Volume 196 - Issue 11
First-person neuroscience and the understanding of pain
Authors: Lester E Jones and Laura Y Whitburn
Med J Aust 2012; 196 (11): 684. || doi: 10.5694/mja12.10746
Published online: 18 June 2012
Published online: 18 June 2012
To the Editor: At first, Thacker and Moseley appear to do an about-turn on much of their published work by de-emphasising the role of the brain and nervous system in the human pain experience.1 However,
on closer scrutiny, their reflection encapsulates key messages for health professionals about pain not being located in the tissues, while exposing the inadequacy of non-person-centred approaches to their practice and ...
To the Editor: At first, Thacker and Moseley appear to do an about-turn on much of their published work by de-emphasising the role of the brain and nervous system in the human pain experience.1 However, on closer scrutiny, their reflection encapsulates key messages for health professionals about pain not being located in the tissues, while exposing the inadequacy of non-person-centred approaches to their practice and to researching pain.
The questioning of current research strategies is timely given that research on novel brain-focused pain treatments, such as graded motor imagery, is beginning to gain traction in the clinical community.2 A risk with such technique-based treatments is that they are adopted with little thought to the mechanisms that optimise their application or to the person they are applied to.
Importantly, in considering these novel approaches, health professionals must be careful not to fall back into retrograde tissue-model habits, drawing focus on the reorganised homunculi of the brain as the next tissue to target. Instead, we should be excited by the continuing mystery surrounding the mind, the self and consciousness — each being an essential component of any perceptual experience.3,4 Thacker and Moseley’s reflection on the adequacy of modern neuroscience reminds us — and gently directs us — to re-engage with the person, or the whole being, and to be cautious about our attributions to, and our focus on, the brain.
Competing interests
No relevant disclosures.
References
- Thacker MA, Moseley GL. First-person neuroscience and the understanding of pain. Med J Aust 2012; 196: 410-411. 0_CBBHACAC
- Moseley GL, Gallace A, Spence C. Bodily illusions in health and disease: physiological and clinical perspectives and the concept of a cortical ‘body matrix’. Neurosci Biobehav Rev 2012; 36: 34-45. 0_i1142864
- Fuchs T, Schlimme JE. Embodiment and psychopathoogy: a phenomenological perspective. Curr Opin Psychiatry 2009; 22: 570-575. 0_CBBFHICJ
- Glannon W. Our brains are not us. Bioethics 2009; 23: 321-329. 0_i1142870