egg collection does not endanger the woman’s health? Why not preserve the woman and her partner’s frozen embryos until the woman’s medical condition is sufficiently stable to both sustain a pregnancy and care for the child that hopefully results from it? If the woman’s health cannot be restored sufficiently to achieve this, these couples could then show some altruism of their own by donating the embryos to infertile couples who desperately want a child irrespective of whether they can claim “genetic ownership”. Thus far, there is little evidence that altruistic donation and genetic ownership are even half way to meeting each other.2
However, Morton should be commended for drawing attention to a national problem in women’s health. The disparities and discrepancies between the Australian states and territories in almost anything that relates to reproduction2-5 is an utter disgrace. Reproductive health should be equitable among all Australians.
References
- Neale MC, Neale BM, Sullivan PF. Nonpaternity in linkage studies of extremely discordant sib pairs. Am J Hum Genet 2002; 70: 526-529. CHDFJEIB
- Kovacs GT, Breheny SA, Dear MJ. Embryo donation at an Australian university in-vitro fertilisation clinic: issues and outcomes. Med J Aust 2003; 178: 127-129. i1085779
- Pratt A, Biggs A, Buckmaster L. How many abortions are there in Australia? A discussion of abortion statistics, their limitations, and options for improved statistical collection. Parliament of Australia research brief. Canberra: Parliament of Australia, 2005. Available at: http://www.aph.gov.au/library/pubs/rb/2004-05/05rb09.pdf (accessed May 2005).
- Pennings G. Reproductive tourism as moral pluralism in motion. J Med Ethics 2002; 28: 337-341.
- de Crespigny LJ, Savulescu J. Abortion: time to clarify Australia’s confusing laws. Med J Aust 2004; 181: 201-203. CHDEIFAF