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Editorial

Monitoring drinking water: the receding zero

Testing is only one part of an overall preventive strategy to ensure high quality affordable drinking water

MJA 1999; 171: 397-398
For related article see Byleveld et al

Improvements in analytical methods now allow us to measure minute quantities of chemicals and microorganisms in water which a decade ago would have been undetectable. However, our understanding of the impact on public health of low-level exposures to these contaminants lags far behind the technological expertise which enables us to detect them. The rationale for testing drinking water needs to be placed in perspective with the more important aspects of overall system management and risk minimisation.

Testing of drinking water shares some similarities with laboratory testing in medicine. Before embarking on a testing regimen, the reliability of the testing method needs to be established, the purpose of the test should be clear, and there must be an adequate response plan to deal with the result. The mere fact that a particular test exists does not justify its use -- these three requirements must also be fulfilled.

Some critical factors in drinking water require continuous monitoring, as even temporary disruption can have major health consequences. An obvious example is monitoring of chlorine concentrations to ensure effective destruction of waterborne pathogens. Failure of chlorination systems is one of the more common causes of waterborne disease outbreaks.1

Also frequently monitored are levels of faecal coliform bacteria, which, although not pathogenic, are an early indication of faecal contamination. Increased levels provide a warning of failure in water treatment or a break in the integrity of the distribution system, or possible contamination with pathogens. Tests for faecal coliform bacteria are cheap, reliable, and rapid. High levels of faecal coliforms may indicate an elevated risk of waterborne gastroenteritis.2

Chemical contaminants in drinking water (eg, arsenic or pesticides) require considerably less frequent measurement, because exposure to the guideline level does not pose a significant health risk over a lifetime's consumption. These health guideline levels are very conservative and have built-in safety factors to compensate for limitations in scientific knowledge and variation in sensitivity among the exposed population.3

For all potential waterborne contaminants, including individual pathogens such as Cryptosporidium and Giardia, there is a great temptation to attempt to apply numerical limits. This is understandable: a numerical value is easily understood and compliance can be clearly judged by regulators and water authorities alike. However, as illustrated by the at times frenzied debate accompanying the water contamination episode in Sydney in 1998, some contaminants can not be equated with a meaningful health-based guideline value.4

Despite this, the United Kingdom government is pressing ahead with enforcing a numerical limit for Cryptosporidium in drinking water and daily monitoring of a large number of water supplies. The legislation will impose a legally enforceable maximum concentration of 10 oocysts/100 L for water supplies considered to be at risk of contamination.5 The presence of Cryptosporidium oocysts above this level will constitute a criminal offence, and could result in an unlimited fine. The impetus for this legislation is complex and relates to an inability under UK law to prosecute water authorities for outbreaks of waterborne cryptosporidiosis on the basis of epidemiological evidence.

It is estimated that the cost of testing treated drinking water for Cryptosporidium in the UK will be at least £8 million per year. It has been assumed that this improved management of drinking water treatment plants may prevent about 150 reported cases of waterborne cryptosporidiosis annually. Thus, the cost of preventing each reported case would be about £53 000.5 Reported cases probably represent about one-tenth of community cases,6 making the cost per community case prevented closer to £5300. These data illustrate the potentially enormous costs of water testing for individual pathogens, and the disproportionate cost-benefit relationships generated when arbitrary limits are imposed without regard for public health evidence.

Overemphasis on numerical guidelines also leads to compliance with "the numbers" becoming the primary focus of drinking water quality management. This simplistic interpretation disregards the proper and intended role of numerical guidelines as a basis for verifying the integrity of operational barriers and water treatment processes. Deviation from normal values may not necessarily constitute an immediate public health risk, but it signals a need to identify the cause and, if neccessary, intervene to restore operational control.

The Australian Drinking Water Guidelines drawn up by the National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) in 19963 recognise the primary importance of the multibarrier approach for minimising health risks in water supply systems, but there has been a recent tendency for this message to be overlooked by both regulators and water utilities. The Sydney contamination episode has had widespread repercussions in the Australian water industry, but one very positive outcome has been the recognition that a preventive risk management approach offers a better means of protecting public health than a reactive response centred around intensified testing of drinking water.

The current review of the 1996 NHMRC Australian Drinking Water Guidelines7 will consider expanding the existing elements of system management and integrating them into a comprehensive risk-based framework for water quality management, emphasing prevention rather than reaction. For example, improved management of agriculture and recreation in catchment areas will reduce the potential for contamination. This approach includes (i) systematic assessment of each water system from catchment to tap to identify hazards and prioritise risks specific to the system; (ii) establishment and documentation of effective operating procedures to define the processes and procedures for critical activities serving as barriers to contamination; and (iii) operational control measures and verification protocols to ensure that the barriers are functioning effectively.

This approach offers Australia a rational and cost-effective alternative to the excessively complex and costly regulatory systems in the United States and Europe. Routine water testing for a variety of chemical, physical and microbial parameters will remain important for operational monitoring and verification of system performance, but our drinking water supply will not be improved by measuring for measuring's sake. There needs to be a very clear rationale for testing drinking water and an understanding of what the result of each measurement means. Testing is only one part of an overall preventive strategy to ensure high quality drinking water at an affordable cost.

Christopher K Fairley
Head, Infectious Disease Epidemiology Unit

Martha I Sinclair
Senior Research Fellow

Samantha Rizak
Research Fellow
Cooperative Research Centre for Water Quality and Treatment
Department of Epidemiology and Preventive Medicine
Monash University, Monash Medical School, Alfred Hospital, Melbourne, VIC
christopher.fairleyATmed.monash.edu.au

  1. Surveillance for waterborne disease outbreaks -- United States, 1995-1996. MMWR Morb Mortal Wkly Rep 1998; 47(SS-5): 1-34.
  2. Indicator organisms and the coliform concept. In: Gleeson C, Gray N, editors. The coliform index and waterborne disease. London: E&FN Spon (Chapman & Hall), 1997: 38-59.
  3. National Water Quality Management Strategy: Australian Drinking Water Guidelines. National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC), Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and New Zealand (ARMCANZ). Canberra: NHMRC/ARMCANZ, 1996.
  4. Sinclair MI, Fairley CK, Hellard M. Protozoa in drinking water: is legislation the best answer? Med J Aust 1998; 169: 296-297.
  5. Public health and drinking water: preventing Cryptosporidium getting into public drinking water supplies. Consultation paper. London: Department of the Environment, Transport and the Regions; May 1998.
  6. Wheeler JG, Sethi D, Cowden JM, et al. Study of infectious intestinal disease in England: rates in the community, presenting to general practice, and reported to national surveillance. BMJ 1999; 318: 1046-1050.
  7. National Health and Medical Research Council (NHMRC) and Agriculture and Resource Management Council of Australia and New Zealand (ARMCANZ). National Water Quality Management Strategy. Revised Australian Drinking Water Guidelines. Draft -- July 1999. Available from: <http://www.nhmrc.health.gov.au/ advice/water.htm> (accessed 16 September 1999). No longer available, but see revised and updated version at http://www.health.gov.au/hfs/nhmrc/publicat/synopses/eh19syn.htm Accessed 10 May

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