Designing incentives for good-quality hospital care

Stephen J Duckett
Med J Aust 2012; 196 (11): . || doi: 10.5694/mja11.11464
Published online: 18 June 2012

Is now the time to send a signal that poor-quality care should not be rewarded in activity-based funding?

Public hospitals in Australia are in for a shake-up over the next few years, with boards being reintroduced in many states and activity-based funding (ABF) being rolled out nationally.1 ABF will replace global or historic budgets for hospitals in most states. National casemix classifications will be agreed, and the work of hospitals described and priced using these classifications. Australian refined diagnosis-related groups (AR-DRGs) will be used for inpatients, and other classifications will describe outpatient, emergency department, mental health and subacute activity.

  • School of Public Health, La Trobe University, Melbourne, VIC.


Competing interests:

I was part of the consulting team that advised the IHPA about the national pricing framework for activity-based funding. The views expressed here are my own and not necessarily those of the IHPA.

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