To the Editor: The recent article by de Crespigny and Savulescu1 is nominally about the medical care of pregnant women, but its ramifications extend more widely into power relations, law and ethics, and matters of life and death.

The article is entirely adult-centred: its authors never hint that a doctor who is treating a pregnant woman has not one but two patients. There is never the faintest suggestion that the fetus is a separate human being with his or her own medical interests. The “research” reported is a survey of 20 obstetricians, who all agree with the authors on abortion for fetal abnormality. Unsurprisingly, most said they would prefer fewer constraints on such abortions.

Which abnormalities are grounds for termination? The authors never say, although terminations are performed in Victoria for conditions as readily treatable as cleft lip.2 The authors cite an estimate that where Down syndrome is identified in Victoria, 95% of pregnancies are terminated. Yet people with Down syndrome do not appear to find their lives intolerable: is the misery we want to put Down syndrome children out of their misery, or their parents’?

The authors insist that in Victoria, “uncertain laws compromise good prenatal care”. The prenatal care they seem to have in mind can hardly be called care of the child: can it be called care of the mother? In one of the cases cited, a woman at Melbourne’s Royal Women’s Hospital was threatening suicide unless her pregnancy was terminated after a diagnosis of dwarfism at 31 weeks.1 Instead of providing her with urgent psychiatric care (had they never encountered a suicidal patient before?), the doctors terminated her pregnancy. If she had demanded the amputation of her left arm, would they have called in the surgeons? The surgical mutilation of an adult patient would not have been considered for a moment, but the surgical killing of a fetal patient was an available and practised routine. This woman was already not well, and the “prenatal care” she received put her further at risk.

This case illustrates how true prenatal care is compromised, not by the few remaining legal limits on child destruction and abortion, but by their ready availability. Readers of the literature on post-abortion syndrome will have encountered many other illustrations of what should be obvious: that you are not likely to help a woman by destroying her child. Experienced and attentive general practitioners and psychiatrists will be able to give their own examples.

Doctors need to pay close attention to the short paragraph on conscientious objection.1 The authors declare that “a doctor’s conscience should not be allowed to interfere with medical care” and that if “some individuals or institutions have moral objections ... those objections cannot compromise patient care”. If that does not mean that the authors want to exclude anyone who disagrees with them about what constitutes “medical care” from medical practice, what does it mean? There could hardly be a plainer threat to doctors’ personal professional judgement.

To the Editor: Superficially, de Crespigny and Savulescu make a compelling case for clarifying late-term abortion law.1 However, at a deeper level, it is disappointing that alternative points of view were not discussed in their article. The only solution offered in the case of a potentially imperfect child is to abort the pregnancy and try again. Unfortunately, this ignores several important issues.

First, the consequences of abortion for the mother, both physical and psychological, are neglected.2 Our experience, as general practitioners, is that late-term abortions only lead to heartache and regret, even depression and anxiety, as the mother tries to deal with what has happened to her. Every time she sees either a “normal” or an “abnormal” child, her loss is re-lived. A patient of one of us (S B G) has developed Asherman syndrome as a result of a late-term abortion; she is now infertile.

Second, without a definition of “child”, any discussion regarding abortion law is, at best, futile; at worst, it is emotionally charged and reliant on anecdotes. If a fetus is defined as a child, then that child has a right to live, whatever the disability. If not, then any disability up to the defined age could potentially justify “abortion” (ie, destruction).

Third, the references given to support the assertion that women might “refuse to consider motherhood” without genetic testing described women who carry germline monogenic abnormalities (eg, thalassaemias, Huntington genotypes). These women would be eligible for earlier antenatal screening, such as pre-implantation genetic diagnosis, amniocentesis and chorionic villus sampling — all of which are available well before the current legal time frames in question.

Fourth, de Crespigny and Savulescu’s premise for allowing late-term abortion is that there is a life-threatening fetal abnormality and the mother wishes to have children. However, a consequence of liberalising the law for the benefit of these women would be that women with non-life-threatening fetal abnormalities, and also those who simply did not want a child, could also access late-term abortion more easily. This is obviously a major concern.

Finally, use of the term “child destruction” in the law is important when considering these situations. A helpful definition of the purpose of the law is to prevent injustice.3 As seen by the ability for women to access “legal” abortion before 20 weeks’ gestation, any law that protects children needs to stand. The pregnant woman clearly has a voice; unfortunately, the unborn child does not have the same ability to state his or her case before an ethics committee.

In reply: Watt seems to wish to return to the days of no prenatal testing; we believe today’s women reject this paternalistic view. However, Watt is correct in saying our article is “adult-centred” — it is not self-evident that the fetus is a patient, nor is this view consistent with those of most liberal legal jurisdictions.

It has been found that 81% of Australians,1 including a majority in all major Australian religious groups,2 agree with a woman’s right to choose an abortion. Only 4% of Australians consider abortion wrong.3

We echo Amnesty International’s call for abortion to be decriminalised globally.4 Abortion laws should no longer discriminate against pregnant women with fetal abnormalities.

Contrary to Watt’s claims, it is well documented that an experienced psychiatrist was central in managing the pregnant woman who had an abortion at 32 weeks at the Royal Women’s Hospital. In addition, we do not believe abortion has been demonstrated to cause psychiatric “post-abortion syndrome”,5,6 nor that abortion is analogous to amputating a healthy limb.

We do not challenge doctors’ personal judgements. All individuals must be free to make their own value judgements for their own lives, including doctors. However, doctors have a duty to inform patients of all appropriate treatments. When a patient requests abortion and the doctor has a moral objection to providing it, the doctor must refer the patient to another practitioner.5

Contrary to Gerber and Wenham’s claims, we did not suggest that “to abort the pregnancy and try again” is the only option for fetal abnormality. Abortion — or continuing the pregnancy — must be the woman’s decision.

One of us (L J d C) has 30 years’ experience of prenatal testing, including treating many women after terminations for fetal abnormality. Such women are sad about the diagnosis and outcome, extremely worried during subsequent pregnancies, and regret having had to make an awful decision. However, none have said that they made the wrong decision.

Regarding Gerber and Wenham’s comments about the definition of “child”, our position is that (before birth) the fetus does not have the rights of a child.7

The data we cited show that prenatal testing for Huntington disease “allows” at-risk women, who might otherwise choose not to conceive, to have children. Personal experience (of L J d C) shows that women with a past history of other serious fetal disorders are no different.

We did not suggest that late abortion should be available only in cases of life-threatening fetal abnormality. Indeed, our article clearly related to “pregnant women with fetal abnormalities” (not necessarily life-threatening). The claim that women would request late abortion simply because they don’t want a child demeans women’s integrity.

We need clear abortion laws so that pregnant women and their doctors can know when abortion is lawful. Developing clear laws necessitates removing the crime of child destruction.8