Connect
MJA
MJA

Bridging the communication gap between public and private radiology services

Turab Chakera, Yusuf Nagree, Swithin Song and Philip Jones
Med J Aust 2009; 191 (10): 558-560. || doi: 10.5694/j.1326-5377.2009.tb03310.x
Published online: 16 November 2009
Setting up the system

In May 2008, the Western Australian Department of Health (DoH) and the private radiology provider Perth Radiological Clinic (PRC) undertook a pilot project to see whether a public–private PACS link could be established to facilitate electronic transfer of images between the Armadale–Kelmscott Memorial Hospital (a public outer metropolitan hospital that outsources its radiological imaging to PRC) and the metropolitan tertiary hospital PACS.

The brief was to expedite patient management, allow specialist opinion without physical patient transfer, and reduce repeat examinations (and hence radiation exposure) of patients transferred to public hospitals for tertiary-level management. Additionally, the system was to allow bidirectional image transfer to enable private sector radiologists to access public sector images for patients under their care. Members of the project team included representatives of the DoH’s Information and Communications Technology group, representatives of two major private radiology providers, PACS administrators from the Perth tertiary hospitals, and ourselves.

The pilot project was funded by an initial grant of $100 000 from the DoH. To implement the project, the working group initially proposed to set up a dedicated server, the Western Australian Radiology (WARAD) server outside the DoH firewall (in the “demilitarised zone” [DMZ]) that could receive images from the private sector for retrieval by the public hospital PACS. Similarly, the public hospital PACS could send images to the WARAD server for retrieval by the private sector (Box, A). However, because of security issues, an alternative model was developed whereby the WARAD server could receive images from the private sector for the public system but images for the private sector would be sent directly to the private provider’s network via secure virtual private network (VPN) links (Box, B). The VPN provides an exclusive link to the WARAD server, which is more secure than transferring data via a public internet connection.

The WARAD server is a proprietary DICOM (Digital Imaging and Communications in Medicine) server loaded with the same software as the existing public hospital PACS, for workflow and compatibility advantages. It was installed and configured for $40 000 and has an ongoing annual maintenance cost of $4000. The system set-up cost for PRC (borne by PRC) was $25 000, and the ongoing maintenance cost of the dedicated VPN link is $1500 per month. No other significant costs were incurred. WARAD server maintenance is now part of the DoH’s PACS application support.

The bandwidths from the private providers and the DoH vary between 10 and 100 Mbps (megabits/second), while the DoH’s network link from the WARAD server back to the DoH internal PACS servers has a bandwidth of 1 Gbps (gigabit/second).

No major compatibility issues were encountered other than minor network address translation issues, which were easily solved.

Patient consent and user authorisation

The agreed protocol requires that patients give consent, with the sending site obtaining and keeping a written consent form (or verbal consent in emergency cases). The patient consent procedure is a difficult area that is under constant review. The working group is currently discussing with the legal branch of the DoH the feasibility of developing an “implied consent” model that would allow patients an “opt out” option when they first present. This would reduce current heavy demand on the time of authorised personnel in both private and public systems.

Once images have been transferred to the receiving PACS, local protocols are implemented to make the images available for viewing by authorised users. In the public system, the images are viewable by any authorised PACS user with an appropriate username and password. Access in the private system is determined by the private providers’ existing security models.

Access to the server infrastructure is limited to authorised system administration staff by way of specific firewall rules for that user and a unique username and password. All access is auditable.

To further protect patient privacy, images in the WARAD server are deleted after 2 weeks (this lag period is under review). If there is a requirement to have the images permanently stored in the receiving PACS, system administrators create radiology information system events to which the images can be linked.

A memorandum of understanding outlining the system concept, responsibilities of each party, timeliness of image exchange, and patient confidentiality and consent issues was signed by both the public and private parties. A process and protocol document was developed and distributed to clinical staff and radiographers.

Discussion

The pilot project was completed in May 2008. A similar exchange of digital images was introduced in Pennsylvania, United States, in 2006,1 but, to our knowledge, the system described here is the first successful link between public and private PACSs in Australia.

In June 2008, imaging studies on 65 patients were successfully transferred between the public and private sector. Due to the success of the pilot project, two additional private providers requested linkage and were connected by February 2009, and two additional independent practices now wish to join. Current traffic is approximately 150 studies per week in any one direction. Challenges include the resource-intensive nature of the transfer process: the personal intervention required by staff in both the public and private systems to obtain consent and the time spent on telephone communication each time a patient presents for imaging are substantial.

Since the implementation, there has been only one minor adverse incident, in which the images required were transferred in a timely fashion for a second opinion but were not reviewed until the next day. However, this did not affect the outcome for the patient.

An audit trail regarding use of the shared system and objective evidence of reduction in radiation exposure (by eliminating repeat examinations) is being collected and will hopefully be published within the next 2 years. However, there is anecdotal evidence of reduction in repeat examinations.2

  • Turab Chakera1
  • Yusuf Nagree2
  • Swithin Song1
  • Philip Jones3

  • 1 Department of Imaging, Royal Perth Hospital, Perth, WA.
  • 2 Armadale–Kelmscott Memorial Hospital, Perth, WA.
  • 3 Western Australian Department of Health, Perth, WA.



Acknowledgements: 

We would like to thank the WA DoH and many other people in both the public and private hospitals and clinics whose support and help has been instrumental in bringing the venture to fruition.

Competing interests:

None identified.

Author

remove_circle_outline Delete Author
add_circle_outline Add Author

Comment
Do you have any competing interests to declare? *

I/we agree to assign copyright to the Medical Journal of Australia and agree to the Conditions of publication *
I/we agree to the Terms of use of the Medical Journal of Australia *
Email me when people comment on this article

Online responses are no longer available. Please refer to our instructions for authors page for more information.