A no-fault compensation scheme for serious adverse events attributed to vaccination
Authors: Heath A Kelly, Clare Looker and David Isaacs
Published online: 4 July 2011
No-fault compensation, based on the ethical principle of redistributive justice, should form a cornerstone of Australia’s immunisation strategy
Australia has an enviable reputation for its publicly funded vaccine program — a program that has benefited Australian children and adults over many years. In 2010, the National Immunisation Program funded 12 vaccines, twice as many as a decade previously. To monitor outcomes from this program, the Australian Childhood Immunisation Register, which commenced data collection in 1996, provides a detailed record of vaccine uptake by children.1 Funding for the register and for incentives to general practitioners to improve vaccine uptake are part of the total budget for Australia’s vaccine program, estimated to exceed $400 million annually.2,3 One area for improvement in the vaccine program is monitoring of adverse events following immunisation (AEFI). Another would be the introduction of a no-fault compensation scheme for serious adverse events which can be confidently attributed to vaccination.
An investigation into the unexpectedly high number of febrile convulsions in children aged less than 5 years after they had received the influenza vaccine in 2010 — in some cases, with devastating consequences4 — provided a forceful reminder that timely vaccine safety monitoring is needed in Australia.5 More active adverse event surveillance is certain to uncover more AEFI but many of these will only be coincidental, while others will be of a transient or relatively trivial nature. On rare occasions, a serious AEFI with long-term sequelae will be recognised. A decision will then need to be made on whether the vaccine was responsible for that serious event.
The World Health Organization defines four categories of serious AEFI: hospital admission or prolongation of an existing hospital admission; permanent disability; any event that is life threatening; or death.6 Using these criteria, 8% (193/2396) of the AEFI reported by passive surveillance in Australia in 2009 were judged to be serious.7 However, unlike many countries where compensation schemes exist for adverse events attributed to a vaccine, Australia has no routine approach to making the assessment of attribution. Parents of children or adults who believe they deserve compensation for a serious adverse event that they attribute to a vaccine are therefore required to make their case through the adversarial legal system. This requires the demonstration that an individual or an organisation was at fault. However, fault is often difficult to demonstrate and an adverse event may be caused by vaccination through no fault of the vaccine manufacturer, the regulator or the person who administered the vaccine.
We have previously argued that a Queensland child who developed transverse myelitis after receiving oral polio vaccine was an example of an adverse event following vaccination where no fault was attributable to any party.8,9 Despite detailed epidemiological evidence that was consistent in this case with the causal criteria for an AEFI promulgated by the Institute of Medicine of the National Academies in the United States,8 and despite laboratory evidence showing that the polio virus recovered from this child was similarly pathogenic to a polio virus that has been accepted as causing vaccine-associated paralytic polio,9 the polio expert committee concluded that the evidence was insufficient to support a causal relationship between the oral polio vaccine and transverse myelitis. As causality has not been accepted, this child has received no compensation.
By 2010, 19 countries around the world had implemented no-fault AEFI compensation, implicitly answering “yes” to the question of whether the community owes a duty of care to an individual injured by a vaccine.10 There is also a strong ethical argument for this position, based on the concept of redistributive justice. Any person who is injured while helping to protect the community — for instance, by contributing to herd immunity, such that there are sufficiently many people immunised to prevent widespread disease transmission within the community — should not bear the consequences of injury alone. In essence, the community owes a debt of gratitude to that person.
Temporal association of an adverse event with receipt of a vaccine does not establish causality and the underlying notion of causation used in most compensation schemes is similar to that used in epidemiology.10 The World Health Organization has published guidelines on causality for an AEFI.11 An adverse event considered to be very likely or certainly due to a vaccine would comprise a “Clinical event with a plausible time relationship to vaccine administration, and which cannot be explained by concurrent disease or other drugs or chemicals”.11 To simplify and expedite determinations of causality in the US, a vaccine injury table is used to predetermine causality if a vaccine injury is included in the table.10 However, determining causation is a complex issue. Recognising this, most countries have a designated committee, comprising medical and legal members, which deliberates on the attributable relationship between receipt of the vaccine and subsequent adverse event.10
Concerns about funding a no-fault compensation scheme is another of the probable barriers to its implementation in Australia. Schemes are currently funded by one of four methods: a vaccine levy; compensation for AEFI as part of a much broader injury compensation scheme; specific AEFI compensation funded through general tax revenue; and funding in association with industry.10 Funding through a vaccine levy has been self-sustaining in the US. Despite compensation payments having been made to 2580 claimants since 1989, the compensation fund there has a surplus of about US$3 billion.12,13
No-fault vaccine-injury compensation programs are based on the premise that any adverse event attributable to vaccination is not due to the fault of a specific individual or organisation, but due to an unavoidable risk that is acknowledged as being associated with vaccines. Germany has been operating a no-fault AEFI compensation scheme for 50 years.10 France restricts its compensation to serious AEFI, since these are likely to have long-term implications for the injured party.10 Restricting compensation to events with long-term consequences, above a nominated clinical threshold, may be an acceptable model for Australia. We have previously argued that Australia should follow the lead of other advanced countries and implement a no-fault compensation scheme.14 We continue to argue that such a scheme, based on the ethical principle of redistributive justice, should form a cornerstone of Australia’s immunisation strategy.
DisclaimerThe views expressed are those of the authors and have not been endorsed by any institution or organisation with which the authors are affiliated or by any committees of which the authors are members.
References
- Australian Government. Medicare Australia. Australian Childhood Immunisation Register. http://www.medicareaustralia.gov.au/public/services/acir/index.jsp (accessed Feb 2011).
- Australian Government Department of Health and Ageing. Annual report 2009–10. Part 2.3. Outcome 1: population health. Program 1.5: immunisation. http://www.health.gov.au/internet/annrpt/publishing.nsf/Content/annual-report-0910-toc/$File/Full%20Report%20of%20the%202009_10%20Annual%20Report.pdf (accessed Feb 2011).
- Australian Government. Budget 2010–11. Essential vaccines. http://www.budget.gov.au/2010-11/content/bp3/html/bp3_spp-1.htm (accessed Feb 2011).
- Bita N. Virus in the system. The Australian 2011; 28 May. http://www.theaustralian.com.au/news/features/virus-in-the-system/story-e6frg8h6-1226063484330 (accessed May 2011).
- Gold M, Effler P, Kelly H, et al. Febrile convulsions after 2010 seasonal trivalent influenza vaccine: implications for vaccine safety surveillance in Australia [editorial]. Med J Aust 2010; 193: 492-493. 0_i1095918
- World Health Organization. Yellow fever. Surveillance of adverse events following immunisation against yellow fever. Geneva: WHO, 2010. http://whqlibdoc.who.int/hq/2010/WHO_HSE_GAR_ERI_2010.1_eng.pdf (accessed May 2011).
- Mahajan D, Roomiani I, Gold MS, et al. Annual report: surveillance of adverse events following immunisation in Australia, 2009. Commun Dis Intell 2010: 34: 259-276. 0_i1095923
- Kelly H. Evidence that the association between oral poliovirus vaccine and transverse myelitis may be causal: a case history and review of the literature. J Paediatr Child Health 2006; 42: 155-159. 0_i1095925
- Thorley B, Kelly H, Nishimura Y, et al. Oral poliovirus vaccine type 3 from a patient with transverse myelitis is neurovirulent in a transgenic mouse model. J Clin Virol 2009; 44: 268-271. 0_i1095927
- Looker C, Kelly H. No-fault compensation following adverse events attributed to vaccination: a review of international programs. Bull World Health Org 2011; 89: 371-381. 0_i1095929
- Collet JP, MacDonald N, Cashman N, Pless R. Monitoring signals for vaccine safety: the assessment of individual adverse event reports by an expert advisory committee. Advisory Committee on Causality Assessment. Bull World Health Org 2000; 78: 178-185. 0_i1095931
- US Department of Health and Human Services. Health Resources and Services Administration. National Vaccine Injury Compensation Scheme. Statistics reports. http://www.hrsa.gov/vaccinecompensation/statistics_report.htm (accessed Feb 2011).
- US Department of the Treasury, Bureau of the Public Debt. Treasury Direct. Vaccine injury compensation reports. http://www.treasurydirect.gov/govt/reports/tfmp/vaccomp/vaccomp.htm (accessed 15/02/11).
- Isaacs D. Should Australia introduce a vaccine injury compensation scheme? J Paediatr Child Health 2004; 40: 247-249. 0_i1095938
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